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In 2002, Reginald Bibby surprisingly asserted that a renaissance of religion is, or soon 
will be taking place in Canada. However, the assertion clashes with the dominant belief based 
largely on Bibby‘s accumulated data about Canadians‘ religious beliefs and practices, that 
Canada is becoming an increasingly secularized society. 
Based on forty-two in-depth interviews, this dissertation tests the ―renaissance thesis‖ and 
improves our grasp of how Canadians subjectively understand their religious involvements by 
comparing the views of active religious affiliates (those who identify with a religious group and 
attend religious services nearly every week) and marginal religious affiliates (those who identify 
with a religious group and attend religious services primarily on Christmas or Easter, or for rites 
of passage such as weddings and funerals). What explains their higher and lower levels of 
religious involvement, what is the likelihood that marginal affiliates could eventually become 
active affiliates, and how does this understanding help us to assess the degree of religiosity or 
secularity in Canada?  
I argue that active and marginal affiliates are distinct mainly because of their different 
experiences with the supernatural or their local congregation, and the social influences that either 
encourage or discourage involvement in a religious group. These conclusions emerge from a 
close examination and testing of fundamental principles in Rational Choice Theory, a theory 
currently popular in the sociology of religion and in Bibby‘s ongoing analysis of religion in 
Canada.  
Contrary to Bibby‘s prediction, there is little reason to believe that marginal affiliates will 
eventually become active affiliates, regardless of changes to the supply of religion in Canada. In 
general, marginal affiliates appear content with their current levels of religiosity. As a result, I 
think it is likely that we will witness continued secularization at the individual level in Canada, 
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Religion in Canada: Setting the Landscape 
Introduction: Religious Renaissance? 
In this dissertation I draw on findings from forty-two in-depth interviews to address two 
questions pertinent to our current sociological understanding of religion (especially Christianity) 
in English Canada.1 First, what explains higher and lower levels of religious involvement in 
Canada? I tackle this simple yet surprisingly overlooked question by comparing how ―active 
religious affiliates‖ (those who identify with a religious group and attend religious services nearly 
every week) and ―marginal religious affiliates‖ (those who identify with a religious group and 
attend religious services primarily on Christmas or Easter, or for rites of passage such as 
weddings and funerals) understand their religious activities.
2
 Second, how are we to assess the 
degree of religiosity or secularity in Canada in light of active and marginal affiliates‘ religious 
beliefs, practices, and involvements? 
The need for such a study arises in response to Reginald Bibby‘s (2002) surprising 
assertion that a renaissance of religion is, or soon will take place in Canada. The claim clashes 
with the dominant belief based largely on Bibby‘s own data about Canadians‘ religious beliefs 
and practices, that Canada is becoming an increasingly secularized society. So why has Bibby 
seemingly changed his mind? The rationale behind his new view can be briefly summarized in 
terms of three basic points. 
                                                 
1 Unless stated otherwise, any reference to religion in Canada refers to Christianity in English Canada.   
2 My ―active‖ and ―marginal‖ religious affiliate categories build on these findings and distinctions, though I do not 
measure ―marginal religious affiliate‖ the same way that Bibby (2002 and 2004) does. He defines a ―marginal 
affiliate‖ as someone who attends bi-monthly or monthly and an ―inactive affiliate‖ as someone who attends less 
than monthly. I chose to collapse the terms ―marginal‖ and ―inactive‖ because individuals who attend once or twice a 
year are still somewhat involved and they do identify with a religious group. I more specifically state that  
―marginal‖ refers  to those who attend  for religious holidays and rites of passage, however, since this is the most 
common feature of those who attend less than monthly and who potentially desire more involvement in their 
religious group. 
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First, as Bibby has long demonstrated, there is ongoing evidence in Canada of widespread 
personal beliefs and practices relative to the sacred. Most Canadians continue to believe in a 
higher power, they pray with some degree of regularity, many claim to have experienced a 
supernatural entity, and many believe in life after death (among other indicators). Second, Bibby 
(2002: xii) alleges that ―organized religion is making something of a comeback, and that it is all 
to be expected.‖ He supports this claim by pointing to various statistics of increased or stabilized 
religious service attendance patterns among Roman Catholics, mainline Protestants, conservative 
Protestants, and those from non-Christian religious traditions. He also documents the many 
Canadians who consistently attend religious services for religious holidays and rites of passage 
each year. Third, among Canadians who attend religious services less than monthly, he argues 
there is evidence that many are open to greater involvement, if only religious groups would adjust 
the way that  religion is supplied or delivered (e.g., offer more relevant preaching or livelier 
music). Together, Bibby claims that the pieces are in place for a modest revival of religious 
groups in Canada as we unite in our spiritual and religious quests. 
Bibby has made an invaluable contribution to our knowledge of religion in Canada over 
the last several decades. However, I am a critic of the renaissance thesis. In Thiessen (2006) and 
Thiessen and Dawson (2008) I called Bibby‘s optimistic interpretation and forecast for religion in 
Canada into doubt on several counts (see Bibby 2008 for a response to these criticisms). First, as 
Bibby‘s own data reveals, Canadians‘ religious beliefs and practices were as fragmented in 2002 
as they were in 1987, when Bibby first (and correctly) suggested that fragmented beliefs and  
 
 3 
practices were indicative of individual secularization in Canada.
3
 Therefore, it was odd that 
Bibby was suddenly so optimistic in Restless Gods (2002) about the current and future state of 
religion in Canada. Second, Bibby‘s optimism relies heavily on the assertion that 55% of ―less 
than monthly‖ attenders desire greater involvement in their religious group, when in reality only 
15% actually indicated a definitive desire to do so. In fact, 40% said ―perhaps‖ they would be 
interested in more involvement. In combining these responses Bibby glosses over the ambiguity 
surrounding the ―perhaps‖ response. Do those who answered ―perhaps‖ really want more 
involvement and what would it take to make it happen? Even with those who did say ―yes‖ what 
was preventing them from pursuing further involvement? Had they tried to get more involved 
given the many religious options now available in Canada? The lack of meaningful answers to 
these questions led me to question whether Bibby‘s projection was overzealous. Third, Bibby‘s 
inconsistent and misleading use of numbers and percentages, such as showing numerical 
increases in membership or attendance figures, despite stable or decreasing percentages relative 
to the entire population, left the door open to multiple and competing interpretations. While in 
some cases Bibby emphasized the numerical increases to support the renaissance thesis, one 
could as easily note the decreasing percentages to refute the same argument. Many researchers 
would argue that the latter is the more accurate measurement to rely on (including Bibby, who 
made this very point in Fragmented Gods 1987: 13). Finally, even if the evidence for a religious 
renaissance was much stronger, are the results of three surveys in a ten-year span enough to 
refute the forty-year trend of religious decline in Canada, or do we need more time to test 
whether this renaissance is in fact a trend or just a blip on the graph of religious activity in 
                                                 
3 For example, high proportions of ―less than monthly‖ attenders continue to respond affirmatively to the following 
statement posed on Bibby‘s surveys: ―Some observers maintain that few people are actually abandoning their 
religious traditions. Rather, they draw selective beliefs and practices, even if they do not attend services frequently. 
They are not about to be recruited by other religious groups. Their identification with their religious tradition is fairly 
solidly fixed, and it is to these groups that they will turn when confronted with marriage, death and, frequently, birth. 
How well would you say this observation describes you?‖  
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Canada? With these and other reservations and questions in mind (see Thiessen 2006 and 
Thiessen and Dawson 2008), I could not logically or empirically agree with Bibby‘s conclusion 
that a religious renaissance is underway in Canada. More and different data were needed to 
resolve the issue.  
The Research Questions & Theoretical Context: The Approach   
 Some attempts have been made in Canada to distinguish between active and marginal 
affiliate attitudes and behaviours (see e.g., Bibby 2002; Bowen 2004), including suggestions that 
marginal affiliates could eventually turn into active affiliates (Bibby 2004). Yet as will be seen, 
analysis of existing quantitative data has resulted in inconclusive and competing interpretations 
about affiliates‘ current and potential future religious involvement. Surprisingly, little serious 
qualitative research has been undertaken to increase the precision and depth of our understanding 
of these findings. While quantitative data is certainly useful, qualitative data, especially when 
carried out in a comparative context, can help to fill in some of the gaps that standard survey 
results do not give the reader. To really make progress on the issues surrounding the renaissance 
thesis, Thiessen and Dawson (2008) called for in-depth qualitative interview data of the very 
participants who filled out Bibby‘s previous surveys. The rationale was that if I could speak with 
both occasional and regular attenders, those central to Bibby‘s renaissance conclusions, then 
maybe I could gain greater clarity and precision about the similarities and differences between 
their religious beliefs and practices. With this information in hand, I could also more effectively 
evaluate Bibby‘s religious renaissance thesis. This is what I did.  
Throughout this dissertation I capture the thoughts and feelings of those Canadians who 
graciously shared their stories and religious views with me. It is surprising that few if any 
scholars have pursued rich, textured, and detailed qualitative data and analysis about seemingly 
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basic facets of religious life in Canada. In the Weberian spirit of understanding people from their 
own perspective, an idea later developed by symbolic interactionists, I ask what do we really 
know about why Canadians attend religious services or why they believe in a supernatural being? 
I would argue that we do not actually know much. This is troubling, especially when we look to 
our southern neighbours and their rich balance of quantitative and qualitative research in the 
sociology of religion. Therefore, with the underlying objective of further testing Bibby‘s 
renaissance thesis, this dissertation draws on interview data with active and marginal religious 
affiliates to better explain what accounts for higher and lower levels of religious involvement in 
Canada. 
I begin this process in chapter two where I provide six vignettes of individuals that I 
interviewed, to improve our grasp of how active and marginal affiliates understand their religious 
involvements. What are the similarities and differences between these two groups in terms of 
their actual religious beliefs and practices, and the meanings that they attach to those beliefs and 
practices? Although no two individuals share the exact same religious history or possible 
trajectory, the vignettes begin to elucidate the major similarities and differences that are common 
to many of the active and marginal affiliates that I interviewed. These stories are the basis for the 
remaining data description and analysis in the dissertation.    
One of the ways that scholars, including Bibby (1987, 1993, 2002), have attempted to 
understand different levels of commitment to social organizations, particularly religious ones, is 
by applying ―rational-choice‖ theory (see e.g., Stark and Finke 2000). This theory is the basis of 
discussion in chapter three and four. My data collection and analysis centers on the latest and 
most refined presentation of the theory as found in Stark and Finke‘s Acts of Faith (2000). In 
particular, I focus on their bold conclusions about religious costs and rewards, religious supply 
and demand, as well as the social nature of religion. For instance, they posit that people make 
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religious decisions in the same way that they make other life decisions, by weighing costs and 
rewards and that humans, when looking for religious rewards, will seek to enter extended, 
expensive, and exclusive exchange relationships with the gods if the gods are believed to be 
dependable, responsive, and of great scope (Stark and Finke 2000: 96-102, 144). These technical 
terms are specific to rational choice theory and are conceptualized in the following way: humans 
will make periodic ―payments‖ over a long period of time, incur significant material, social, or 
psychic costs, and make exchanges with god(s) only if they believe that the god(s) can be trusted 
to keep their word with humans, if the god(s) are concerned about and act on behalf of humans, 
and if the god(s) possess a diverse array of powers and range of influences with which to meet 
human needs. Put another way, if individuals believe the gods have been faithful and responsive 
to their expectations in the past, they are more likely and willing to pay higher costs in 
anticipation of receiving certain religious rewards. If someone prays for healing, whether or not 
they were healed will influence the likelihood that they will pray for healing again in the future. 
While Stark and Finke might be correct, we lack concrete empirical data. How exactly do active 
and marginal affiliates make sense of the religious rewards that they are pursuing (both this-
world and other-world rewards) and the religious costs involved in obtaining those rewards, and 
how do past results influence current and future religious decision-making processes? What 
possible disadvantages, if any, might a rational actor consider when deciding their level of 
involvement in a religious group? These basic questions need to be asked and addressed with 
some directly relevant empirical data.  
Stark and Finke also make assumptions about the relationship between the ―supply‖ and 
―demand‖ side of religion, a relevant theme to this project given Bibby‘s market-model approach 
to studying religion. They posit that there is an ongoing ―demand‖ for religion and the 
supernatural, and that individuals participate in religious groups primarily because they seek to 
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make exchanges with the gods. The supply-side exists to motivate and sustain individuals‘ high 
levels of religious commitment, and in doing so the suppliers of religious goods and services are 
thought to have substantial power to change people‘s religious preferences. There are problems 
with this argument however. How do we know that people have an inexhaustible demand for 
rewards that only religion provides or that people turn to religious groups primarily for religious 
reasons? How confident can we be in the assertion that differences in the supply of religion are 
the primary ―pull‖ in motivating people to commit their time and energy to a religious 
organization? Alternatively, is it possible that individuals disregard a religious group‘s efforts to 
instil higher levels of religious interest and commitment, relying more on their own reasons to 
motivate and sustain their religious commitments? With respect to religious preferences, what if 
we explored the hypothesis that individuals determine their religious preferences and 
communicate such preferences either by increasing, maintaining, or limiting their involvement in 
their religious group? In other words, regardless of what religious groups do, individuals set their 
religious preferences and act accordingly. These questions also need to be approached with first-
hand empirical data.   
In a related manner, rational choice theorists posit that the supply-demand relationship is 
influenced by religious consumers‘ social ties. An individual‘s propensity to adopt certain beliefs 
and practices is directly related to how those around them think and behave, and the stronger 
those ties to a religious group are, the greater confidence one has in religious explanations. From 
a sociological perspective this reasoning makes sense. Logic would suggest that marginal 
affiliates, given their relatively low level of participation in their religious group, have a lower 
level of confidence in religious explanations when compared with active affiliates. However, 
Heelas and Woodhead‘s (2005) recent findings indicate that those with limited involvement in a 
religious group are quite confident in the religious and spiritual explanations that they retain. But 
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how do we ultimately know whether Stark and Finke or Heelas and Woodhead are correct? Is it 
true, as Stark and Finke propose, and Bruce (2002) agrees,
4
 that an individual‘s confidence in 
religious explanations is strengthened when others express confidence in them, when individuals 
participate in religious rituals, and when people conserve their social (i.e., interpersonal ties, 
especially with others who share a similar religious worldview) and religious (i.e., mastery of and 
attachment to a specific religious culture) capital?5 If this is the case, then to what degree and 
how precisely is this the case? 
In chapter‘s three and four I explore the ―rational-choice‖ approach to studying religion, 
concentrating on the above questions regarding religious costs and rewards, religious supply and 
demand, as well as the social nature of religion. What are the main premises behind rational-
choice theory, what are some of the criticisms of it, and how does the data from this study test 
this theory and further our understanding of the similarities and differences between active and 
marginal religious affiliates? My analysis, as will be seen, is largely premised on the belief that 
we need to focus more intently on the ―demand‖ side of the religious equation than rational 
choice theorists are inclined to do. In the end, a ―demand‖ side focus lends itself particularly well 
to working out the differences between active and marginal affiliates, and to assessing whether 
marginal affiliates are truly open to greater involvement in their religious group.   
Alongside rational choice theory, Reginald Bibby‘s work on religion in Canada is situated 
in another current (and strongly related) debate in the sociology of religion, secularization (e.g., 
Berger 1967; Bruce 2002; Casanova 1994; Luckmann 1967; Martin 1978; Stark 1999; Wilson 
1982). As I will demonstrate in chapter‘s five and six, the way in which the questions about 
                                                 
4 Steve Bruce argues that religious beliefs and practices which are detached from regular involvement in religious 
organizations cannot be sustained because they lack the social structures necessary for reinforcement.  
5 Readers should take note of these definitions of ―social capital‖ and ―religious capital,‖ as I repeatedly use these 
technical terms common to Rational Choice Theory throughout the dissertation.  
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rational choice theory are resolved will influence how a person evaluates whether or not Canada 
is or soon will experience a religious renaissance, or if some variation of the secularization 
narrative is more appropriate for describing the state of religion in Canada. As just one example 
to illustrate the complexity of this matter, if people claim to attend religious services mainly for 
non-religious reasons, how should we evaluate the strength of religion in Canada? Should we 
reject the secularization narrative because people are attending, or should we accept the 
secularization narrative because people attend church for non-religious reasons? 
When we think about the topic of secularization in a larger context, many researchers 
agree that the United States is the most religious nation in the industrialized world, while many 
Western European nations are the least, as defined by belief in God and attendance at religious 
services (e.g., Bruce 1999, 2002; Davie 1994; Finke and Stark 2005). The picture in Canada is 
less clear. Quantitative studies consistently reveal that regular attendance at religious services and 
religious institutions‘ social influence has decreased significantly over the last fifty years (e.g., 
Bibby 1987 and 1993; Bowen 2004; Lyon and Van Die 2000). Yet there is enduring evidence 
that Canadians are privately ―spiritual‖ (see, e.g., Bibby 2002; Emberley 2002; Rawlyk 1996). 
High proportions of Canadians, for example, continue to pray in private, to believe in a 
supernatural entity, to identify with a religious group, and to attend religious services for rites of 
passage and religious holidays (Bibby 1987, 1993, 2002, 2006). Moreover, as indicated earlier, 
some marginal affiliates indicate their potential willingness to become more involved in their 
religious group (Bibby 2002, 2004). So, is Canada more like the United States or Europe?   
Two interpretations have emerged from the data. Bibby (2002, 2006) argues that the 
many Canadians who still identify with a religious tradition and attend religious services at least 
a few times a year are proof that organized religion remains important in Canada. He notes that 
many Canadians who are marginally involved in religious groups are open to greater 
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participation, if only the groups would better meet certain ministry, organizational, and personal 
needs. For example, religious groups need to help individuals feel loved, connected, and cared for 
in a community. They also need to offer more relevant preaching, music, and programs. 
Moreover, they should attempt to be more inclusive along moral, ethical, and theological lines 
(e.g., on issues of birth control, abortion, or women in leadership) (Bibby 2002: 220-222). 
Accordingly, he has advised religious organizations to target these marginal affiliates to increase 
the ranks of their active members (Bibby 2004). For Bibby the degree of importance that 
individuals attribute to religion is thus defined broadly, and is not necessarily connected to their 
level of commitment. Any level of involvement signals the pervasiveness of religion. His 
hypothesis is essentially that despite lower levels of involvement, marginal affiliates award high 
levels of importance to their religion and religious organization.    
Conversely, Steve Bruce (1999, 2002) and Kurt Bowen (2004) argue that people should 
not read too much into these marginal religious attachments because they speak more to the 
decreasing importance of religion than to its survival or chance for revival. They contend that 
private spirituality has little impact on most people‘s daily life in modern Western societies and 
that it will eventually disappear without reinforcing social structures in place. Consequently, 
Bruce and Bowen define religious involvement narrowly; an individual‘s beliefs and practices 
need to be supported by some form of religious community to remain salient. Their hypothesis is 
that marginal affiliates do not award a high level of importance to their religion or religious 
organization.    
In some respects both of these positions make sense, but the trouble is that they arrive at 
very different conclusions based on similar quantitative data. This theoretical dilemma can be 
resolved, in part, by addressing the underlying methodological limitations of evaluating the 
secularization thesis with primarily quantitative data. Instead, and as I have done here, we need to 
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ask Canadians through in-depth interviews to explain how they understand their religious 
involvement and what meaning they attach to their religious attitudes and behaviours (this is 
especially important among marginal affiliates who selectively turn to their religious group to 
meet certain needs). For example, what does commitment to a religion or religious organization 
mean for both active and marginal affiliates? What factors, motivations, costs, and benefits are 
associated with high or low levels of involvement? Do affiliates even make a connection between 
religious ―costs‖ and ―benefits‖ and their own religious involvement?  If they do, how is the 
connection made, and so on? For marginal affiliates, what does occasional participation mean to 
them? Why do they continue to attend for religious holidays and rites of passage? More than this, 
what factors or barriers do they think stand in the way of greater involvement? Have they done 
anything to overcome these barriers, and if so, what? By asking these types of questions, we see 
the usefulness of testing rational choice propositions as a way to evaluate the secularization thesis 
in Canada, while also advancing our comparisons of active and marginal affiliates.  
Against the backdrop of Bibby‘s renaissance thesis, I use chapter‘s five and six to 
examine questions about secularization. In chapter five I summarize several key theorists‘ 
perspectives for and against the secularization thesis, and in chapter six I test and apply some of 
these theories with the data from this study. My argument will be that, in contrast to Bibby‘s 
optimism for a religious resurgence, particularly among marginal affiliates, we should not 
anticipate a religious renaissance anytime soon. In fact, we should expect to witness ongoing 
secularization in Canada, particularly at the level of individual belief and church attendance. 
In the final chapter I summarize some of the major similarities and differences between 
the active and marginal affiliates in this study. Based on these comparisons, and my general 
conclusion that we should expect further secularization at the individual level, I enter a brief 
discussion about the possible implications for civic engagement in Canada. I do so to position 
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this study in the growing and recent conversation about the intersection between individual 
religious belief and practice and civic engagement (see e.g., Bibby 2007; Bowen 2004; Dillon 
and Wink 2007; Putnam 2000; Smith and Snell 2009; Stanczak 2006; Zuckerman 2008). I 
conclude the dissertation by following Bibby‘s (2004) lead (and others such as Smith and Denton 
2005 or Wuthnow 2005, 2007) and offering a series of recommendations for Canadian church 
leaders in light of my findings in this project. 
The Data 
Given the centrality of Bibby‘s research to the sociological study of religion in Canada, I 
approached him with a request to interview a subsample of active and marginal religious 
affiliates in the Calgary region from his latest 2005 national survey sample. Bibby generously 
agreed to assist. I additionally relied upon a snowball sample of participants, initiated by those 
from Bibby‘s sample who participated in my research.  
There were three advantages to recruiting participants from Bibby‘s sample. First, 
drawing qualitative data from an existing representative sample alleviated some of the strains of 
snowball sampling and screening eligible participants. While I ended up relying on snowball 
sampling, the effort needed to begin this process was reduced thanks to Bibby‘s sample. Second, 
since some of these individuals had already taken part in Bibby‘s study, this enhanced their 
willingness to contribute again. Third, this sampling strategy allowed for triangulation of findings 
with existing quantitative data as well as for a research dialogue with the leading sociologist of 
religion in Canada. This has in fact already started (see Thiessen and Dawson 2008; Bibby 2008), 
and hopefully will continue. 
Calgary was an advantageous location to gather data for several reasons. First, Bibby‘s 
2005 national sample included a Centennial Year oversampling of Albertans. Compared to other 
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locations therefore, the likelihood of recruiting the desired target sample was enhanced. Second, 
Albertans score close to the national average for measurements of both active and marginal 
religious affiliates (see Bowen 2004: 54-55). This does not mean my small sample is statistically 
representative on a national scale, but it does help to reduce the likelihood of skewed results. 
Finally, as I live in Calgary, this was a time and cost effective way of conducting this research.  
 Some background information about Bibby‘s sample is useful at this point.6 Bibby‘s 2005 
sample includes 2,400 participants (weighted down to a representative sample of 1,600 cases) 
that allows accurate generalizations to be made about Canadians within about 2.5 percentage 
points 19 times out of 20. Of this national sample, 625 Albertans completed the self-administered 
survey, including 200 in Calgary, 194 in Edmonton, 87 in communities between 10,000 and 
99,999 in size, and 144 from communities with less than 10,000 people.  
By way of context, approximately 80% of Albertan respondents in Bibby‘s sample 
identify with a Christian religious group, 17% do not identify with any religious group, and the 
remaining identify with an ―other‖ religious group (e.g., Islam, Judaism, Buddhism).
7
 Of the 625 
Albertans sampled, 165 (27%) are active affiliates, 387 (63%) are marginal affiliates, and the 
remaining participants are not weekly attenders, but are present at least once a month. Of the 387 
marginal affiliates, 83 (21%) say that they are ―definitely‖ open to greater involvement in their 
religious group, 131 (34%) say that they are ―perhaps‖ open to greater involvement, 119 (31%) 
reveal that they are not open to greater involvement, and 54 (14%) did not indicate whether or not 
they are open to greater involvement.  
                                                 
6 Personal communication with Bibby – August 2007.  
7 A 2001 Statistics Canada report shows that 39% of the province‘s population identifies as Protestant, 26% identify 
as Roman Catholic, 23% claim to have ―no religion,‖ and the rest classify as Christian Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, 
Buddhist, Hindu, or Sikh.  
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Narrowing these figures down to the 200 Calgarians who were surveyed, about 74% 
identify with a Christian religious group, 22% do not identify with a religious group, and the 
remaining 4% identify with an ―other‖ religious group.8 Fifty respondents (25%) are active 
affiliates, 131 (67%) are marginal affiliates, and the remaining participants attend less than 
weekly, but attend at least once a month. Of the 131 marginal affiliates, all of whom are included 
in the targeted sampling, 24 (18%) say that they are ―definitely‖ open to greater involvement in 
their religious group, 42 (32%) say that they are ―perhaps‖ open to greater involvement, 44 (34%) 
indicate that they are not open to greater involvement, and 21 (16%) did not indicate whether or 
not they are open to greater involvement. 
In terms of my sample, Bibby made initial contact with 160 of 200 in the Calgary region 
who participated in his 2005 survey (addresses were only available for this number).
9
 This 
contact consisted of a letter of invitation by Bibby along with a formal participant recruitment 
letter from me that outlined the nature of this project and what their participation would entail 
(see ―Appendix C‖ and ―Appendix D‖). After initial contact was made with participants, those 
who wished to participate (nine in total) contacted me directly, via telephone or email. Some 
participants that I interviewed from Bibby‘s sample then referred others to participate. While it 
would have been ideal for every participant in this project to have also participated in Bibby‘s 
survey, in no way does this jeopardize my ability to assess Bibby‘s research and data. In the end I 
am still dealing with active and marginal religious affiliates.     
Between May 2008 and July 2009, I conducted forty-two interviews, including twenty-
one active affiliates and twenty-one marginal affiliates. With the exception of two interviews that 
                                                 
8 According to a 2001 Statistics Canada report, 35% of Calgarians identify as Protestant, 26% are Roman Catholic, 
25% have ―no religion,‖ and the remaining are Christian Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, or Sikh.   
9 To maintain confidentiality Bibby did not provide me with the contact information for participants, hence he made 
the initial contact.  
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occurred over the telephone (to accommodate their schedules), all interviews were face-to-face 
and typically took place in coffee shops, people‘s homes, or places of employment. Although no 
official incentive was offered for their participation, participants were offered a meal or snack, 
and drink during the interview. Participants were required to sign a consent form prior to the 
interview, or in the case of the telephone interviews, give verbal consent to the terms of the 
interview (see ―Appendix F‖). They were also given the opportunity to ask any questions that 
they had about the project, or their involvement, before and after the interview. The interviews 
lasted 72 minutes on average, and ranged from 42 to 108 minutes long. All interviews were 
digitally recorded and then transcribed, and detailed field notes were taken during the interviews. 
Given the nature of qualitative research, new themes emerged in the interviews that warranted 
additional contact with the first eleven participants. These conversations took place either over 
the telephone or email, and I documented their responses in field notes or email records. 
Of the 42 people interviewed, there are 23 males and 19 females. Fourteen are between 
the ages of 18-34, fifteen between 35 and 54, and thirteen are 55 or older. Ten individuals are 
single, one is engaged to be married, 19 are in their first marriage, 4 are in their second marriage, 
4 are divorced, and another 4 are widowed. In terms of completed education, four people did not 
finish high school, 4 did not pursue education beyond their high school graduation, 5 have a 
diploma or certificate, 8 have some college or university training (including three people who did 
not complete high school), 18 possess a Bachelor‘s degree, 4 hold a Master‘s degree, and two 
have Doctorate degrees. Thirteen identify as Roman Catholic, eleven are part of mainline 
Protestant groups, ten associate with an evangelical Protestant tradition, and eight are part of a 
non-denominational tradition or do not pledge allegiance to any single stream of Christianity (see 
―Appendix A‖ for a comparative chart based on these demographics).  
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Throughout the interview process I used NVivo 8, a qualitative data software package, to 
sort, organize, code, and analyze the data. As several scholars have indicated recently (Dohan and 
Sanchez-Janowski 1998; Hesse-Biber 2004; Miles and Huberman 1994), computer software is 
extremely helpful for clearly and logically coding mass amounts of qualitative data, without 
diminishing the role of the researcher to code the data. As is customary practice when coding 
qualitative data, I coded and analyzed the data throughout the data collection process, oscillating 
between data collection and analysis. My initial objective when coding was to identify categories 
and subcategories that intersected with this project‘s overarching theoretical interests, such as 
comparisons between active and marginal affiliates, rational choice theory, and secularization 
theory (see ―Appendix E‖). Still, building on a grounded theory approach (Charmaz 2004; 
Strauss and Corbin 1998), I also wanted to identify recurring patterns that emerged from the data, 
ones that were not initially central to this study. Thus, in the ―first cycle‖ (Saldaña 2009) or 
―open coding‖ (Strauss and Corbin 1998) phase of the coding process I identified major 
overarching categories in the data (e.g., religious upbringing or secularization). With every 
additional cycle of coding, I coded and re-coded, analyzed and re-analyzed earlier transcripts in 
light of discoveries from later interviews, resulting in several major (new and revised) headings 
and subcategories (e.g., different reasons for declining religious involvement or the potential 
desire for greater involvement in their religious group).10 During the coding process I also created 
―analytic memos‖ (Charmaz 2004; Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995; Miles and Huberman 1994; 
Saldaña 2009; Strauss and Corbin 1998) to connect the data with the literature, to hypothesize 
about relationships between the data, to compare between active and marginal affiliates, and 
those with different denominational ties, and to document new research questions that arose from 
                                                 
10 This process is sometimes referred to as ―focused coding,‖ where the researcher goes back through all transcripts 




 Once all of the data was coded in NVivo, I tabulated the number of responses that 
corresponded with the codes that I created. For example, if the main category was ―reasons why 
marginal affiliates attend religious services when they do,‖ and they offered six different reasons, 
I documented how many individuals cited each reason. My purpose for doing this was to give a 
clearer sense of just how many people believe or practice certain things. With respect to coding 
reliability, I relied on my supervisor, a fellow graduate student, and everyday conversations to 
test whether or not my coding and analysis ―made sense.‖          
There were several advantages to interviewing individuals to address the research 
questions at hand. In contrast to quantitative data, interviews tackle ―why‖ and ―how‖ questions 
(as opposed to ―what‖ questions), and examine the processes behind religious affiliates‘ religious 
decisions
12
 (see Duneier 2006: 686; Espeland 2005: 3; Goodwin and Horowitz 2002: 36; Lamont 
2005: 2; Ragin 1987). Approaching the research questions this way yielded comparative insights 
into the similarities and differences between religious affiliates. Theoretically, these comparisons 
build on Bibby‘s ongoing descriptive comparisons, but as mentioned before, these comparisons 
uniquely address why people‘s level of involvement in their religious groups converge and 
diverge as they do. Put simply, these comparisons add the needed depth and context that is 
currently missing in quantitative research. Moreover, these comparisons enable me to directly test 
the competing theories about secularization in Canada, ones that are largely based on quantitative 
data and analyses.  
                                                 
11 Inherent in this coding process are the many stages of coding that Strauss and Corbin (1998) refer to, including 
axial coding, selective coding, process coding, conditional and consequential coding, and theoretical sampling.  
12 For example, what factors contribute to people‘s ongoing involvement, decreased involvement, or desire for 
greater involvement in their religious group? Are these local congregational factors? Denominational factors? Family 
factors? Cultural factors? Employment factors? A specific event in life? Further, why are marginal affiliates not 
responding with greater involvement when some religious groups are seemingly changing to meet marginal affiliate 
demands? 
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Methodologically, the decision to compare between groups, as opposed to interviewing 
only active or marginal affiliates, is logical because it ensures that I do not incorrectly isolate 
marginal affiliates‘ attitudes or behaviours, for example, when in fact they are common among 
both active and marginal affiliates. By not confusing trait ―x‖ among active affiliates with trait 
―y‖ among marginal affiliates, this project is designed with high construct and internal validity in 
mind (see Yin 2003: 34).  
More than this, when discussing why marginal affiliates turn to religious groups for rites 
of passage or religious holidays, our current understanding is based on how religious leaders 
interpret the situation (see Bibby 1993: 147-151), but not on how Canadians define it for 
themselves. It appears obvious, therefore, that we need to ask Canadians directly about their 
religious involvement. 
The exploratory nature of this project is aided with in-depth interviews because this 
method, in addition to its usefulness for testing existing theories, is ideally premised on creating 
space for new and unanticipated theoretical categories to emerge from the data (a feature that is 
not as common in survey research) (see Goodwin and Horowitz 2002: 37; Johnson 2002: 112-13; 
Strauss and Corbin 1998). This occurs as participants openly discuss a variety of topics that are 
not limited by the interviewer‘s questions, as opposed to survey research where participants are 
restricted in what they communicate based on the fixed questions and answers provided. On one 
hand this project is framed to contribute to existing discussions about active and marginal 
religious affiliates, rational-choice theory, and secularization theory. On the other hand, new 
themes, such as the role of tradition or sacred space, emerged early in the data collection process 
that helped to shape the type of questions asked later in the data collection process (and 
consequently inspired me to go back and ask initial participants additional questions based on 
later discoveries).  
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Finally, this project makes use of data, investigator, and theoretical triangulation (see Yin 
2003: 98-99). Beginning with data triangulation, I compare the qualitative data from this study 
with the original quantitative data that prompted this project in the first place. How does this 
qualitative data clarify, challenge, or confirm existing numerical findings? In terms of 
investigator triangulation, while this is technically a ―solo‖ project, I have relied on committee 
members and fellow academics to help make sense of the themes and possible interpretations 
from the data. As mentioned earlier, theoretical triangulation consists of corroborating or 
challenging existing theories alongside proposing new theories that arise from the data (see 
Espeland 2005; Jick 1979). 
Reflexive Positioning 
Part of the art of qualitative research is combing through massive amounts of data and 
distilling a narrative that aptly reflects those interviewed, in order to yield theoretically 
significant findings. I agree with those (see e.g., Altheide and Johnson 1998; Denzin 1990; 
Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995; Prus 1996; Richer 1988) who suggest that this process is an 
intersubjective one, whereby the researcher is a co-producer of the data with the participant. The 
participant produces the data by answering a series of questions, and the researcher contributes 
through note-taking, coding and analyzing the data, as well as filtering the essential findings for 
the readers. This is important because both researchers and participants‘ biases are at play in all 
forms of social scientific research, and shape the historical and cultural lens through which 
something is studied and interpreted. All through this dissertation participants‘ biases and 
worldviews are presented, each contributing to our knowledge of religion in Canada. In his 
introduction to Identity and the Sacred (1976: x), Hans Mol declares: ―it is becoming a habit of 
scholars in the sociology of religion to present an autobiographical account of their ideologies in 
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introductions. I think it is a good habit. It helps readers to understand (and explain away, if they 
so desire) whatever pro- or anti-religious biases they encounter.‖ As a co-producer of the 
knowledge presented here, it is only fitting that I take a brief moment to reflexively position 
myself.  
I write as a devout Christian who was socialized (and still practices) in the evangelical 
Protestant tradition. Growing up as a preacher‘s son, I was exposed to the many elements of 
religious organizations. I learned about the politics, the leadership roles, the missions and visions, 
and the strategies for evangelism in religious organizations. Moreover, I have been and currently 
am involved in various leadership positions in the local church and I am a sociology Professor at 
Ambrose University College, an evangelical liberal arts university in Calgary, Alberta. Although 
I do not claim to be even a lay theologian, I am deeply interested in how Christians and other 
religious groups live out their beliefs in the context of Canadian society. On the one hand, this 
interest has come out of a personal dissatisfaction with the personal piety, or lack thereof, of 
some who attend weekly religious services. Many weekly attenders seem to struggle to live out 
their faith during the days between weekly religious services. On the other hand, as one who is 
committed to an organized religious group, I am concerned about the significant decline in 
weekly attenders since the 1950s. I have not personally witnessed the renaissance of religion that 
Bibby speaks of so confidently. However, lack of involvement in religious organizations is not 
only disconcerting to me as a practicing member of a religious group; it also concerns me as a 
member of Canadian society. What are the implications for Canadian society if fewer people are 
involved in religious organizations, or adopt a set of religious beliefs and practices? 
The application of data, investigator, and theoretical triangulation is intended to alleviate 
any fears that these biases might cloud my ability to look fairly and objectively at the data 
gathered. In the end, I am confident that the findings are a fair and balanced reflection of an 
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untold aspect of religious life in Canada today. Hopefully the reader arrives at a similar 
conclusion.    
 22 
Chapter 2 
Converging and Diverging: Six Active and Marginal Affiliate Vignettes 
Introduction 
Drawing on six vignettes from those that I interviewed, my primary goal in this chapter is 
to outline some of the central similarities and differences between the active and marginal 
affiliates in my sample. My purpose for documenting these stories is twofold. First, they 
introduce the reader to the central people and themes at the core of this dissertation. The stories 
that I present mirror the beliefs, behaviours, and experiences common to many others that I 
interviewed. While these observations may resonate with many active and marginal affiliates 
across Canada, further empirical research is clearly needed to test these findings further. Second, 
these accounts will become the basis for testing and applying rational choice theory and 
secularization theory in later chapters, advancing my chief objective to understand what explains 
higher and lower levels of religious involvement in Canada. 
Mindful that active and marginal affiliates are not homogeneous groups, my secondary 
task in this chapter is to highlight some distinct elements within the active affiliate camp, between 
those raised in a religious home and who remain actively religious, those raised in a religious 
home but abandoned their religious faith for a time before resuming active involvement in a 
church, and those without a religious upbringing who are now actively involved in a religious 
group. We will also see differences within the marginal affiliate group, between those not raised 
in a religious home yet attend mainly for religious holidays and rites of passage today, those who 
attended religious services regularly when growing up and attend primarily for religious holidays 
and rites of passages today, and those who attend religious services mainly when invited to 
another‘s rite of passage or for the occasional religious holiday. In addition, the following stories 
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shed some light on similarities and differences between Roman Catholics, mainline Protestants, 
and evangelical Protestants.  
Admittedly, one of the central and difficult tasks for sociologists is to make complex sets 
of data comprehensible for others. Typically, sociologists navigate their way through data 
analysis by creating distinct categories into which they organize individuals, their attitudes, and 
behaviours. Sometimes this is a straightforward process that can be effective. Other times real life 
is too complex and people‘s lives cannot be reduced to compartmentalized categories. In studying 
Canadian religion, sociologists have categorized national levels of religiosity in several ways, in 
the process drawing on different measurement frameworks. For instance, Acadia University 
sociologist Kurt Bowen (2004: 44) identifies four religious groups. The ―very committed‖ attend 
religious services weekly, define themselves as religious, and say that religion is important to 
their lives. The ―less committed‖ attend religious services one to three times a month and claim 
religion is not important to them. ―Seekers‖ indicate that religion is important in their lives, but 
rarely or never attend religious services. The ―non-religious‖ rarely or never attend religious 
services and assert that religion is not important to them.  
Chief researcher at Angus Reid Strategies, Andrew Grenville (2000: 217-221) identifies 
three groups: ―churchgoers,‖ ―private believers,‖ and ―nominal and non-Christians.‖ Each of 
these groups has sub-categories. Among churchgoers there are the ―church-centered.‖  They 
attend religious services at least weekly, claim that church doctrine is more important than their 
personal beliefs, engage in various private devotions, and hold orthodox beliefs. ―Privatistic 
churchgoers‖ are similar to the previous group except they claim that private beliefs are more 
important than their church‘s doctrines. Within the private believers camp, Grenville identifies 
―independent believers‖ who do not think that attending church is a necessary condition of being 
a ―good‖ Christian. In the ―occasional Christians‖ group, we find those who attend church, pray, 
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or read religious material a few times a year and claim that religion is important for guiding how 
they should live. In the final grouping of nominal and non-Christians, Grenville introduces the 
―private theists,‖ those who do not think religion is important to their lives or attend religious 
services, but they pray on occasion and maintain some level of belief in God. Rounding out this 
group are ―atheists and agnostics‖ who do not generally believe in a god or participate in any 
religious activities. 
Over the course of his career Reginald Bibby has introduced readers to a range of 
categories, beginning with his distinction between the ―committed‖ and ―uncommitted‖ in 
Fragmented Gods (1987: 62-85). The ―committed‖ believe in God, the divinity of Jesus, and life 
after death. They pray on occasion, claim to have experienced God‘s presence, and know who 
denied Jesus. The ―uncommitted‖ adopt religious beliefs and practices in fragments or do not 
believe or practice at all. In Unknown Gods (1993: 170), he expanded these categories to include 
―active affiliates‖ (people who identify with a religious tradition and attend religious services 
nearly every week or more), ―marginal affiliates‖ (who identify with a religious tradition and 
attend from two to three times a month to many times annually), ―inactive affiliates‖ (who 
identify with a religious tradition and attend once a year or less), ―disaffiliates‖ (who do not 
identify with a religious tradition, attend less than yearly, and their parents identify with a 
religious tradition), and ―non-affiliates‖ (where neither they nor their parents identify with a 
religious tradition and they attend less than yearly). In Restless Gods (2002: 47-49) and Restless 
Churches (2004: 62-63), Bibby modified his definition of ―marginal affiliates‖ to include those 
 25 




The reason for presenting these different categories is to illustrate the methodological 
challenge that sociologists face when categorizing and labelling respondents. As we can see, it is 
difficult to provide measurements, analysis, and conclusions that are consistent, accurate, and 
comparable with one‘s own studies and others‘ findings. Some categories contain only a couple 
of measures as their criterion, while others include five or six indicators. This is problematic for 
the sociological study of religion in Canada and elsewhere.  
These limitations are magnified when we consider the driving emphasis on quantitative 
research in the sociology of religion in Canada, at least when it comes to studying Christianity 
(Reimer 2008). This methodology fails to capture the depth of information that is needed to better 
understand questions about religion in which sociologists are interested. For instance, what does 
it mean when a person says that religion is important to them? Is this a sign that religion remains 
salient for individuals, as Bibby (2002) suggests, or that it matters little if unaccompanied by 
religious practices such as church attendance, as Bowen (2004) argues? Unfortunately, 
quantitative data does not provide us with such answers. As a result sociologists of religion reach 
competing conclusions about similar data, or they unsuccessfully design survey instruments 
intended to measure the same concept (i.e., secularization), that in the end leave them with 
ambiguous data and interpretations.2  
As a way to possibly resolve this problem, it has been suggested that researchers should 
include more, rather than less, measures and make them consistent when differentiating groups of 
                                                 
1 I could mention countless others to illustrate the many ways to organize, categorize, and differentiate between key 
religious indicators among populations (see e.g., Finke and Stark 2005; Heelas and Woodhead 2005; Rawlyk 1996; 
Reimer 2003; Roof 1999; Smith and Denton 2005; Smith and Snell 2009; Stark and Finke 2000; Wuthnow 2007). 
2 As we will see in chapter five, the contemporary debate over secularization between Steve Bruce and Rodney Stark 
or Reginald Bibby and Kurt Bowen, for example, is clear evidence of this problem. These conflicts are rooted not 
just in deeper theoretical positions, but also in methodological decisions and interpretations.  
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people based on religiosity levels (Thiessen and Dawson 2008: 407). This is because more 
indicators give the reader more and precise information about respondents‘ attitudes and 
behaviours, which in turn lends itself to more well-rounded and informed data interpretations. 
After going through the process of gathering first-hand interview data, and coding and analyzing 
the volume of information that participants shared, I see the challenges of such an endeavour. 
Finding individuals who share the exact same five or six characteristics in terms of religious 
beliefs and practices is difficult, though not impossible. Consequently, though I still favour 
demarcating groups with more rather than less measures, it is pragmatic to follow Bibby‘s lead to 
distinguish active and marginal affiliates, based solely on their identification status with a 
religious group and their frequency of religious attendance. We will see, however, that there are 
several other traits common to active and marginal affiliates that help us to understand these two 
groups better. Not only this, but after interviewing and analyzing active affiliates, it became clear 
that they vary in terms of religious upbringing and in their differing liberal and conservative 
views about religion and the world. Furthermore, not all marginal affiliates have the same 
motivations for selectively turning to religious organizations or do so on the same occasions. As I 
present and discuss some of these similarities and differences, I am not claiming, unless indicated 
otherwise, that there is a straightforward causal relationship between various factors and people‘s 
religious beliefs and practices. All I am arguing is that correlations do exist between certain 
variables and people‘s religious attitudes and behaviours, and further research (e.g., qualitative 
research with larger sample sizes or multivariate statistical analysis of large survey sets) is 
needed to pinpoint specific cause-effect relationships. 
In light of the methodological dilemmas outlined above, I follow the excellent qualitative 
work modeled by people such as Reimer (2003), Roof (1999), and Smith and Denton (2005), and 
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present three active affiliate stories
3
—Andrew Donnelly, Becky Eagleton, and Cam Bender—and 
three marginal affiliate stories—Emerson Cairns, Emily Foster, and Debbie Fisher—whose 
narratives, though their own, resemble many others who I interviewed. Their stories help us to 
connect real lives to abstract sociological concepts and theories and vice versa. All three active 
affiliates identify with a religious tradition and attend religious services weekly; however the 
trajectory that they followed to get where they are today varies. Andrew Donnelly was raised in a 
religious home where he and his parents attended a Salvation Army church each week, and he is 
now actively involved in an Anglican church. Becky Eagleton was raised attending a variety of 
evangelical Protestant congregations, including the Alliance, Baptist, and Full Gospel 
denominations. However, she made a conscious decision to abandon ongoing church 
involvement for a period of time before eventually returning to regular participation in a Baptist 
congregation. Cam Bender had almost no exposure to religion or religious organizations growing 
up but went through a conversion process in his mid-thirties that led him to being actively 
involved in a local United Church of Canada congregation.  
The three marginal affiliates identify with a religious tradition and attend religious 
services sporadically. However, the reasons and occasions for their involvement differ. Emerson 
Cairns rarely attended religious services growing up, but now primarily attends a United Church 
of Canada church for religious holidays and to celebrate significant life events, such as weddings 
or the birth of a child. Raised in a religious home, Emily Foster attended Lutheran services 
regularly. Today her attendance patterns have tapered off to religious holidays and rites of 
passage in the Roman Catholic Church, the tradition that her husband was raised in. Debbie 
Fisher either has observed key life events in a church or may consider observing others there but 
                                                 
3 To protect anonymity, the names used here are pseudonyms.  
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limits her exposure to church to those occasions when she is invited to another person‘s wedding, 
baptism, or funeral. 
As I present these six vignettes, I am reminded of one main reason for why I am drawn to 
qualitative research. It is the opportunity to meet with individuals and hear them express, in their 
own words, their beliefs and experiences relative to the supernatural and their religious 
institutions, which leaves me in a privileged position to pass those along to readers. Hopefully I 
represent their views honestly and accurately, avoiding the pitfalls of qualitative research that 
Gary Fine (1993) warns against,
4
 demonstrating the kind of care, precision, and fairness that 
those I interviewed generously showed me.            
Active Affiliates 
Andrew Donnelly: A Born and Bred Active Affiliate 
 
Seventy-five year-old Andrew Donnelly welcomed me into his home on a June afternoon. 
He guided me to the kitchen table that overlooks the lush garden in his backyard, where, like so 
many of those I met with, he offered me a drink of water. Andrew is a retired teacher with a 
Master‘s degree in Religious Studies. Married and father to three children, he grew up in southern 
England along with his two brothers and two sisters, while his father served in the royal army 
before becoming an engineer in an aeronautic factory. While growing up, his family attended a 
Salvation Army church many times a week.  When I asked if his family was fairly religious, he 
replied, ―Very religious, yeah.‖  
Andrew served as a musician in the army for two years after high school where he 
encountered and was transformed by a book by the Roman Catholic writer and monk Thomas 
                                                 
4 Gary Fine (1993) outlines ten lies about social researchers. These include that researchers are kind, friendly, honest, 
precise, observant, unobtrusive, candid, chaste, fair and literary. He argues that researchers can easily fall into the 
trap of being deceptive throughout the research process in ways that range from pretending to like participants, to 
skewing or ignoring data from individuals that they disliked, to unfairly representing participants in the final write-
up.       
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Merton. Though he valued his evangelical roots, which emphasized a personal relationship with 
Jesus, his reading of Merton facilitated a growing interest and desire for the sacramental and 
monastic features of the Christian life—features not commonly found in evangelical settings. 
This path led Andrew to formally join the Roman Catholic Church and become a monk. In the 
monastery he developed an appreciation for total commitment to God and the liturgical 
orderliness and structure of life, features which continue to affect his Christian life. After 
spending several years in a monastery, Andrew felt God calling him to pursue different 
vocations, those of husband and teacher. 
While he still identifies as a Catholic, Andrew actively participates in an Anglican church. 
With his love of music, he began singing in the nearby Anglican congregation‘s choir where he is 
now actively involved. With respect to his religious affiliation, he states, ―I don‘t think there‘s 
any reason why I should become an Anglican. I see myself . . . as a Catholic Christian.‖ When I 
ask him how important his religious affiliation is relative to other identifiers in his life, Andrew 
quickly clarifies that I ―have to define the word religion.‖ This was a common sentiment among 
twenty-five of the forty-two that I interviewed. The word ―religion‖ is problematic for active and 
marginal affiliates alike, conjuring up negative connotations of authoritarianism, sexism, 
legalism, and dogmatism. They prefer words such as ―faith,‖ ―spirituality,‖ or ―personal 
relationship with God,‖ terms that are less threatening, inclusive, and more acceptable in the 
wider culture. This finding is not surprising since scholars have increasingly accounted for this 
distinction between ―religion‖ and ―spirituality‖ in the last decade (see e.g., Bibby 2002: 194-
202; Dillon and Wink 2007; Fuller 2001; Hood Jr. 2003: 249; Marler and Hadaway 2002: 294; 
Wuthnow 1998, 2001; Zinnbauer, Pargament, and Scott 1999: 901). What may be surprising to 
some who are not actively involved in a church is that regular attendees have just as many 
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problems with the word ―religion‖ as those who do not regularly participate (see e.g., Cavey 
2005; Levan 1995).   
After he voiced his displeasure with the word ―religion,‖ Andrew acknowledged that his 
ties to both the Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches are not that important, but that his 
identification as a Christian is of primary importance: 
My Christian faith isn‘t something which is . . . laid on top . . . it‘s not part of my life. My 
religious faith is an expression of what is ultimately true in my life . . . Being a committed 
Christian doesn‘t mean that you say goodbye to all the other parts of life. It is something 
which is part of life . . . the Christian faith is a way of looking at life as a whole . . . There 
is no conflict between the ordinary and the spiritual. There is no conflict. It is the same 
thing as two things. 
 
 Andrew‘s statements represent a distinct pattern among most (nine out of thirteen) active 
affiliates that I interviewed who were raised in a Christian home and who have maintained or 
increased their level of involvement over time: they give little importance to their denominational 
affiliation.
5
 Instead, they give overwhelming evidence that their religious faith as a whole is the 
most important thing in the world. Similar to other active affiliates that I met, one female in her 
twenties states that she desires to experience ―God in all aspects of my life: my physical body . . . 
my emotional state, my family . . . Allowing God to be in charge of everything: finances.‖ Put 
simply, religion functions as a master status that influences active affiliates‘ beliefs and actions in 
all facets of their lives.  
 As a Roman Catholic who attends an Anglican church, Andrew still holds on to the 
beliefs that shaped his evangelical upbringing in the Salvation Army, such as a belief in a divine 
being who is active in the world and has a personal relationship with humans. He also maintains 
that the Holy Spirit is a gift from God to His followers living on earth, to provide guidance and 
                                                 
5 Donald Miller (1997) provides evidence to suggest that denominational affiliation is less and less important for 
people, and Clarke and Macdonald (2007) show the recent and dramatic rise in Canadians who simply identify as 
―Christian‖ versus identifying with any particular denomination.   
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direction for upright living. These beliefs are evident in Andrew‘s discussion of the indescribable 
and mysterious restlessness of the human soul that drew him to faith in God and to his church 
observance. Citing St. Augustine‘s Confessions, he claims, ―Lord, you have made us for yourself, 
and our hearts are restless until they rest in you.‖ It could be argued that most (thirteen) other 
active affiliates I interviewed echo this belief, to the extent that they feel lost without a guiding 
sense of morality, meaning, purpose, and direction in life from God. Several active affiliates 
offered statements such as God ―helps bring purpose and meaning to your life,‖ God ―puts things 
into perspective for me,‖ or God reminds them ―of the way you should be living your life.‖ A 
marginal affiliate male in his early thirties declares that God provides him with ―a set of 
guidelines. I need guidelines . . .  I‘ll never live up to those guidelines, but at least I have 
something to . . . shoot for.‖ The difference between actives and marginals lies in how they 
conceptualize, establish, and maintain their groups‘ ―sacred canopy‖ in their personal life. For 
Andrew and other active affiliates, ongoing church attendance reminds them that God should 
guide their moral compass and frame their daily experiences meaningfully. Marginal affiliates do 
not feel the same pull, desire, or necessity to reinforce their belief systems weekly. They only 
require a few appearances at church each year.  
 I then ask Andrew, ―Do you find that you gain anything specifically from your personal 
faith commitments?‖ Rather than offering what I expected would be a list of benefits for 
believing and belonging, he offered the following response:  
At least for the Christian, there‘s only one road to God, and that is by way of the cross. 
And the cross is not peace or tranquility . . . The cross is painful . . . If you‘re going to 
follow Christ . . . who is the crucified . . . the crucified Lord, then there is no way to avoid 
the cross . . . That means . . . that you cannot expect total peace. You can‘t expect an 
escape from conflict . . . the Christian life is not a departure . . . is not an escape from the . 
. . problems and the pains . . . of everyday life . . . it‘s . . . a more intense way of living 




Five other active affiliates made this point, especially those with no religious upbringing: in order 
to be actively Christian one must surrender their life to the will of God in all things. One active 
affiliate says that ―sometimes God asks you to do stuff that doesn‘t make any sense. You know, 
you give up control of your life.‖ Another active affiliate states that ―God asks for us to 
surrender. He says, ‗Surrender all things to me,‘‖ while another person acknowledges that ―you 
don‘t get to make your own decisions. Your life isn‘t your own anymore. If you‘re serious about 
it, it‘s not your own anymore. So you‘re not . . . you‘re not the boss.‖  
 When asked if religion is primarily an individual journey or one that ought to be shared 
with others, Andrew suggests that religion is primarily an individual phenomenon, but that 
individuals are shaped by their surroundings. Individuals consciously decide whether or not to 
believe in God and they decide to change their lives according to a set of religious principles. 
Consequently, they acquire their initial ideas and concepts about religion from other people, and 
group gatherings help to challenge and reinforce these ideas.  
 I ask Andrew, ―How influential is your own congregation in shaping your beliefs and 
practices?‖ He responds, ―Indirectly only . . . indirectly. I don‘t think . . . when I was younger . . . 
I‘m not so impressionable now as I was.‖ Andrew‘s encounter with Thomas Merton and the 
Roman Catholic Church as a young adult exemplifies the stories of most active affiliates whose 
religious beliefs and practices were developed in their youth. Once those beliefs are established 
active affiliates seek congregations that reaffirm those values. In this light, interviewees in my 
study agree that social influences help shape their religious creeds and practices, but ultimately 
they are responsible for their beliefs.   
 To summarize, Andrew‘s story offers insights into the life-worlds of many active 
affiliates that I spoke with. They believe that their religious worldview shapes their entire 
worldview, especially for those who were raised in a Christian home and attended church 
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regularly. Their religious beliefs and practices guide how they act in the different spheres of their 
lives, including their economic decisions and the life choices they make regarding vocation or 
marriage, among others. This is further evidenced in Andrew‘s realization that to be totally 
committed to his Christian faith, he must submit his human will and desires unto God. In this, he 
and other active affiliates, particularly among those who were raised in a religious home, do not 
interpret their life as their own. It is God‘s to do with as He wants. As will be seen later, the same 
cannot be said about the marginal affiliates that I interviewed. Furthermore, regardless of age, 
those active affiliates who were raised in religious homes and who have maintained active 
involvement in a church place less importance on their denominational affiliation than their 
overarching Christian identity. This is illustrated in Andrew‘s exposure to various denominations 
and the low priority he places on them as an important identity marker. This is also reflected in 
Becky Eagleton‘s story, which I turn to next.   
     
Becky Eagleton: A Raised, Abandoned, and Returned Active Affiliate 
 
I approached Becky Eagleton‘s home on a dark November night. She greeted me at the 
door, along with her husband and young son, and welcomed me inside. As her husband and son 
left for the basement, Becky made me a cup of tea and we sat down in the main floor living room. 
Approaching her twenty-eighth birthday, Becky is a psychological assistant who works with 
children and adolescents with behavioural or cognitive challenges. She loves her job. 
Becky and her two brothers grew up in Saskatchewan where their father worked in real 
estate and their mother stayed at home. Becky recalls, ―I had a great childhood, a really close 
family.‖ Their family attended religious services in an evangelical setting once or twice a week, 
and her parents attended a Bible study each Tuesday night. Her parents were actively involved in 
church activities, ranging from music to the prayer chain to helping in the nursery. Claiming that 
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denominational affiliation was not important to her parents (similar to Andrew Donnelly), Becky 
spoke of her parents‘ movement from a Full Gospel to an Alliance to a Baptist church. When 
asked about the motivation for changing congregations and denominations, she cites leadership. 
In some cases the pastor advanced beliefs that differed from her family‘s and so they left, while 
at other times they were attracted to the personality or preaching of a pastor from another 
congregation. Regardless of the denomination, they always sought solid teaching from the Bible, 
a strong desire of other evangelicals that I interviewed.  
Religion was important to Becky‘s family when she was growing up, but when she 
entered grade ten, Becky quickly realized that her religious involvement was not ―cool,‖ 
according to her peers: 
I think it was hard for me to find my place as a Christian in a secular world . . . I was an 
athlete, and so I felt like I was always under scrutiny . . . people knew who I was and 
stuff, so it was really hard for me to balance Becky the athlete . . . with Becky the 
Christian because none of my friends were Christian. And so merging those two was 
really difficult for me . . . I never drank in high school. All my friends drank. I didn‘t do 
drugs. All my friends did drugs. I wasn‘t having sex with my boyfriend. All my friends 
were having sex with their boyfriends.  
 
Becky struggled with this throughout high school, which continued into university when she 
began dating a non-Christian. Despite warnings from family and close friends that this boyfriend 
was not a good match for her, Becky ignored their advice and physically and emotionally 
detached herself from them. Her boyfriend lived out of town, so she spent many of her weekends 
visiting him. The combination of missing church when away on weekends and her boyfriend‘s 
active assault on her Christian faith contributed to a gradual move away from active involvement 
in church life. Becky‘s boyfriend was also critical of her physical appearance, which factored into 
an eating disorder that she developed. 
 35 
 Becky would eventually break up with her boyfriend, at which point she realized that she 
had distanced herself from God, her church, and her family. She also came to the conclusion that 
if she was to solve her eating disorder, she would need to correct her relationship with God: 
In order for me to really be a healthy person . . . I needed to revamp my relationship with 
God . . . I needed to understand that God loved me, that God made me, and . . . that‘s 
enough. Right? I don‘t need anything else. And so, for me to recover from an eating 
disorder, knowing those two things were critical, and so I had to learn about God in a 
whole new way than I think I had ever previously known him…I had a desire to 
understand God better and to figure out, for me, what it meant to be a Christian and felt 
like I needed to be involved in a church to hear someone talking about God to get a better 
idea of what that could look like. 
 
As she processed these life changes, Becky was invited to get involved in a parachurch 
organization6 where leaders were required to actively participate in a church. At the same time, 
Becky‘s good friend invited her to return to the church that she attended before dating the non-
Christian. Becky‘s eventual return was aided by the combination of strenuous life circumstances 
and social supports encouraging involvement in church. 
Today, Becky and her family attend a Baptist church weekly. She and her husband are 
involved in the church‘s children‘s ministry, she participates in a weekly women‘s gathering, and 
they are pondering joining a weekly small group. When asked how important it is that she is 
Baptist, she claims that it is not important at all and that if she were to shop around for a different 
church (which she is not currently doing), she would consider most other Christian options other 
than Roman Catholicism because it‘s ―not a fit for me.‖ 
Similar to other active affiliate interviewees, Becky says she is drawn to church for three 
main reasons: to learn from the Bible and the pastor, to participate in a like-minded community, 
and to honour and worship God through music and prayers. One male that I interviewed says that 
he attends ―to hear the Word, because it‘s good to hear.‖ Another individual that I met enjoys 
                                                 
6 A parachurch organization is a religious organization that exists independent of any single church or denomination, 
but fulfills goals that assist what churches are doing in areas such youth, poverty, evangelism, or music.  
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―the community, the camaraderie . . . the group of people . . . they‘re a group of like-minded 
people.‖ One woman attends to ―honour the Lord and worship Him,‖ and another attends to focus 
―on the practice of worshipping and giving thanks.‖ She says, ―When I‘m at home alone . . . I 
don‘t necessarily feel the same worship. There‘s times when I do, but, more often than not . . . 
there‘s something from being with others and praying together that . . . helps me feel like there‘s 
a life presence there.‖    
An extrovert, Becky delights in getting to know other people and is drawn to the social 
aspect of church life. Being part of a group of like-minded individuals also helps to solidify her 
own beliefs about God and the world, while helping her and others cope with life‘s difficult 
circumstances. Interestingly, none of her closest friends attend the same congregation that she 
does, though most of them participate regularly in other Christian churches. In fact, only half of 
the active affiliates that I interviewed were close friends with anyone who attends the same 
church, and yet most were close friends with someone actively involved in another church. 
While Becky highly values learning new insights and being challenged from Biblical 
readings and pastoral sermons, what makes Becky and some other evangelical Protestant active 
affiliates in my sample stand out is their belief that they do not need a church to learn about God 
and share in fellowship with believers:  
We attend a church because I think it‘s important to be involved in that community of 
believers. For me, that doesn‘t have to happen in a church, so I would be happy meeting 
with people in a home or wherever. I don‘t care if it‘s a church building . . . But the 
community that I experience in that . . . I do also experience with our friends, having a 
meal together, hanging out, talking about what‘s going on in our lives, what God‘s doing 
in our lives, or what we‘re struggling with. 
 
To clarify what she meant, I asked, ―Do you think you can have these more informal gatherings 
at the expense of Sunday morning church gatherings?‖ She replied, ―Oh, for sure.‖ Because this 
is a common belief among the understudied movement within Christianity known as the 
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―emerging church,‖ which challenges traditional ways of doing church (see e.g., Bell 2005 and 
2008; Frost 2006; Gibbs and Bolger 2005; Hirsch 2006; Jones 2008; McLaren 2001, 2003, 2004, 
2006, 2007; Pagitt 2008), I pushed Becky a bit further and asked, ―Do you think you need to 
have, for lack of a better term, a trained specialist, like a pastor, for example, to walk you through 
discussions, or is that something that can happen without that?‖ Becky confidently replied, ―I 
think it can happen without that . . . I think if you‘re doing a more informal setting, if everybody . 
. . not everybody. But if enough people are of the same mind . . . like, here‘s what we want to do 
in these settings: we want to learn from each other; we want to grow; we want to challenge each 
other . . . then, yes, I think it can happen.‖ Generally speaking, this may be indicative of openness 
among evangelical Protestants to creatively engage the surrounding culture in meaningful and 
relevant ways while also holding steadfast to their core convictions. These alternative religious 
group gatherings (e.g., home churches) are worthy of sociological study in the future.  
Like Andrew, Becky has a difficult time with the word ―religion,‖ but claims that her 
personal relationship with Christ is very important. It is about ―putting God . . . in the middle of 
what you‘re doing all the time, and so I would say that that is a mindset that I have, that God‘s 
just a part of me and a part of what I‘m doing, and I try to keep that in the forefront of my mind, 
to be involving him.‖ To accomplish this she tries to read her Bible regularly and reads a lot of 
Christian books about spirituality and about being a good wife and mother. Becky prays to God 
often, and she listens to worship music constantly. Becky also sees her job and relationships as 
―ministry‖ opportunities where she can share and model her Christian faith with others. This is 
important to Becky because she firmly believes that individuals must enter into a personal 
relationship with Christ, admitting they are sinners, and accepting God‘s grace and forgiveness in 
exchange for eternal life in heaven. While she does not force these beliefs on others, something 
that many active and marginal interviewees in my study are vehemently opposed to, she tries to 
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model Christian values and attitudes in her relationships with non-Christians in particular. It is 
important to Becky that her non-Christian friends are eventually ―saved.‖ Similar to Becky and 
other active affiliate evangelicals that I interviewed, one woman in her mid sixties diligently 
prays for her unsaved friends and family members: 
I think we should share it with others because you‘re so excited about it. I love to share it. 
I love to share it with . . . people that I come in touch with when the opportunity . . . I‘m 
not nasty about it. I don‘t push it down their throat, but when . . . the subject comes up 
and I can sort of steer it that way, yeah. Because you want them to be saved, too. You 
know, that‘s always on my heart . . . for others to be saved.  
 
Overall, Becky has a strong sense that she can depend on God‘s providence. She told me 
of a recent flight she was anxious about taking because it was on a really small plane. She prayed 
and asked God to calm her fears. Her family also prayed about the flight. Everything worked out 
fine on her flight, and she credits God‘s response to her prayers as instrumental to the outcome. 
Although some marginal affiliates provided instances of times that they too had depended on 
God, it was much more common for active affiliates to claim that they could unequivocally 
depend on God. Of course, there were also examples of active affiliates who prayed for a specific 
outcome that did not transpire, such as healing from sickness. But as we‘ll see in chapter four, 
they still found a way to explain this by stating that everything happens for a reason and God is in 
all things. 
In sum, Becky‘s narrative validates some of the themes in Andrew‘s religious story such 
as denomination mattering little to those raised in a religious home or individualism sometimes 
ruling over group authority. However, her story introduces us to some additional characteristics 
found among the active affiliates that I interviewed. In contrast to marginal affiliates, active 
affiliates tend to believe that God is actively involved in the world. Whether they believe that 
God prevented someone from getting into a car accident, healed a family member of an illness, or 
provided for someone financially, active affiliates are more likely to believe that God is involved 
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in human affairs. This belief is reinforced through active affiliate religious practices as well, 
including tithing, private prayer, Bible reading, and serving others, beliefs that are encouraged in 
a larger Christian community and developed through pastoral interpretations of scripture. 
Becky‘s story also points to a belief and desire for life after death, which for most active affiliates 
in my sample outside of liberal congregations, such as the United Church of Canada, was 
specified to mean heaven and the avoidance of hell. Entrance into heaven was conditional upon a 
combination of factors that included God‘s grace toward humanity along with the individual‘s 
willingness to believe in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Combined, these things 
shape Becky‘s evangelical outlook on the world, namely that she should actively seek to convert 
others, not through invasive tactics, but through modeling a life of love and hospitality toward 
others.  
The question arising from Becky‘s story is why she was raised in a religious home, 
abandoned any type of participation in her religious group, and then returned to regular 
involvement, when some marginal affiliates, as will be seen later, were raised in a religious 
home, also ceased their church involvement, but never returned again? Answers to this question 
as well as others relative to those who have increased their level of church involvement over time 
will become clear as the chapter progresses. 
 
Cam Bender: A Transformed Active Affiliate 
 
Cam Bender invited me to his downtown apartment in late October while his roommate 
was out for the evening. The view of the Rocky Mountains to the west was spectacular; the lights 
from buildings, cars, and street lamps were dazzling, and the energy of people buzzing around 
was appealing. Cam is a single thirty-seven year-old high school graduate who is an office 
manager for an oil company. He grew up in Calgary, the second of five children. His parents are 
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divorced. His mother, whom he lived with, worked in retail, and his father was a truck driver who 
was rarely around. 
Cam recalls that his mother believed in God, but that his family was not affiliated with a 
religious group, never attended religious services, never engaged in religious conversations in the 
home, and the Bible on the bookshelf collected dust. He describes his family as a good one. 
There was no alcohol or drug use and they were not in trouble with the law. Cam claims that at 
the age of thirteen he became a ―born again‖ Christian. Somewhat perplexed by this, given that 
he had no religious background and none of his friends were obviously religious, I asked him if 
anyone else introduced him to the idea of being ―born again.‖ He had difficulty articulating his 
conversion experience, but he indicated that it was sui generis. From that moment on Cam 
believed in God, though he did not appear to have any social supports before or for some time 
after to shape his beliefs.7     
In his early twenties Cam attended a few religious services in his downtown 
neighbourhood because he was interested in the buildings‘ architecture. He also attended a few 
church services that friends invited him to, mainly for religious holidays and rites of passage. 
However, it was in his early thirties, when his younger brother (an evangelical Protestant) gave 
him The Purpose Driven Life, a best-selling book by Rick Warren (pastor of Saddleback Church 
                                                 
7 It is not my intention, nor my role as a sociologist, to question the legitimacy of an interviewee‘s story. However, 
admittedly it appears odd that a person would come to accept a religious belief when they, at least from their own 
admission, had no social setting to even learn about this belief system. Where did such beliefs come from? I asked 
him about this later in the interview. He said that he began to read the Bible in his early teen years, to learn more 
about how he wanted to live his life and to follow the Holy Spirit‘s guidance in his life. This coincided with his 
―born again‖ experience. I could be wrong, but perhaps this is an example of someone projecting current beliefs and 
practices, or at least current terminology, on to past experiences.  
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in Lake Forest, California, one of America‘s largest megachurches)
8
 that he seriously started 
thinking about religion and church involvement:  
I got to the part about . . . attending services and attending church and having a Christian 
family to support you and mentor and things like that, and that really hit home with me. I 
think God was kind of tapping me on the shoulder . . . that part was written for me. So I 
thought about it a long time . . . and I thought, ―Well, where am I going to go to church?‖ 
So I kind of looked around, and I worked downtown, and I‘d walked by the church a 
million times . . . And, when I really kind of started thinking about going to church or 
going somewhere to attend services, I walked by the church, and all of a sudden there it 
was. You know, there was just this big spotlight on it. I couldn‘t have missed it. And so I 
thought, ―Okay, well . . . I‘m going to go there and see what I think about it.‖ And I went 
in, and I knew that was right where I needed to go. I never . . . because I live . . . within . . 
. walking distance of at least half a dozen churches, and I could have gone anywhere, but 
that was where I needed to go, and I really felt God was telling me . . . that‘s where I 
needed to go. 
 
Today, Cam attends weekly services in the same United Church of Canada congregation 
that he first noticed years ago. The members‘ friendliness was appealing, which contributed to 
him staying. In terms of his involvements in the church, he recently helped lead a six-week 
church-wide discussion on the topic of ―hospitality‖ and he volunteers as an usher on Sunday 
mornings.  
I asked him how important it was to be part of the United Church of Canada as opposed to 
another Christian denomination and he indicated that it was very important, but not to the point 
that he would go around announcing his denominational affiliation to everyone. He would not 
consider changing religious affiliation mainly because ―they embraced . . . the beliefs that I did 
have‖ (e.g., inclusiveness toward all people, especially the marginalized). As in Andrew and 
Becky‘s stories, here we see again a subtle form of individualism among those who attend church 
                                                 
8 Rick Warren is best known for his ―Purpose Driven‖ publications that include Purpose Driven Church (1995) and 
Purpose Driven Life (2002), which have captivated evangelicals around the world. Thousands of churches 
worldwide have modeled their organization after Warren‘s successful church plant in California, a church that has 
grown from zero to 20,000 over the last thirty years by targeting those who do not attend church regularly. His 
influence was also popularized in 2005 when Ashley Smith, a young woman held hostage by Brian Nichols, shared 
insights from The Purpose Driven Life with Nichols that ultimately convinced him to release her. Warren‘s 
influential reach is informed by theologically conservative views about homosexuality, abortion, and stem cell 
research, but also social action in areas of poverty, disease, education for the marginalized, and the environment.    
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regularly, not unlike the ―privatistic churchgoers‖ that Grenville (2000: 218) discusses. These 
churchgoers attend services weekly, and yet while the church plays a role in reinforcing 
worldviews, it is ultimately the individual, not their church or its leader, who is the final authority 
of what they believe and how they behave (see Dillon and Wink 2007; Smith and Snell 2009). 
Cam‘s core religious beliefs and practices center on his love of writing poetry. He gave 
me a copy of his latest book. It is filled with poems about everyday experiences of love, 
loneliness, and future goals, and repeatedly references religious and spiritual themes. This is one 
way that he expresses his understanding of God‘s sacrificial love and compassion for humanity. 
Cam enjoys walking on his own, listening to music, enjoying God‘s creation, and communing 
with and meditating on God. Each night he reads prayers, Scriptures, and stories from a 
devotional book before saying his own prayers. On the subject of prayer, Cam says, ―I say my 
prayers every night. But . . . not only that . . . I find I pray throughout the day . . . I talk to God . . . 
say, I‘m in a stressful situation at work or . . . I‘m just saying, ‗Oh, God, get me out of here . . . I 
don‘t want to wait in line here at Starbucks anymore. Get me out of here‘ . . . or, ‗Move this line 
along,‘ or whatever . . . you just sort of pray silently in your head.‖ It was interesting to note that 
the notion of prayer and a God who intervenes in world affairs is almost unique to Cam relative 
to other interviewees in my study from the United Church of Canada. Most other United Church 
members that I interviewed do not believe that God is actively involved in human affairs, 
maintaining instead that humans play the main or only role in how human affairs transpire. One 
male that I interviewed says, ―I don‘t think that you can say that there is a God that acts in the 
best interests of human beings . . . I don‘t believe in the personified God which speaks to people, 
the bearded old man in the sky that threw lightning bolts at people, or whatever. It just doesn‘t 
make very much sense to me, and I think that . . . modern science has sort of revealed that.‖ As a 
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result, he, and others, do not pray because they believe that their prayers cannot move God whom 
they are unsure even exists, or if he or she does, is not a puppeteer in personal or social events. 
I asked Cam whether religion was important to him. He replies, ―Oh, definitely. 
Spirituality, not necessarily religion because I‘m not big on . . . you can‘t eat meat on Fridays, or 
you can‘t do this, or you can‘t do that or whatever, you know . . . they don‘t have a lot of those 
types of rules in the United Church. But spirituality, you know? Definitely. It‘s very important to 
me.‖ Again, the term ―religion‖ is troublesome to active affiliate interviewees.   
I proceed to ask, ―What does that word [spirituality] mean to you?‖ Cam replies, ―I think 
it‘s just . . . communication with God, having Jesus in your heart, having the Holy Spirit within 
you, and being attuned to that, being able to listen to that . . . like, happened to me. Being able to 
interpret . . . what you‘re being told and understanding it.‖  
When I ask Cam questions about his belief in the afterlife and what is required to obtain 
life after death, he, like other active affiliates, highlights the need to believe in Jesus, that Jesus is 
the Son of God, and that Jesus died on a cross for humanity‘s sins. Curious if any practices 
should accompany these beliefs, he replies ―not really, no.‖ In contrast to Roman Catholics and 
evangelical Protestants, groups that stereotypically offer black-and-white answers about heaven 
and hell, Cam‘s conception of what is involved in obtaining life after death is fairly broad and 
inclusive in that particular religious practices are not required. But his belief is not as broad as 
fellow members of the United Church of Canada in my sample. Most whom I interviewed are 
either unsure about whether there is life after death, or they are not clear of what is required to go 
on to the next life, or they do not believe at all in life after death. For example, a United Church 
of Canada male says that he is ―pretty agnostic on heaven,‖ while another United Church of 
Canada female states, ―Where we go from here, I don‘t know.‖     
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Cam‘s story teaches us two things. First, like Becky, choosing to pursue greater 
involvement in a religious group is sometimes influenced by one‘s social ties.
9
 Cam‘s brother is a 
longstanding influence on how he thinks about religion, even though they do not attend the same 
church. That said, social ties are not always present, as was the case for a few active affiliates 
who developed an interest and eventual level of regular involvement in a church entirely on their 
own. These individuals were drawn to a church to investigate its beautiful architecture or attend a 
concert, only afterwards finding values in the church that echo their own. A marginal affiliate 
male that I interviewed reflects on one of those experiences: 
I went to a concert at [Alpha Church] . . . and they had . . . these bookmarks that were in 
the pews, and we looked at one that said, ‗An open, accepting spiritual place for all 
people‘ . . . So we thought, ‗Well, maybe we‘ll come‘ . . . And they had a rainbow flag on 
the . . . sign outside, and that‘s one of the things that my mom had always talked about . . . 
was connection with spirituality was acceptance of, I guess, more broadly, all people but . 
. . more specifically, I remember my mom talking about acceptance of gay and lesbian 
people into the . . . and [Alpha Church] had a nice little rainbow flag . . . that really 
appealed to me, and it kind of went from there.  
 
Second, Cam‘s experiences provide insights to characteristics that are prominent among 
other active affiliates in the United Church of Canada that I interviewed. Without question, those 
from my sample lean toward the liberal end of the theological continuum when it comes to 
believing in a God, believing in a God who is active in the world and that they can depend on, 
believing in the afterlife, and the possible requirements to enter heaven (if there is a heaven). 
They also lean more to the side of individualism when it comes to their beliefs and practices, 
which they find is supported and encouraged in the United Church of Canada with its propensity 
for critical discourse about religious and secular ideas (see e.g., Graham 1990; Milton 1991). 
From my sample, religious beliefs appear more fluid and less certain in United Church circles 
                                                 
9 This fact is supported in many studies on conversion, especially in studies on those who join new religious 
movements (see e.g., Dawson 2006; Harrison 1974; Lofland 1977; Stark and Bainbridge 1985).  
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than among Roman Catholic, Pentecostal, or Baptist interviewees who tend to be more 
theologically conservative. 
Marginal Affiliates 
Emerson Cairns: A Home Grown Marginal Affiliate 
 
It was a cold March morning and the bitter Calgary winter had not yet subsided when I 
walked downtown to meet Emerson Cairns in his high rise corner office. We had been trying to 
schedule an interview for a couple of months, so I was hopeful that nothing would come up at the 
last minute that would take him away from our appointment. Thankfully he was there when I 
arrived and was welcomed into his office. Emerson, thirty-three, has a Bachelor‘s degree in 
geography and currently works as a director of a financial services firm. He is married, with one 
daughter and twin boys on the way.  
The second of four children, Emerson grew up in Montreal where his father was an 
engineer and his mother stayed at home. His father has a Roman Catholic background and his 
mother was raised in the United Church. Although he does not describe his father as a devout 
Catholic, he characterizes his mother‘s parents as actively religious. His mother was also a 
Sunday school teacher in the United Church. When recalling his family‘s church involvement, 
Emerson indicates that it was limited to the United Church at Christmas, Easter, and when they 
visited his grandmother. Asked if religion was important to him or his family, he replied, ―We‘re 
not atheist non-believers or anything like that, but . . . it doesn‘t make up . . . a big part of what 
we do or who we are.‖ They did not pray, they did not read the Bible, nor did they talk about God 
or religious things.  
 Emerson has maintained a consistent level of church involvement throughout his life. 
Today he identifies with the United Church of Canada, though his affiliation with this 
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denomination means ―nothing‖ to him because he knows almost nothing about other 
denominations. This is all he has ever known. Emerson and his wife were married in the United 
Church and they attend almost every Christmas. They do not really practice their faith in the 
home, and he is uncertain when I ask him about his belief in God:  
I think I do. I believe in something. I don‘t know if that‘s just been instilled . . . I don‘t 
know what side of the fence . . . I sit on . . . I have no reason to, but I . . . but you do . . . I 
don‘t know if I believe in a big bang theory any more than I believe in God. Right? So, 
you know, it‘s comforting to believe in God, versus, you know? But, probably, I believe 
more in the science . . . but God provides comfort.  
 
He shows a similar apprehension towards life after death, unsure of what exactly happens after 
life on Earth.  
I asked Emerson about the appeal of attending religious services selectively and to 
identify as a Christian while not subscribing to definitive beliefs about God or the afterlife or 
observing any religious practices in the home. For him, and many other marginal affiliates that I 
spoke with, religion is a source of good morals and principles in society (though he admits that 
religion is also a source of immense evil in the world, which marginal affiliate interviewees 
repeatedly noted). He says that he tries to do unto others as he would have them do unto him. He 
wants his children to subscribe to this belief, but he does not believe that he and his wife can 
suitably provide the framework for their children to live this out. He acknowledges that this is 
where the church and a trained specialist (i.e., a religious leader) may have more of a role in his 
family‘s life:  
Moving forward, we‘ll have . . . I don‘t want to say we‘ll have more influence, but . . . 
We‘ll expose our children . . . to it just so they get, sort of . . . a basic understanding . . . I 
don‘t think I‘m capable . . . of conveying it properly to them . . . I‘m not an expert, you 
know? But I think it‘s good for them . . . I had that basic knowledge that I feel like some 
degree . . . of desire to convey that to my children.  
 
For those who are hopeful that individuals like Emerson might pursue greater involvement in 
their church, he qualifies the above statement later in the interview:  
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I‘d say I‘d like for that to happen, whether or not I . . . am willing to be up at  . . . I don‘t 
even know what time that starts on Sunday. Eleven? Ten? . . . We look at that as our day 
of rest . . . Like, we‘re busy the rest of the week and . . . But, again . . . I think it would be 
more along those lines of . . . to expose them that way. Maybe I‘d just flip on channel 
whatever, get some Billy Graham. 
 
On top of Emerson speculating about his future beliefs and actions, I posed some 
questions about his past and current beliefs and practices. I ask him, ―What draws you on 
Christmas?‖ ―Custom,‖ he replied. Each Christmas his family goes out for Chinese food, they 
attend a Christmas service, and they watch A Christmas Carol, and the Chinese food is as 
important as the church service. Denying that he gains any religious significance when attending, 
he stresses that Christmas services are an opportunity for his family to spend time together. Not 
unlike sitting around the fireplace and talking, the Christmas service is another social event. He 
even leaves money in the offering plate, comparing the church service to watching a live show. 
He pays for the services that others offer for his enjoyment. In terms of the benefits of attending, 
he says that he feels good when he leaves; ―it‘s nice to be there.‖ It also helps remind his family 
that Christmas is not just about exchanging gifts.     
Changing directions slightly, though still focused on selective attendance, I asked 
Emerson why he got married in a church. Emerson quickly commented: 
We wanted the ceremony . . . I didn‘t want to do it in a field or this or that with a justice 
of the peace or anything like that . . . There wasn‘t . . . I wouldn‘t say it was overly 
religious . . . there were some . . . undertones, but there was no readings . . . we didn‘t 
look and say, like, ‗Do this.‖ Like, it was, probably, ‗the whatever one that everybody 
does.‘ He said, ‗Pick one of these three.‘ It was like, ‗Pick a box.‘ And so we had 
somebody do that . . . in my mind, that‘s where you get married: you get married in a 
church . . . and whether it‘s overly religious or not, we like to do it in a church . . . in that 
forum . . . we wanted people sitting in pews . . . we were up . . . on stage and that sort of 
thing, and . . . that worked for us.    
 
I asked Emerson if there was ―any sense of religious significance‖ in the ceremony. He 
responded affirmatively, seeing marriage as a sacred union between a man and a woman. He 
rejects gay marriages and opposes polygamous forms of marriage on religious grounds. He 
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acknowledges that he does not understand the religious meaning, significance, and justification 
for Christian wedding rituals, but holds firm in his conviction that marriage is a practice instituted 
by the Christian church that should be observed and respected. 
Some, like Kurt Bowen (2004), posit that religious belief and practice is more 
consequential for daily behaviour the more a person attends religious services. So I asked 
Emerson if getting married in a church had any impact on the quality of his marriage. He 
responded:  
No, I don‘t think so . . . But being married in a church and stuff like that? That was more . 
. . I don‘t want to say pomp and circumstance, but it was something that . . . we felt 
strongly about doing. I just can‘t tell you why . . . it was more . . . this is important 
because this . . . I don‘t want to say the perception and perspective or anything like that, 
but . . . it was the place where the ritual is conducted, and that‘s what we wanted to do.  
 
Curious about the United Church‘s influence on Emerson‘s everyday activities, I asked 
him about whether religion should be primarily individual or social and how influential his own 
religious tradition is in shaping his beliefs and practices. Here is where a defining feature of the 
marginal affiliates that I interviewed, relative to the active affiliates that I spoke with, appears. 
They believe that religion is primarily an individual phenomenon. Emerson claims that ―it‘s more 
individual . . . You‘ve got a belief. That‘s yours . . . and that‘s your journey, in terms of where 
you want to go with that. And I believe everybody else is entitled to their own [beliefs].‖ Another 
individual that I met said that religion is ―definitely an individual journey,‖ while another 
marginal affiliate who I interviewed stated that ―it‘s individual. From my point of view, it‘s an 
individual journey . . . I don‘t care if someone shares it with me, to be honest.‖ Emerson justifies 
his response by pointing to the cultural value of individualism where individuals are entitled to 
choose their own belief system. He is especially adamant that groups should not force their way 
into an individual‘s space to convert them, such as Mormons or Jehovah‘s Witnesses, who have a 
negative reputation among interviewees for their door-to-door proselytizing. Emerson agrees that 
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churches have a role to influence members of their congregation, though he admits that his 
church has little say in his personal beliefs and practices: ―They probably would prefer me to be 
more engaged et cetera, but . . . as long as I show up and bring a cheque and allow them . . . I 
appreciate what they do, and there‘s people who want to be much more involved and who can 
agree to exist on those terms.‖  
To summarize, Emerson had some type of religious exposure growing up, he, like other 
marginal affiliates in my study, continues to attend at Christmas because it is a traditional 
custom, he was married in the church because that is where weddings should be held, and he 
wants his children to be exposed to church to gain good morals and values. In chapter six I 
examine the challenges of late modern life (see e.g., Giddens 1991) relative to tradition, and the 
role that a ―chain of memory‖ (Hervieu-Leger 2000) might play in stabilizing individuals who are 
knowingly or unknowingly fearful of the growing sense of disconnection they have with others 
and even themselves. Beyond this, Emerson‘s uncertainty about God‘s existence or life after 
death is common among the marginal affiliates who shared their stories with me. However, his 
views about religion are unapologetically individualistic and he has little desire for greater church 
involvement. He is not alone.  
 
Emily Foster: A Busy yet “Spiritual” Marginal Affiliate  
 
 Emily Foster, thirty-seven, is married with two children. She taught in the Catholic school 
system before having children, and is now a stay-at-home mother, although she regularly 
volunteers at her children‘s school. She has a busy life caring for her children, which made a 
telephone interview easier on her schedule.   
 Emily was raised in Calgary. Her father owned his own business and her mother was an 
accountant. Like nearly all marginal affiliates who I interviewed, her family was very religious 
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and actively involved in their church growing up. They attended a Lutheran church where her 
father served on the leadership board. Rather than attending Sunday school with other children, 
Emily attended the adult services and fondly remembers sitting beside her father each week. 
Sadly, when she was ten, her father passed away from complications with diabetes. This 
devastated her family. She recalls, ―I think it was devastating. I was very close to my father, and 
we did a lot of travelling together . . . he was, obviously . . . a pillar of support in our family . . . 
and I think his death, actually, kind of had our family fall apart, to some degree.‖ I asked how her 
church responded, and she remembers that they provided meals during the first few weeks after 
her father‘s passing. However, it was not long after when Emily‘s family did not feel like they 
belonged in this church without dad around. Emily recalls that ―it just wasn‘t the same.‖ After all, 
dad was the family‘s main connection to others in the church. They missed the strong sense of 
community that they once felt and decided to leave the local Lutheran congregation. Emily‘s 
mother stopped attending altogether, which Emily attributes to the new demands on a single 
mother‘s time. Emily did go on to visit a number of churches in the area, but never felt like she 
belonged. Her attendance at church gradually ceased.      
Emily‘s mother moved back home with her own family when Emily was sixteen, leaving 
Emily to live with her sister and her husband. A short while later her sister moved away, meaning 
Emily was left on her own to rent an apartment. She worked three jobs during high school and 
university to pay the bills, maintaining high grades throughout. She described this time as a very 
busy one where she developed a strong sense of independence, a trait that has remained ever 
since. Needless to say, she admits that attending church again was not a priority during these 
years: 
I think, because my life was so busy working three jobs going through high school, doing 
all of that, I think the values—which, I think, were modeled through my father—and . . . 
some of the very simple basics . . . do unto others . . . I always thought it was very 
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important to try your best to be honest. Some of those things really stuck, but the form of 
religion and the process of attending church . . . I think that, sort of, fell by . . . I think you 
return to prayer. You have faith to some degree, but it was such a busy time for me.  
 
Emily rarely, if ever, attended religious services for some time, until she met her husband, 
who was Catholic. His mother wanted them to have a religious wedding ceremony in a Catholic 
church. It was not important to Emily to be married in a church, never mind a Catholic one, but 
she accounts for her husband‘s rationale for getting married in a church this way:  
―You know what? Well, first of all, you‘re not Catholic, so that‘s going to be hard on my 
poor mom. She‘s this old, and, you know, da, da, da . . . .‖ And I wasn‘t opposed to being 
married in a church. Of course, that was where my roots were. We grew up spending our 
time in a church, so I wasn‘t opposed to it. I don‘t know that I ever have embraced some 
of the ideals of Catholicism, believing that the sacrament must happen in the church and 
so, therefore, we had to be married in a church. So we tried to just, sort of, make it work 
for us.  
 
Her husband‘s mother was also the main reason they baptized their children in the Catholic 
Church. 
As it turned out, Emily and her husband really enjoyed the priest who performed their 
wedding and they began to attend regularly. They appreciated that Mass was not so formal, and 
Emily found that her experience there reminded her of the safe and comforting feeling that she 
experienced growing up in the Lutheran church. Unfortunately, the church closed down because 
there were too few priests to lead this congregation on the edge of the city where they lived. 
Emily and her family tried driving longer distances to other churches of various denominations, 
but they did not find a warm connection to any other church and they could not be bothered with 
driving around the city for a church as her family already commutes during the week for work 
and other commitments. 
Currently, Emily attends religious services mainly for Christmas and Easter, though she 
does not necessarily attend every single year. This is not unlike the six other marginal affiliates I 
spoke with who take a hit-and-miss approach to attending for religious holidays. She offers 
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multiple explanations for why her family attends when they do. In part, it is routine; sometimes 
her children are involved in a Christmas presentation, and other times they have family from out 
of town who would like to attend. Part of Emily longed for the type of religious experience that 
she was exposed to as a child and in her early years of marriage, and she may even consider 
being more involved in a church, but she admits that it is difficult to sit through a church service 
while tending to two young children, and she cannot get past the driving distance to possibly find 
a church she feels comfortable in. She acknowledges that busyness is the main reason for not 
being more involved and she readily states that her family has not tried hard enough in recent 
years to find a church that would better suit their needs. Other marginal affiliates that I 
interviewed similarly speak about their busy schedules as a deterrent for attending church more 
often. One woman says, ―Just having to get up on a Sunday morning, as bad as it sounds, when . . 
. you work so much, I guess. But that‘s really bad. That‘s bad. But, like, to be honest, that‘s part 
of it.‖ Another male highlights, ―That‘s all it boils down to . . . is time . . . you work your butt off 
all week . . . Sometimes you have to work two jobs so you get to come home, kiss the kids 
goodnight, have a bath, go to bed yourself, and then, all of a sudden, next thing you know, it‘s 
Saturday, and you‘re going grocery shopping, trying to catch up on stuff you‘ve done all week, 
and then Sunday, honestly . . . you don‘t feel like it.‖ 
Emily‘s family, however, does possess a strong set of religious (or spiritual) beliefs and 
practices. Her children know about God, pray regularly, read their devotional books, attend a 
school that emphasizes being a good moral person, and help in giving money to charities. 
Moreover, Emily listens to spiritual leaders on her iPod when she is in the car. Her family also 
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spends a lot of time in the mountains, enjoying nature and seeing God‘s hand in the beauty 
around them.
10
   
I asked Emily, as I did with all interviewees, ―Would you say that religion is important to 
you today?‖ Similar to most that I questioned, religion was not that important, but spirituality 
was. For Emily, spirituality captures all of the non-formal, non-obligatory aspects of religion, 
features that she and many others in my sample believed were missing in the Roman Catholic 
Church. Spirituality is rooted in good morals and values, things that she learned when she was a 
child and desperately seeks to pass on to her children. I asked her if she felt that she was offering 
enough moral and spiritual training for her children. She lamented in the following way: 
I don‘t think so, probably. No . . . I think the idea is grand that you‘re going to do this, 
and you‘re going to do it in your own environment, but life is busy, and it‘s full, and, 
sure, I think that we‘re probably falling short of it, and, I think, if there was an option 
which was more accessible for us—for example, if that Mass was still available and if it 
was in our community—it really . . . I mean, they were playing guitars in the church, and, 
for a Catholic church, that‘s pretty . . . you know? People were coming . . . in nice clothes, 
but they would have jeans with a nice sweater on, and . . . it really rang true for us . . . 
what we were . . . it was a nice fit, so, I guess, if that was still available . . . But, maybe, 
that‘s not how it works. I know it‘s not really supposed to be like a buffet where you jump 
in and out, but, I guess, we lost that, and having not found that feeling again . . . we‘ve 
kind of let it slide. So we‘re probably, no, not offering enough.  
 
 From Emily‘s story we see one of the leading reasons given for why marginal affiliates in 
my sample are not more involved in a church: they are too busy. In some families, both parents 
are working to pay the bills, or they are busy transporting their kids from one event to the next. 
Maybe they need time on weekends to complete chores, or they just want to enjoy Sunday as a 
day of rest. However one looks at it, active participation in a church is not seen as a big enough 
priority for marginal affiliates relative to other things in life. Applying rational choice theory, it is 
correct to say that active affiliates find more benefits and gains by attending regularly, so much 
                                                 
10 Clark and Schellenberg (2006: 4) indicate that in Canada, 37% of those who rarely attend religious services and 
27% of those who never attend services engage in weekly religious practices in the home.  
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so that they are willing to attend regularly in spite of their equally busy schedules. I demonstrate 
this with empirical evidence in chapter four. 
The high level of spiritual belief and practice in Emily‘s home is interesting, and maybe 
surprising to some. It is true that some marginal affiliates that I interviewed have very low levels 
of belief and practice in the home, but Emily is not unique in her ways. Spirituality is important 
to her. Moreover, like Emerson, Emily wants her children to be raised with strong morals and 
values which she believes are found in religion and through trained specialists in religious 
settings. 
Finally, Emily Foster‘s experiences once more illustrate the relationship between social 
ties and one‘s level of religious involvement. She ultimately stopped attending because her father 
passed away and she did not have other strong ties to keep her at any congregation. When she did 
return sporadically, it was because of her husband and her mother-in-law. As we‘ll explore in 
chapter four, the nature and type of social ties that a person has is strongly correlated to their 




 Debbie Fisher: A Sporadic Marginal Affiliate  
 
Debbie Fisher and I met in a coffee shop on a bitterly cold afternoon in January. Plenty of 
people were buzzing around, hoping to warm up with a hot beverage, but this did not detract 
from our task at hand: discussing Debbie‘s religious beliefs and practices. Debbie, a forty-three 
year-old wife and mother of two, was shy throughout the interview and sometimes struggled to 
articulate her beliefs and experiences. Probing questions and a gentle approach helped Debbie 
open up about her life.  
                                                 
11 A footnote to Emily‘s story is that some marginal affiliates that I interviewed, unlike Emily, ran away from church 
because someone they loved died and they blamed God for not intervening and saving them. They were filled with 
anger and hurt, and questioned God amidst their pain, leading them to the conclusion that they could not depend on 
God and thus it was foolish to continue to regularly participate in a religious group. 
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Debbie has a high school education and is currently a cash clerk, having also worked as a 
receptionist and newspaper courier in the past. Debbie grew up in Calgary as a single child. Her 
father was in the armed forces for a period of time before working in a warehouse. Her mother 
worked several jobs over many years, including lunch-room supervisor at school, in-home child 
care worker, jeweller, and bar tender. Debbie‘s parents never attended religious services, though 
her mother was ―very much a believer.‖ Her mother shared her personal religious beliefs with 
Debbie, emphasizing the importance of Christmas and Easter: ―She believed it was important to 
know . . . for instance, the difference with Christmas . . . Christmas isn‘t about Santa Claus. It‘s 
not about presents. There‘s actually a meaning behind it . . . why it actually happens . . . and she 
felt that that was very important to explain that to me.‖ This was the extent of her family‘s 
religiosity as she grew up.  
Debbie valued the religious beliefs and stories that her mother passed on, and developed 
an interest in Christianity. Around the time that this interest developed, Debbie‘s neighbours 
offered her a children‘s Bible and volunteered to bring her to church and Sunday school, which 
Debbie appreciated and acted on. She cannot remember the church‘s denomination, but she 
remembers that she had a lot of fun attending, meeting friends, and learning more about God. 
After attending for at least a year, she is pretty sure that her neighbours moved away, at which 
point she stopped attending. When she entered her teen years she got involved with a youth group 
where the pastor organized activities and prayer sessions. She enjoyed this very much. At the end 
of high school she moved away where she then lost all ties to any type of religious group activity. 
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Right after high school, Debbie struggled to adjust to young adulthood. Living on her own 
and trying to figure out her place in the world was a fearful endeavour.
12
 It was at this time of her 
life that she met her husband-to-be, which she expresses was a ―blessing in disguise, actually. It 
was kind of like the knight . . . [to] rescue me . . . I was so young, still, at that time . . . he was 
kind of my support system.‖ As they considered marriage, they contemplated marrying in a 
Catholic church since her husband-to-be was Catholic (although a non-practicing one), but they 
ran into some roadblocks: ―We had some difficulties trying to get married. We wanted to get 
married through a Catholic church, and we were told no because I was not Catholic.‖ 
I asked Debbie, ―How did it make you feel when you were told that you couldn‘t be 
married in the Roman Catholic Church because of the fact that you weren‘t Catholic but that he 
was?‖ She replied, ―Oh, I guess my nose was out of joint . . . when I thought about it, I didn‘t feel 
that I should have to convert to be able to get married in the Catholic Church . . . and I would 
have had to have taken a course. It‘s not just that . . . to do that. At least, that‘s what we were told 
. . . And I wasn‘t going to be taken as is. I had to be someone different before they would accept 
me, and I think that was the whole point.‖ Among other reasons that will be explored in chapter 
six, interpersonal or intra-organizational tension such as what Debbie experienced factored into 
why some marginal affiliates that I met, who once attended a church regularly, no longer do 
today. Many individuals were driven away from ongoing involvement in their church because of 
tension with other people in their religious group or their church‘s judgmental or selfish approach 
to people. On top of this, some that I interviewed justified why they are not more involved in 
―religion‖ by citing the atrocious things that religious groups have been involved with, such as 
financial and sexual scandals, and wars.  
                                                 
12 See Smith and Snell (2009) and Wuthnow (2007) for an overview of the main challenges that young adults face in 
contemporary society, including things like post-secondary education, delayed marriage, uncertainties of work and 
money, and strained relationships.    
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Following her set back at the Catholic Church, Debbie ended up marrying in a Salvation 
Army church. She could not speak for her husband, but Debbie believed strongly in the necessity 
of being married in a church (including a desire for her children to be married in a church when 
they do marry), and to have Bible readings at the heart of the ceremony:  
I think they have great meaning, and I think they‘re something to live by, I guess, 
somewhat like a contract in your marriage . . . to some degree, I think those things should 
be incorporated into your marriage, and I think that the vows that you make have a lot to 
do with that, as well. Like, I think . . . it‘s one package . . . I don‘t think marriage is 
something to be taken lightly, and that is the place to be doing it. 
 
Similar to the question that I asked Emerson, I asked Debbie if the Bible readings from her 
wedding ceremony had any impact on her marriage. She responded, ―No. No, I don‘t . . . well, I 
shouldn‘t say that. I‘m not so sure how my husband . . . I can‘t speak for him, but . . . yeah, I 
guess it would. It would because how I treat him . . . how I act as a person in general, not just 
with him but with anybody else that I‘m involved with . . . Yeah, so in my marriage and outside 
of the marriage, too, I guess, it carries over, as well. So, I guess, yeah.‖ Looking into the future, 
Debbie says that she would like her funeral to also be held in a church for the same reasons that 
she was married in a church. The religious readings and themes are too important to life to leave 
out of these momentous occasions.  
 Debbie claims that religion has a greater significance in her life since being married and 
having children. She believes that it is incredibly important to share her religious beliefs and 
practices with her children. For example, she does not want her kids to associate Christmas solely 
with money and presents. For her, Christmas is about connecting with a higher power—a being 
they can turn to in difficult times (something she says she has done in difficult circumstances). 
She helps instil these values in her children each night when she prays with them and encourages 
them to tell God what they are thankful for each day. She also gave her son a Bible which he has 
apparently read in its entirety a couple of times, even though she does not read it. 
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 I then asked if she ever attends religious services, and if so, whether her children attend 
with her. Immediately I could tell that my question stirred up strong emotions inside of Debbie, 
feelings that were difficult for her to verbalize. She gently hinted at the fact that her husband did 
not approve of her and her children attending religious services either for religious holidays or on 
a weekly basis. She does not discuss these things with her husband because it introduces 
unwanted tension in the family, and she cannot pinpoint if her husband had a previous negative 
experience in the church that would precipitate his negative reaction. This awareness of his 
disapproval of church involvement largely limits greater participation for her and her children. 
Another marginal affiliate male that I interviewed offered similar information about attending 
church occasionally, stating that ―family more than anything just thought it was crazy. They‘re, 
like . . . ‗What are you doing that for? What are you wasting your time for?‘‖ He went on to say 
that he attends on his own: ―I don‘t even tell them I‘m going there. I‘m just, you know, going out 
for a walk . . . don‘t tell them and don‘t have to feel as . . . uncomfortable.‖  
 Debbie‘s current level of church involvement is limited to when she is invited to attend a 
wedding or a funeral, or when she occasionally drops into an open church or hospital chapel to 
pray and think about life. She does not identify with a specific denomination, like several 
marginal affiliates that I met.
13
 I ask her about why she spontaneously visits a church or chapel to 
pray. Her response is insightful: 
Reconnect, I guess . . . with the symbol, maybe. The symbol of the building, the symbol 
of the church or the chapel. To me, the house of God, I guess. That‘s how it is . . . It just 
feels better . . . To gain a closer connection, I guess. To me, that would be the bottom line: 
just a closer connection or feeling closer . . . I think it‘s a connection with God, and I 
think it‘s a connection with me . . . like, a one-on-one, you know…I feel a closer 
connection . . . when I‘m actually in the church or . . . or a chapel or whatever . . . It might 
sound funny, but it just feels more holy, a little bit more . . . stronger . . . a closer 
                                                 
13 Outside of Roman Catholicism, no single denomination is represented more among marginal affiliates in my 
sample than those who do not associate with a particular denomination (see ―Appendix A‖).  
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connection. You know, it‘s the house of God . . . it‘s what it resembles. It‘s a symbol . . . 
it just feels like I‘m in it and not outside of it.  
 
She then discusses the community and warm atmosphere she finds in churches, going back to her 
teen years. However, she does not believe that people need separate religious institutions to find 
community or to be religious or spiritual. An individual‘s desire for community and for 
opportunities to share one‘s burdens with others can equally be fulfilled in other social outlets 
(e.g., at work). Despite not attending religious services regularly, Debbie is confident that she 
holds to the core religious values her mother passed along. These include being a good person, 
praying to God, reflecting on life, believing in God‘s sacrifice for people, and looking forward to 
eternal life.   
 As with Emerson, Debbie considers religion and spirituality to be private matters. She 
rejects those who try to force their religion upon others. When talking about how influential 
religious groups should be in shaping people‘s beliefs and practices (including her own), she 
offers the following comments: 
I think you take from it what you want, basically. It‘s up to each individual what they . . . 
walk away with . . . like, perhaps, it means certain things to different people . . . Like I 
said, it‘s a personal journey . . . I mean, the foundation is there, but, perhaps, one person 
from the next might take away something totally different from it.  
 
Consequently, this value of individualism facilitated nine marginal affiliates in my study 
to abandon previous involvement in a church. Either parents decided to give their teen children 
the option to attend or people simply grew tired of submitting to church rules and authority. As I 
will expand on in chapter six, individualism is a significant challenge that religious organizations 
are up against, a finding that resonates with studies in recent decades (see e.g., Adams 2006; 
Bibby 1987, 1993, 2006; Bruce 2002; Dillon and Wink 2007; Roof 1993, 1999; Roof and 
McKinney 1987; Smith and Denton 2005; Smith and Snell 2009; Wuthnow 1998). 
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In contrast to almost every other marginal affiliate I interviewed, Debbie indicates a 
desire for greater involvement in a religious group. In addition to her husband‘s restrictions on 
greater involvement, Debbie says that if she had adequate transportation to get to and from 
church (she does not drive), she would consider attending more regularly. She also suggests that 
if church services were offered on a weeknight, then she would contemplate more involvement. 
She was very confident that if a religious group was located next door to her and if they offered 
services at a different time of the week that she would attend more regularly. When I probed if 
she had ever attempted to get more involved before, either in a church in her neighbourhood, or a 
church that offers mid-week services, she replied, ―No, I haven‘t, other than . . . at one point in 
my marriage, I did talk about it with my husband . . . about attending, and that was shut down 
very quickly. And so, like I said, based on . . . what I‘ve told you . . . it makes it difficult. Then it 
never went any further than that.‖ While there appears to be merit in the supply-side argument, 
that if religious groups adjusted their supply of religion, then people would respond with greater 
involvement, Debbie‘s story suggests that factors beyond religious groups‘ control (i.e., her 
husband) are more powerful in influencing her involvement in a church. Only two other 
interviewees showed a genuine desire for greater involvement, each providing reasons beyond 
any church‘s control (e.g., the social cost of losing friends or if they were at a different stage of 
life). I expand on these themes in chapter six. 
Debbie‘s account resonates in three ways with several other marginal affiliates‘ 
experiences. First, social support plays a role in a person‘s attendance patterns. She began 
attending religious services as a child because her neighbours invited her, and she stopped 
attending when her neighbours moved away. As a young adult, her husband filled a needed social 
support, something that many claim to find in a religious community. Put another way, if 
people‘s social needs are met outside of churches, which Debbie‘s are, then there is less of a 
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chance that they will seek a church for social reasons. Further to this, Debbie‘s hesitation to 
attend more regularly today is because of her husband‘s negative response toward these actions.  
Second, when we compare Becky‘s story with Debbie‘s and try to understand why some 
people do not return to the church after a period when they were actively involved and then left, 
we see that religious suppliers play a role. In Becky‘s case, people from her congregation openly 
and generously encouraged her to return and she was warmly received. Debbie‘s experience with 
the Catholic Church at the time of her marriage illustrates the alienating impact of a ―we‘ll accept 
you, but only if you change‖ stance, even if this was not the religious tradition that she was raised 
in. Other marginal affiliates provided me with countless examples of ways in which people in 
their congregation hurt them, preventing them from considering greater involvement again. Some 
marginal affiliates that I interviewed also discuss ways in which God let them down as a catalyst 
for decreased involvement. I turn to some of these examples when I test and apply various 
aspects of rational choice theory.  
Finally, Debbie identifies sacred space in a religious building as influential for her 
sporadic religious attendance patterns. The idea that someone is closer to God and to themselves 
in a sacred space is not surprising, but it begs the question why someone would not pursue 
greater involvement if this was so important? Maybe the answer is that it really is not that 
important for marginal affiliates, an idea that I test in response to Bibby‘s renaissance thesis in 
chapter six. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I set out to document some of the main similarities and differences among 
the active and marginal affiliates that I interviewed. To briefly summarize some of the major 
observations, we learn from Andrew Donnelly‘s narrative that most active affiliates in this 
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sample claim to orient their entire worldview based upon their religious values. This is clear 
when Andrew speaks of his Christian faith as a master status in his life, or when Andrew and 
Becky Eagleton place more importance on their Christian identification than their denominational 
affiliation, or when Andrew admits to submitting control of his life over to God. In my sample, 
active affiliates are distinct from marginal affiliates in this regard.  
Becky‘s experience of relying on God amidst her fears to fly on an airplane illustrates 
another common trait among the active affiliates that I met, that they are more likely than 
marginal affiliates to depend on God and to believe that he cares about and is active in the world.  
Even though both active and marginal affiliates in my study are critical of the term 
―religion‖ and the dogma and legalism that they believe accompanies this word, they both value 
trained specialists who can instruct them in the ways of their faith. Becky, an active affiliate, 
values the insights that she gains from her pastor, while Emerson Cairns and Emily Foster, both 
marginal affiliates, believe that religious leaders can provide their children with better religious 
instruction than they can as parents.  
Active and marginal affiliates also discuss the benefits of interacting with like-minded 
individuals in a church setting, mainly to reinforce their religious belief system. However, actives 
maintain that more regular attendance is necessary to fully benefit from the community of 
believers, to strengthen their belief system, and to help frame their daily experiences in a 
meaningful way.  
Both groups also demonstrate a propensity to elevate individual beliefs and practices over 
the minister or the church‘s beliefs, evidenced in each of the vignettes in this chapter. Still, 
marginal affiliates are more adamant that the individual is the ultimate authority of truth, best 
summarized in Emerson‘s statement that everyone is ―entitled to their own [beliefs].‖ 
 63 
Not surprisingly, a person‘s religious habits are strongly influenced by their social ties. 
For Becky, her boyfriend contributed to her declining involvement at church, and her close 
friends facilitated her eventual return. Cam Bender first entertained the thought of regular church 
attendance because his brother encouraged him to read a book about the Christian life, which 
included a discussion of getting involved in a church community. Emily Foster stopped attending 
religious services because her father passed away. Debbie Fisher chooses not to pursue greater 
involvement in a church because of the negative reaction from her husband. Each of these 
examples exemplifies the central place that people‘s social ties have in their religious decision-
making processes.     
In terms of belief in and desire for life after death, the marginal affiliates that I 
interviewed are less likely to believe in the afterlife or to strongly desire life after death. This 
point is apparent when comparing Becky and Emerson‘s accounts. Moreover, marginal affiliates 
are more vague in what they believe is required to obtain life after death, if there is a next life at 
all. The exception among the active affiliates that I interviewed is those who participate in a 
United Church of Canada congregation, such as Cam Bender. 
From my interviews we discover that marginal affiliates attend religious services largely 
because of tradition (Emerson, Emily, and Debbie), an opportunity to spend time with family 
(Emerson and Emily), a chance to connect with a higher power (Debbie), and to develop good 
morals and values in their life (Emerson, Emily, and Debbie). Based on their own 
acknowledgements, it is doubtful that most, if any, marginal affiliates will actually pursue more 
involvement in their church; mainly because they are too busy for church, or the church or God 
has let them down, or they do not see the need for an external religious authority to tell them 
what to think and how to behave. 
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As we can see in this chapter, active and marginal affiliates are not homogeneous groups. 
Individuals have different life stories, experiences, and worldviews, and their religious beliefs 
and practices vary. Still, there are some overarching traits that help to distinguish active and 
marginal affiliates. These topics, and others, are central to the discussion and analysis in the 
chapters that follow. By explaining and applying rational choice theory, and secularization 
theory, we gain added insights into what explains higher and lower levels of religious 
involvement among active and marginal affiliates, while testing some of the suppositions that are 
central to these theories as well.
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Chapter 3 
Rational Choice Theory and the Sociology of Religion 
Introduction 
I now turn to Rational Choice Theory (RCT) to explain some of the findings presented in 
the last chapter (and those observations yet to come in the dissertation). The need to deal with 
RCT can be addressed in three ways. The most obvious reason is that RCT market language is 
found throughout Bibby‘s (1987, 1993, 2002) analysis of religion in Canada. A full assessment of 
Bibby‘s work, particularly his renaissance thesis, requires a sound grasp of his theoretical 
framework, especially since some of the limitations of his analysis are rooted in the flaws of 
RCT.  
A second reason is that some see RCT as the new theoretical paradigm in the sociology of 
religion, replacing the old secularization model (see Jelen 2002; Warner 1993; Young 1997). 
Like Bruce (1999: 30), I would not go this far as I still find merit in the secularization paradigm. I 
think each theory contributes to a more informed assessment of the other. Still, I am aware of the 
increased attention that RCT has received in contemporary sociology of religion, and I see its 
usefulness for making sense of religious attitudes and behaviours.  
Finally, while one of RCT‘s strengths is its emphasis on theory, some of its core axioms 
and propositions lack concrete empirical data. This is the case with aspects of the argument 
advanced in Rodney Stark and Roger Finke‘s Acts of Faith (2000), and Laurence Iannaconne‘s 
article, ―Skewness Explained: A Rational Choice Model of Religious Giving‖ (1997a). 
Iannaccone openly admits that he does not know whether or not people are rational, but that 
rational choice assumptions have been useful in the social sciences for building and testing 
models of human behaviour. He goes on to encourage empirical research that addresses micro-
level questions relative to rational choice theory and religion (1997a: 41). Steve Bruce (1999: 43-
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44, 121), Mark Chaves (1995: 99), N. Jay Demerath III (1995: 105-106), and Mary Jo Neitz and 
Peter Mueser (1997: 111-117) all echo Iannaconne‘s endorsement of micro-level research, calling 
for qualitative studies that examine individuals‘ stories, cultural context, the variation between 
cases, and religious production processes. To my knowledge, this study is one of the first 
attempts to empirically test some of Rational Choice Theory‘s foundational axioms and 
propositions. 
Among the many axioms and propositions in RCT, I single out three themes in this 
dissertation: religious costs and rewards, religious supply and demand, as well as the social 
nature of religion. I isolate these topics because (a) they are central to rational choice theorists‘ 
attempts to explain religious behaviour (themes that largely have gone untested), (b) they directly 
intersect with the fundamental assumptions surrounding Bibby‘s renaissance thesis, and (c) they 
are most relevant and useful for comparing and explaining the main similarities and differences 
between the active and marginal affiliates that I interviewed. 
The following questions are examples of how these three themes can help us to test and 
explain RCT and Bibby‘s renaissance thesis, and to further compare active and marginal 
affiliates.
1
 In terms of costs and rewards, how exactly do active and marginal affiliates make 
sense of the religious rewards that they pursue and the religious costs involved to obtain those 
rewards, and how do past exchanges with the gods and others influence current and future 
religious decision-making processes? For instance, comparing Becky Eagleton and Emerson 
Cairns‘ belief in or desire for life after death reveals that they view religious rewards differently 
that, in turn, impacts their religious beliefs and behaviours. How might we explain this? With 
respect to religious supply and demand, do people have an inexhaustible demand for rewards that 
                                                 
1 The language used in these questions is drawn from Stark and Finke (2000), the most prominent proponents of 
Rational Choice Theory.  
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only religion provides, such as life after death, and do people turn to religious groups primarily 
for religious reasons? Is the supply of religion really the main variable to consider in shaping 
people‘s religious preferences and motivating them to commit to a religious organization? 
Emerson, Emily, and Debbie‘s stories each suggest that they do not necessarily turn to their 
religious group for religious reasons, and when asked about their potential future involvement in 
their group, they reveal factors that are largely beyond religious groups‘ control. These 
observations at least raise the need to explore these rational choice assumptions further, 
particularly when they are so important for Bibby‘s renaissance thesis. Regarding the social 
aspect of religion, is it true that an individual‘s confidence in religious explanations is 
strengthened when others express confidence in them, when individuals participate in religious 
rituals, and when people conserve their social and religious capital? If this is the case, then to 
what degree and how precisely is this the case? The vignettes in chapter two reveal that social ties 
are correlated with people‘s religious involvements, and addressing these questions about 
confidence in religious explanations may help us to further, and more precisely, evaluate whether 
or not the rational choice claims resonate with humans‘ lived experiences. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the basic premises behind RCT relative to 
sociology as a whole and the study of religion within sociology. Following this I explain some of 
the drawbacks of RCT in the sociological study of religion. Admittedly, this chapter is dense but 
it sets the needed context for the next chapter, where I will draw on my interview data to 
empirically test fundamental axioms and propositions in RCT. My goal is to follow Chaves‘ 
(1995: 99) example of evaluating and testing particular aspects of RCT that either lack empirical 
data or are logically suspect and thus need further examination. Upon examining my interview 
data from both active and marginal affiliates, I will argue that RCT has, in part, failed to 
satisfactorily deal with the topics of religious costs and rewards, religious supply and demand, as 
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well as the social nature of religion. This exploratory exercise, if nothing else, may validate the 
theory or will raise some legitimate challenges for it—both beneficial to the advancement of 
knowledge.  
Rational Choice Theory 
RCT has gained momentum as a universal theory to predict and explain social life, a 
theory influenced by economists, sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, and 
anthropologists. Of its many objectives, one is to elevate the role of theory in academic inquiry 
where some believe rigorous deductive theorizing is lacking (Iannaccone 1988, 1995a; Stark 
1997; Stark and Bainbridge 1996 [1987]). Rational choice theorists believe that this endeavour 
will provide theories mutually applicable and useful to fields like sociology, psychology, and 
economics. In the sociology of religion RCT has received growing interest for its theoretical 
rigor, primarily because of the work of sociologists and economists. Therefore, to fully appreciate 
the assumptions and application of RCT to the study of religion, it is useful to first summarize the 
basic ideas about humans as rational actors, found in sociology and economics.   
In sociology, George Homans (1961) and Peter Blau‘s (1964) exchange theories are 
especially influential, incorporating behaviourist and economic ideas into theories about social 
structure, power, and inequality. George Homans‘ behaviouristic exchange theory proposes that 
we can better explain the social structures around us if we understand humans‘ face-to-face 
interactions. He posits that human interaction is based on the realization that others meet our 
needs by conferring rewards and punishments. In this people pursue rewards that they attach a 
high value to, but recognize that the probability of certain goals being met is not always high. 
Homans expresses this in the following formula: Action = Value x Probability. The course of 
action that one chooses is dependent upon the value of the reward along with the likelihood that 
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the reward will be received. For instance, if Action1 is highly valued (e.g., 100), but the 
probability of that action being successful is low (e.g., .10), and if Action2 is less desirable (e.g., 
50), but the likelihood of that action‘s success is higher (.90), then the second action will be 
chosen (since 100 x .10 = 10 and 50 x .90 = 45).  
Peter Blau‘s (1964) dialectical exchange theory conjectures that the more rewards (and 
valued rewards) that one expects to gain from another, the more likely it is that they will enter a 
relationship with that person. In this, past exchanges impact current and future exchanges. If past 
exchanges were reciprocal, leaving both parties satisfied, then the greater the chance that future 
exchanges would take place. Yet, while some individuals have services that others want, this 
does not mean that the ―wanting‖ individual necessarily has something of equal value to offer in 
return. Power dynamics often ensue, where the person with most of the perceived power can 
generate compliance from the other. The fewer alternatives that the ―wanting‖ person has, the 
more valuable the reward offered by the person in power becomes. Further, the less the 
―wanting‖ individual can survive without the desired reward, the more power the other has to 
dictate the terms of exchange.  
In economics Laurence Iannaccone is known for his deductive approach to studying 
religion, influenced largely by economist and sociologist Gary Becker (1976). Becker‘s economic 
understanding of human behaviour is grounded in three assumptions: maximizing behaviour, 
market equilibrium, and stable preferences. The first idea proposes that people make decisions 
with the goal of maximizing gains and minimizing costs. This applies to everything from 
choosing a chocolate bar to one‘s friends, a job, or a church. The second element of his theory 
indicates that suppliers of a product (e.g., religious groups) constantly adjust to consumers‘ 
demands. Finally, Becker highlights that individual preferences are stable and that any changes in 
the market economy are most often due to changes in supply.     
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Some researchers who study religion have built a theory on this framework, namely 
Rodney Stark, William Sims Bainbridge, Roger Finke, and Laurence Iannaccone (though Rodney 
Stark is the central figure). Three books in particular stand out: The Future of Religion (Stark and 
Bainbridge 1985), A Theory of Religion (Stark and Bainbridge 1996 [1987]), and Acts of Faith 
(Stark and Finke 2000).
2
 Here rational choice theorists have explored an array of topics at both 
the micro- and macro-levels, including: involvement in ―strict‖ congregations, the problem of 
―free riders,‖ religious conversion, religious monopolies and religious pluralism, secularization, 
and the nature, rise, and distribution of sects and cults. Without question an entire chapter could 
be devoted to summarizing and critically engaging each of these topics (see e.g., Bruce 1999; 
Bryant 2000; Young 1997). However, as already noted, three themes are pertinent to better 
understanding the similarities and differences between active and marginal affiliates, and 
evaluating Bibby‘s renaissance thesis: religious costs and rewards, religious supply and demand, 
as well as the social nature of religion. 
 
A Theory of Costs and Rewards 
 
The rational choice theory of religion is built on a particular definition of religion and 
subsequent ideas about costs, rewards, and compensators. Drawing on the work of anthropologist 
James Frazer, Stark and Bainbridge (1985: 5) claim that religion is based on a belief in the 
supernatural and that the supernatural is actively involved in shaping events on earth, while 
humans attempt to please the supernatural in the process. They define religion as ―human 
                                                 
2 For more discussion and application of rational choice theory in the study of religion, see Brewer, Jozefowicz, and 
Stonebraker 2006; Ellison 1995; Finke and Stark 2005; Iannaccone 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1997a, 
1997b; Iannaccone, Olson, and Stark 1995; Iannaccone and Everton 2004; Olson and Perl 2005; Stark and 
Bainbridge 1996 [1987]; Stark and Iannaccone 1994. 
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With this definition as their base, Stark and Bainbridge provide three axioms that explain 
human behaviour in general, but that can be applied to the study of religion. Their first axiom, 
following the tradition of social exchange theorists and economists, states that ―humans seek 
what they perceive to be rewards and try to avoid what they perceive to be costs‖ (Stark and 
Bainbridge 1985: 5). By rewards, Stark and Bainbridge (1996 [1987]: 27) mean ―anything 
humans will incur costs to obtain,‖ while costs are ―whatever humans attempt to avoid.‖ As an 
example, Stark and Bainbridge (1985), in their discussion of sects and cults, comment that those 
who choose to join deviant religious groups incur social costs of alienation and stigmatization, 
from friends, family, and the broader society. In return, they gain religious and secular rewards 
such as inner peace, social support from fellow believers, and financial support from the religious 
community.  
The pursuit of rewards and avoidance of costs is sometimes influenced by individuals‘ 
social and biographical context and individual preferences. For example, Stark and Bainbridge 
(1985: 102-103) assert that those in positions of power in religious organizations place a higher 
value on worldly rewards, such as power or popularity. The powerless, on the other hand, desire 
other-worldly rewards such as eternal bliss, to make-up for the lack of material wealth on earth. 
In sum, like the economist, the rational choice theorist in the sociology of religion believes that 
religious decisions are made like non-religious decisions, by freely pursuing rewards and 
avoiding costs.  
A major criticism that sociologists initially directed against RCT was that actors, when 
making religious decisions, do not actually have as much agency as rational theorists lead us to 
                                                 
3 I define and explain ―compensators‖ later in this section.  
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believe. Instead, a variety of external factors bind people‘s attitudes and actions. One constraint is 
social ties (Bruce 1999: 78, 126-127; Ellison 1995: 95; Sherkat 1997: 68). The way that a person 
is socialized influences what religious beliefs and practices are ―normal‖ or ―deviant,‖ desirable 
or undesirable: 
For instance, individuals socialized within more lenient groups and traditions may find 
the very notion of imposing sacrifice and stigma repugnant – a violation of personal 
privacy, a denial of personal autonomy, or a diversion from ‗true‘ spiritual pursuits. Thus, 
when selecting a new religious affiliation, they may begin by excluding some or all strict 
groups from the field of possible choices – perhaps out of opposition to religious 
demands, or because of other biases and social pressures against joining strict groups. 
Similarly, persons raised within strict traditions may well exclude more lenient groups 
from serious consideration, viewing those groups as outside the pale of ‗real‘ religion 
(Ellison 1995: 95).  
 
This is why Becky Eagleton stated that if she were to look for a different church, she would not 
entertain a Roman Catholic congregation because their beliefs and practices deviate too much 
from her evangelical Protestant roots. In this sense religion is not so much an achieved status 
(though it could be), but rather an ascribed status at birth. Further, social ties, like Debbie 
Fisher‘s husband, can be equally restrictive for a person‘s religious decision-making processes, 
which in Debbie‘s case limits her from pursuing greater involvement in a church.  
Another constraint is lack of available options (Heath 1976: 46). Those in the remote 
jungles of Africa have a different quantity and quality of food options than those in Toronto. The 
types of congregations available to someone in a hamlet of 200 people versus a large city of three 
million influences the amount of choice that a person has. This is important to realize when RCT 
implies that religious consumers can shop around for the best religious product to meet their 
needs. The theory is too simple to fit reality.   
Stark and Finke acknowledged these limitations in later revisions to the theory, stating 
that ―people make religious choices in the same way that they make other choices, by weighing 
the costs against the benefits . . . within the limits of their information and understanding, 
 73 
restricted by available options, guided by their preferences and tastes, humans attempt to make 
rational choices‖ (2000: 85). By adding these qualifications, Stark and Finke respond to their 
critics by stressing the subjective nature and interpretation of what it means to be rational. It is 
inaccurate to suggest that a decision is irrational just because someone has limited or faulty 
information, but rather it is the intention of rationality amidst the available information and 
options that is important to bear in mind. Stark and Finke equally acknowledge that social ties 
can be a constraining factor, but this does not mean that these constraints are not accounted for as 
individuals make rational choices about what religion they choose to believe and practice. In the 
end, Stark and Finke still advocate for the view that individuals possess high levels of agency in 
decision-making processes, and they call on sociologists to look objectively at people‘s decisions, 
their processes for arriving at those decisions, and then evaluate the impact of those decisions 
(also see Bruce 1999: 36).4  
Stark and Bainbridge‘s (1985: 6) second axiom suggests that rewards are not always 
accessible to all people and some rewards are not available at all. For instance, power is a scarce 
resource. Not everyone can be in positions of power. Or consider eternal life, which is 
supposedly ―the single most urgent human desire‖ (Stark and Bainbridge 1985: 6), and yet is 
assumed to be unavailable in this world. The question that inevitably arises is how and why do 
people continue to pursue rewards that are, for all intents, unattainable? 
The answer emerges in Stark and Bainbridge‘s third axiom: people create, exchange, and 
accept compensators. A compensator is ―the belief that a reward will be obtained in the distant 
future or in some other context which cannot be immediately verified‖ (Stark and Bainbridge 
                                                 
4 Despite Stark and Finke‘s revisions to their theory, they can still be criticized for advancing a theory that is not 
falsifiable. According to their theory, it is impossible to falsify their fundamental claim that all actions are based on 
rational processes. However, their theory differs from economic settings where it is straightforward to quantify one‘s 
pursuit of maximization of utilities (and thus to demonstrate irrational decisions). In many ways, their theory is filled 
with tautologies. 
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1985: 6). They quickly point out that this term is not intended to be derogatory, as in the way 
Marx suggests that religion is a drug for the masses. Instead, the word describes how people 
create beliefs about how to gain a reward in the future when it is not immediately available.  
Stark and Bainbridge talk about two types of compensators, specific and general. Specific 
compensators deal with rewards in a limited way (e.g., a child is promised candy if they clean 
their room), while general compensators promise rewards that are far reaching in their 
consequences (e.g., the belief that life has meaning or that there is life after death). Regardless of 
the type of compensator, each are akin to delayed gratification or an IOU, and they give the 
individual or group the sense that it has control over accessing desired rewards. As sociologists of 
religion have tracked for decades, religion is one of the most powerful legitimating frameworks 
for people to make sense of the world. When it comes to religious compensators, people believe 
that if they abide by certain rules (e.g., do not steal), then they have control over the most general 
religious rewards, such as experiencing a happier life now and an eternal one later. Both Andrew 
Donnelly and Becky Eagleton, and others who I interviewed that are like them, exemplify Stark 
and Bainbridge‘s points about the role that compensators can play in shaping a person‘s religious 
orientation toward the world, both in this life and the next. 
In A Theory of Religion (1996 [1987]), Stark and Bainbridge modified their definition of 
compensator to accommodate a new term, ―explanation,‖ in their theory. By definition, 
―explanations are statements about how and why rewards may be obtained and costs are 
incurred‖ (1996 [1987]: 30). When rewards are not readily available, humans create and accept 
explanations about how their reward can be obtained in the future (1996 [1987]: 35). Given the 
close proximity of this definition to their initial idea of compensator, Stark and Bainbridge 
redefined compensator to mean ―postulations of reward according to explanations that are not 
readily susceptible to unambiguous evaluation‖ (1996 [1987]: 36). When comparing their 
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original definition of compensator with the later additions of explanation and compensator, 
confusion ensues. It appears that the first definition of compensator and the definition of 
explanation are very similar if not identical, leaving the new conceptualization of compensator 
redundant and less useful (see Bruce 1999: 31-33). As a result, Stark and Finke eliminated the 
idea of compensators altogether in their latest version of the theory, relying instead on the word 
explanations or ―conceptual simplifications or models of reality that provide plans designed to 
guide action‖ (2000: 87). Stark and Finke once again ascertain that individuals create and accept 
explanations for obtaining rewards in the future. Furthermore, Stark and Finke adjusted their 
initial classification of religion to more accurately reflect the shifts in their theoretical language: 
―Religion consists of very general explanations of existence, including the terms of exchange 
with a god or gods‖ (2000: 91).  
 What makes this theory directly applicable to religion is its insistence that some rewards, 
such as eternal life or an understanding of the meaning of life, can only be obtained when one 
assumes that the supernatural exists and is responsible for giving the reward to individuals (Stark 
and Bainbridge 1985: 7). Not only this, but throughout Stark, Bainbridge, and Finke‘s work we 
find that they believe that most if not all people desire life after death. Stark and Bainbridge insist 
that ―the single most urgent human desire‖ is eternal life (1985: 6). They go on to suggest that 
―so long as humans intensely seek certain rewards of great magnitude that remain unavailable 
through direct actions, they will be able to obtain credible compensators only from sources 
predicated on the supernatural‖ (p.7-8). In A Theory of Religion, Stark and Bainbridge (1996 
[1987]: 315) comment that ―all humans share the desire for very general rewards, such as 
everlasting life, which seem unavailable to anyone this side of paradise.‖ Stark and Finke argue 
that ―religion is the only plausible source of certain rewards for which there is a general and 
inexhaustible demand‖ (2000: 85).  
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When we consider these axioms sequentially, along with the rational choice definition of 
religion, an implicit assumption becomes clear: individuals and groups believe that the gods (if 
they exist) have some degree of control over who obtains religious rewards (both in this world 
and the next).  
(A) Religion is based on general explanations of existence and a belief in supernatural 
beings, who are involved in human affairs and who humans attempt to please.  
 
(B) Humans seek religious rewards and avoid religious costs.  
 
(C) Since not all rewards are available, people create, exchange, and accept explanations 
about how and why rewards can be obtained in the future.  
 
(D) All people desire life after death, a reward that is not empirically verifiable and is 
believed to be controlled by a supernatural force.  
 
Accordingly, rational choice theorists have extended social exchange theories to include 
exchanges between humans and the gods, premised on the human desire for religious rewards 
(Stark and Bainbridge 1996 [1987]: 81-86; Stark and Finke 2000: 83-113). However, what 
exactly are the terms of exchange between humans and the gods?   
The main factor to consider when exchanging with the gods is the costs. What are 
individuals willing to pay the gods and what factors influence this decision-making process? 
Stark and Finke (2000: 97-98) argue that humans will pay higher costs to the extent that the gods 
are believed to be dependable, responsive, and of great scope. A dependable god can be relied 
upon to keep their word with humans, a responsive god is concerned about and acts on behalf of 
humans, while a god of great scope has a diverse array of powers and range of influence with 
which to meet human needs. A god of great scope is especially appealing. In polytheistic settings, 
people shop between gods who have limited power to only heal illnesses or curse others or bring 
rain for farmers‘ crops or help a couple with fertility. Gods in these settings have limited power 
over a person‘s entire life. A monotheistic god, on the other hand, is believed to have a greater 
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scope of power over all facets of a person‘s life, both on earth and in the afterlife. The 
monotheistic god is more convenient because it is believed to be able to heal illnesses and curse 
others and bring rain for farmers‘ crops and help a couple with fertility (i.e., akin to one-stop 
shopping). The combination of these rewards, which in total is a single god‘s loyal protection of 
an individual in all aspects of life means that people are willing to pay higher costs in exchange 
for these valuable rewards. To the degree that individuals believe their god or gods score high in 
these areas, they are more likely to engage in extended and exclusive exchanges with them (p.99-
100).
5
 This means that people will make periodic payments over an extended period of time and 
they will make exchanges with one god only. 
Heath (1976: 7-18), Iannaccone (1997a: 33-35), and Stark and Finke (2000: 106-113) 
note that when individuals make exchanges (with people or gods), some exchanges are riskier 
than others. Riskless exchanges are those made after comparing all of the available options, and 
then proceeding with the one that gives the actor a high level of certainty that the desired 
outcome will occur. Riskless exchanges tend to be informed by past experiences, when 
individuals or groups experienced their god as dependable and responsive and in turn responded 
with extended and exclusive exchanges. In some ways, Becky Eagleton‘s experiences affirm this 
type of exchange, both when she decided to resume regular church involvement and when she 
(and those around her) prayed about her flight experience. A person‘s level of risk is also 
decreased when others share the same religious explanations and when they jointly participate in 
or witness an array of religious phenomena (e.g., religious rituals, prayers, miracles, or mystical 
experiences) (Heath 1976: 46; Iannaccone 1997a: 33-35; Stark and Finke 2000: 96-111).  
                                                 
5 The logical question is how does one know if a god has been dependable, responsive, or of great scope. Rational 
choice theorists point to past experiences; individuals will know from their past experiences whether their god has 
―delivered‖ in response to their sacrifices or prayers. In the next chapter I present data on questions that I asked 
active and marginal affiliates about their past experiences in these areas of dependability, responsiveness, and scope.    
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High risk exchanges involve people‘s attempts to minimize their losses rather than 
maximize their gains. This is why people have house insurance. The thought of losing all of one‘s 
possessions is a greater burden than spending ninety dollars a month to insure everything, even if 
one never uses the insurance. This is akin to Pascal‘s Wager, where people assume a 50/50 
chance that God exists. Rather than assuming that God does not exist and running the risk of 
going to hell, people choose to believe that God does exist. If they are correct, great, but if not, 
the costs are minimal, relative to the risks (i.e., cost) of eternal damnation. Some marginal 
affiliates that I interviewed adopt this position when it comes to attending church for religious 
holidays. One male in his early forties admits that ―if I don‘t attend then, I‘m going to hell.‖ 
Another marginal affiliate, a female in her late forties, comments about people in general and 
says that ―we were taught that if you don‘t go any other time of the year, you have to go then 
[Christmas and Easter]. Maybe they‘re afraid they won‘t go to heaven if they don‘t go.‖ I ask her 
if this is a personal fear, and she says, ―I guess I would feel that way.‖ I then asked if she shares 
the same fear for her children, if they do not attend for religious holidays, and she again 
responded affirmatively. In total, people‘s assessment of costs, rewards, and risks informs how 
and why they make exchanges with the gods.           
 
A Theory of Supply and Demand 
 
As has been demonstrated, rational choice theorists posit that individuals have a never 
ending demand for religion (see e.g., Bibby 2002, 2004; Iannaccone 1997a: 28-29; Stark 1997: 
46-48; Stark and Bainbridge 1985: 6-8, 431; Stark and Bainbridge 1996 [1987]: 101, 315; Stark 
and Finke 2000: 85, 89). But if this is true, how do we explain varying levels of religious belief 
and practice within and between nations?  
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One explanation is that there is variation in individuals‘ tastes and preferences (Stark and 
Finke 2000: 38, 86). Sometimes this is attributed to one‘s culture and the way that they are 
socialized. This is why preference for one religion over another takes place, or why certain styles 
of music are more preferable to others. Psychological and idiosyncratic variations also help to 
explain differences in tastes and preferences. A person‘s tastes are influenced by whether they are 
an introvert or extrovert, thinker or feeler, leader or follower. 
A second explanation, and the one that rational choice theorists endorse most, is that the 
supply of religion significantly shapes individuals‘ preferences and tastes (see Finke 1997; Finke 
and Stark 2005; Stark and Finke 2000; Stark and Iannaccone 1994). This idea emerged as Stark, 
Bainbridge, and Iannaccone pondered why America was considerably more religious than 
Europe. In their search for an answer they highlighted America‘s official separation of church 
and state, which created a setting for religious groups to openly compete for people‘s allegiances. 
This is in contrast to many European nations, such as France, Germany, Italy, or Belgium, where 
church and state are closely linked. To understand the intrinsic differences between these 
extremes they built on Peter Berger‘s (1967: 138) observation that religions confront a ―market 
situation‖ in religiously plural societies, and they introduced the idea of a ―religious economy:‖ 
―religious economies consist of a market of current and potential followers (demand), a set of 
organizations (suppliers) seeking to serve that market, and the religious doctrines and practices 
(products) offered by the various organizations‖ (Stark and Finke 2000: 36). Since RCT assumes 
that there is a constant demand for the things that religion has to offer, such as life after death, it 
follows that the supply-side should be closely examined to properly understand how and why 
religious economies change. Similar to secular businesses like McDonalds or Coca-Cola, 
religious groups succeed or fail in an unregulated economy because of their ability to effectively 
create, maintain, and market a product that people are interested in, which includes supervising 
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and motivating people‘s exchanges with the gods (Stark and Finke 2000: 103-113). What, then, 
distinguishes religious suppliers‘ effectiveness where religious pluralism is found versus a 
religious monopoly?  
Beginning with religious pluralism in the United States, RCT draws on economists‘ logic 
and presumes that with more market options comes increased competition between suppliers 
(Finke and Stark 2005; Stark and Finke 2000; Stark and Iannaccone 1994). We see this everyday 
as fast food restaurants, car companies, and hotels compete for people‘s loyalty. These types of 
companies set themselves apart from their competitors by sharpening their product with 
innovative marketing campaigns, reduced prices, free upgrades, healthier food choices, and toys 
for children. These companies believe that if they constantly improve their product, then people 
are more likely to consume their merchandise. Religion is no different. Competition between 
religions, such as between Jews, Christians, and Muslims, or competition within a religion, as 
between Anglicans, Baptists, and Pentecostals, entails that religious groups are vying for people‘s 
attention amidst a crowd of religious and non-religious ―voices.‖ Religious groups enhance their 
product by adjusting their music, preaching, programs, or doctrines, hopeful that more people 
will join their organization.  
Rational choice theorists posit that the result is that people not only turn to organizations 
that sharpen their supply, but they respond with high(er) commitment levels (Iannaccone 1994). 
Why? It is because people are willing to pay higher costs (i.e., commitment) when they believe 
the reward is of greater value, an idea that has been repeated over the years by rational choice 
theorists. Stark and Bainbridge state that ―the value of a reward is equivalent to the maximum 
cost a person would pay to obtain the reward‖ (1996 [1987]: 34). Stark and Bainbridge (1985) 
and Iannaccone (1994) claim that people are drawn to sects, as opposed to churches, because of 
the high rewards (e.g., assurance of being part of a chosen few, perception of belonging to a 
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‗true‘ family, and material and social benefits) involved, making them more willing to incur high 
costs (e.g., geographical separation from family and friends, stigma in society, and time and 
money) along the way. Stark and Finke reiterate these beliefs when they say that:  
Among religious organizations, there is a reciprocal relationship between expense and the 
value of the rewards of membership . . . to the extent that one is motivated by religious 
value, one must prefer a higher priced supplier. Not only do more expensive religious 
groups offer a far more valuable product, but in doing so, they generate levels of 
commitment needed to maximize individual levels of confidence in the religion (2000: 
145-147).  
 
If individuals come to value a particular religious brand, and they associate strongly desired 
rewards with that brand, then they are more likely to pay higher costs to ensure that they receive 
those rewards. This is what Stark and Finke conjecture has taken place in the United States, all 
because religious groups exist in a free market whereby they openly compete by sharpening their 
product and offering better rewards to retain current members and attract potential members.       
Conversely, in countries with a religious monopoly (i.e., state church) there is little 
competition because there are few, if any, religious options available. Examples include the 
Anglican Church in England, the Presbyterian Church in Scotland, the Lutheran Church in 
Germany, and the Roman Catholic Church in Italy. According to Stark and Finke (2000: 228-
239), many European religious organizations are weaker because they lack the impetus to 
sharpen their supply, sometimes growing more liberal in belief and practice with time since they 
have little fear of losing valuable social or financial support to other religious organizations. This 
is evident in four ways. First, some countries have allowed governments to influence local church 
theology in liberal leaning directions. For example, Scandinavian political leaders permitted 
female clergy and accepted religious leaders who did not profess a religious faith or were not 
baptized. As a result, the costs for membership (i.e., baptism) are reduced, and thus the reward 
value associated with membership in the organizations is less also.  
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Second, since the state pays for clergy salaries and church building upkeep (in Germany, 
for example), it is likely that clergy become lazy and complacent when it comes to improving 
their product to attract more people. After all, why would it matter if there are ten people or one-
thousand people in the congregation if attendance and giving does not influence salary? 
Third, lazy clergy and state-funded congregations breed lazy congregants. If clergy lack 
the drive to improve their religious product, and if church members are not required to ―pay‖ to 
maintain the organization (i.e., tithe), then congregants are likely to respond with laziness as well. 
Namely, they see themselves as participating in a ―free‖ organization where they are not required 
to give of their time, money, or energy to sustain the group. This returns us to the earlier idea 
about religious pluralism and groups that improve their supply, and possibly costs for belonging 
to the group, in exchange for people‘s commitment. People associate cost with the value of 
rewards, and if something does not cost much, it must have lower value. 
Finally, given that religious monopolies have historically screened out competition from 
other religious groups through legal sanctions (such as in Germany, France, Belgium, 
Switzerland, or Italy), it is difficult for religious pluralism to develop and serve as the antidote to 
the lower levels of religious belief and practice mentioned here. For example, in the mid 1990s, 
German media portrayed evangelical groups as deviant, sectarian or cultish, and with terrorist 
potential, leading to police raids on some evangelical congregations. In France and Belgium, 
Jehovah‘s Witnesses were targeted with higher taxation and had their religious publications 
banned from the postal system in an effort to curb deviant cults (Stark and Finke 2000: 232-236). 
Rational choice theorists are, therefore, not surprised that levels of religious adherence are lower 
in places where a religious monopoly exists.          
Stark and Finke summarize the above conjectures this way: ―Religious pluralism (the 
presence of multiple suppliers) is important only insofar as it increases choices and competition, 
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offering consumers a wider range of religious rewards and forcing suppliers to be more 
responsive and efficient‖ (2000: 201). 
 
A Theory of the Social Nature of Religion 
 
The entire rational choice approach to religion stresses that religion is a social 
phenomenon, a point strongly supported in the findings in chapter two. For example, the 
understanding of and desire for religious rewards is rooted in how people are socialized at home 
and in religious circles. The relationship between religious supply and demand is also shaped in 
social contexts, both religious and non-religious. In their ―cultures‖ people learn what is 
desirable, normal, and deviant. Two additional ways in which rational choice theorists emphasize 
the social nature of religion include conversion and reaffiliation, and ongoing commitment to a 
religious group. Beginning with the former, Stark and Bainbridge‘s (1985) extensive examination 
of cults and sects reveals religious groups‘ successful initiatives to rely on interpersonal bonds 
when recruiting members. That is, members of religious groups sought to convert their family, 
friends, neighbours, and co-workers. Using the Unification Church as their example, Stark and 
Bainbridge (p.308-309) (building on Lofland and Stark‘s work in the 1960s) suggest that having 
a close bond with someone already in the Unification Church was a key step in the ―joiners‘‖ 
conversion process.6 In fact, some joined the Unification Church without knowing much about 
their belief system, including some who outright rejected their ideology at first, relying instead on 
their friend‘s trustworthiness and character. They go on to show that this same principle applies 
to an array of cults, sects, and conventional religious groups. As Stark and Finke revised and 
strengthened their theory in Acts of Faith (2000), they captured these findings with this 
                                                 
6 Eileen Barker‘s study of Moonies supports these findings, in part, though she argues that close bonds with someone 
already in the group only accounted for about one quarter to one third of the European Moonie population in the 
1970s and 80s (Barker 1984: 96-97).   
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proposition: ―In making religious choices, people will attempt to conserve their social capital 
[interpersonal attachments]‖ (p.119). Given the time and energy that people invest in their 
relationships, and the subsequent safety and stability in life that comes from meaningful social 
ties, individuals are reluctant to risk jeopardizing their relationships by not conforming to 
expected values and actions. Debbie Fisher‘s limited involvement because of her husband‘s 
negative reaction is clear evidence of this point. For this reason, people‘s choice of religion and 
level of religious belief and involvement is influenced by their friends and family‘s attitudes and 
behaviours.     
Once an individual joins a religious group, social influences remain important for 
maintaining commitment to the group. According to RCT religious groups exist to promote and 
sustain individuals‘ religious commitments, achieved by providing explanations for individuals in 
search of religious rewards. As Stark and Bainbridge put it: 
Living religion is a social enterprise, and religious beliefs take on significance for human 
affairs only as they are tied to social exchanges. Lone individuals, and even pairs of 
exchange partners, are seldom able to sustain strong supernatural orientations without 
powerful outside assistance . . . therefore, vigorous, formal religious organizations and 
social movements can give beliefs and attitudes considerable salience for personal 
relationships; in the absence of such mass social support, beliefs and attitudes are not 
generally salient (1985: 343-344).                
 
This is why Stark and Finke (2000: 160-162) contend that when there are less dense social 
networks within a congregation there will also be low levels of reinforcement for commitment 
and less efficient means of monitoring member behaviour. It is unsurprising then that Stark and 
Finke (2000: 107) conclude that ―an individual‘s confidence in religious explanations is 
strengthened to the extent that others express their confidence in them.‖ These ideas are also 
endorsed by Ellison (1995), Iannaccone (1994), and Sherkat (1997).     
 85 
Criticisms of Rational Choice Theory 
Many criticisms have been levelled at RCT, including some that have already been 
mentioned regarding choice versus constraint and compensators versus explanations (see 
Ammerman 1997; Bruce 1999, 2002; Bryant 2000; Chaves 1995; Demerath III 1995; Ellison 
1995; Heath 1976; Hechter 1997; Marwell 1996; Neitz and Mueser 1997; Olson and Hadaway 
1999; Olson and Perl 2005; Sherkat 1997; Young 1997). Here I outline additional criticisms that 
have been repeated most often among scholars, those that tackle the core RCT assumptions, and 
those that aid in my comparison of active and marginal affiliates. As it turns out, my interview 
findings validate many of these criticisms, which I will detail in the next chapter. 
 
Costs and Rewards  
 
 Concerns over the definition and conception of ‗costs‘ and ‗rewards‘ are many and 
justified, pointing to the over simplicity of RCT. The most glaring challenge is that, as opposed 
to money which is a universal tangible way of measuring cost in the economy, there is no single 
criterion for determining and measuring religious costs and rewards (Bruce 1999: 124-127; 
Bryant 2000). While rational choice theorists have rightly attempted to provide examples of costs 
and rewards over the years, many of which have been cited in this chapter, their attempts are 
inevitably flawed due to the subjective criteria for individuals weighing costs and rewards. What 
may be a cost for one person could in fact be a reward for another. For instance, raising a child 
could be an inconvenience to the individual trying to advance financially and career wise, while it 
is a significant reward to the person longing for a child. When we think about why people 
commit to stricter churches, it makes sense, in part, that they are willing to incur costs of social 
stigma, lost friendships, time, money, and extreme personal piety, knowing that they will receive 
highly sought after rewards along the way, including greater social solidarity, material support, 
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and firm promises of eternal life. The trouble with this theory is that it assumes, all things being 
equal, that people actually desire the same rewards, above all a supposed intense desire for life 
after death. This could not be further from the truth! As Emerson Cairns‘ narrative reveals, and 
illustrative of others in my sample, not all people desire life after death, let alone an intense desire 
among those who do want to experience eternal life, and individuals have different 
understandings and thresholds for costs that they are willing to incur. To imply a generic 
understanding of costs and rewards is erroneous.      
A similar drawback is the idea that cost and value are directly related. I agree with Bruce 
(1999: 87) that this is too simplistic on two fronts—there is no universal measurement for what a 
religious cost is, and even if there was, evaluating the worth or value of the cost expended is 
entirely subjective. People interpret costs and value differently, so who decides what is expensive 
and what is valuable? More than this, RCT does not account for undue inflation where the cost of 
a product far exceeds its actual value, such as the gas spikes around the world in 2008. My home 
in Calgary costs more than three times the price of a similar home in Prince Edward Island. Does 
this mean that the house is worth more or that I value it more? Not at all! The truth is I lament the 
fact that I had to spend this amount of money on a house. The reward is no greater because the 
cost was. Bringing this back to religion, it could be argued that religious groups‘ high costs (e.g., 
beliefs about abortion, euthanasia, or homosexuality) turn some away, believing that they can 
obtain the same rewards (e.g., eternal life, community, or peace of mind) for half the cost 
elsewhere. As will be seen later, many active affiliates who participate in theologically liberal 
traditions, for example, give this rationale for why they are affiliated with the United Church of 
Canada. The criticism, and one that I agree with, is that RCT naively projects a theory of costs 
and rewards that does not accurately explain real human behaviour. Humans are more complex 
than the theory indicates.  
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Another limitation of these terms, especially cost, is the implication that cost entails 
something bad or undesirable. The following statement by Stark and Bainbridge exemplifies this:  
We believe close analysis of usage of the terms good and evil reveals that humans employ 
these terms as synonyms for rewards and costs. Good is beneficial. Good people reward 
us. Evil is costly. Evil people do ‗bad‘ things to us—that is, they extract costs out of 
proportion to any reward we get from them (1996 [1987]: 114). 
 
The trouble with this conceptualization is that costs may actually be enjoyable and desirable for 
some, once again highlighting the absence of a single and consistent measure for religious costs 
in RCT (Bruce 1999: 55; Bryant 2000: 542). For some marginal affiliates, as demonstrated in 
chapter two, attending church is interpreted as a cost, something undesirable, for obtaining the 
reward of eternal life (and avoiding hell). Still, many active affiliates joyously anticipate 
attending church each week, all the while believing that it is a cost or requirement for receiving 
life after death. As one Roman Catholic male states, ―I don‘t consider, you know, my time as a 
sacrifice.‖ As will become clear in the next chapter, few people that I interviewed think in terms 
of costs and rewards and they do not think of certain beliefs or behaviours, such as giving one‘s 
time and money to religious and charitable organizations, as undesirable costs. Instead these are 
things that people willingly and happily embrace.  
It is difficult to know whether the underlying problem is, on the one hand, an incorrect or 
poorly conceived theory about religious costs and rewards, such that the fundamental theoretical 
assumption that people consciously weigh costs and rewards when making religious decisions is 
not true in reality, or on the other hand, that the theory still has merits, but is simply weak in how 
it can be operationalized. Perhaps the language of ―costs‖ and ―rewards‖ needs to change, or at 
least the ways in which they are conceptualized should change, to account for some of the 
limitations noted above. Future micro-level research in this area would be profitable.     
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Religious Demand and Preferences  
 
 Another criticism of RCT concerns the assumption that religious supply largely dictates 
the religious marketplace while religious demand, preferences, and tastes are constant. Three 
problems arise with this reasoning. The first has to do with the economist assumption that 
individuals have stable and unchanging preferences and tastes.
7
 Heath (1976: 47-48), Ellison 
(1995: 90-93), and Sherkat (1997: 69-72) all question the legitimacy of this assumption, and 
rightly so. They contend that tastes and preferences change because of psychological and 
personality differences between individuals. For example, Sherkat (1997: 70-71) suggests that 
individual preferences are different because some prefer novel ideas to familiar ones. Social ties 
are also important to consider because socialization shapes people‘s tastes and preferences. Inter-
religious marriages are another example where someone may convert and acquire their spouse‘s 
religious tastes and preferences, as we saw in Emily Foster‘s story. Yet another example of social 
influences comes in multicultural settings, like Canada, where exposure to people of different 
cultures and traditions may actually alter the preferences of locals. This helps to explain the 
growing popularity of various forms of Buddhism among Westerners (Bruce 2002; Eck 2001; 
Albanese 2007).  
Another issue concerns the notion that demand for religion and the supernatural, and one 
could even say for religious organizations, is constant. In chapter‘s five and six I look at this in 
the context of the debate over secularization in Canada, but for now it is worth asking whether it 
is right to argue that people have an inexhaustible demand for rewards that only religion 
provides, or that people turn to religious groups primarily for religious reasons? How do we 
know that desires for these general explanations and rewards are chief among many? Moreover, 
                                                 
7 To be fair, Stark and Finke (2000: 38, 86) have left a small window open to the possibility that tastes and 
preferences might vary given certain individual and social factors, however they are adamant in emphasizing that this 
is rare. They, like other proponents of RCT, most often advocate that preferences are stable over time and place.  
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what makes rational choice theorists so confident that exchanges with the gods is the main factor 
that draws people into involvement in religious organizations? Where is the empirical support? 
The limitation of RCT is that it assumes and speculates things that are questionable at a strictly 
logical level, never mind the empirical data that is desperately lacking to support these claims. 
Emerson, Emily, and Debbie‘s vignettes each offer clear examples that fly in the face of rational 
choice assumptions about people‘s demand for religion, whether it is their motivations for being 
religious or their demand for life after death or greater involvement in a religious organization. 
Sherkat (1997: 73-77) additionally posits that some make religious decisions out of 
sympathy for another, as is the case for those who attend a religious service to please their 
parents (such as Emily Foster who married in a church out of respect for her mother-in-law). 
Others make religious decisions out of antipathy to spite others, for instance a young adult who 
gets involved in a new religious movement to rebel against their parents. Some attend religious 
services to set a good example for others, such as parents for their children. Some people even 
seek out religious involvement for completely secular reasons, like involvement in new 
friendships or sporting activities. Sherkat‘s point is that involvement in religious organizations is 
not necessarily, nor even often, motivated by a desire to make exchanges with the gods, nor is 
there even a deep-seated demand for religious things. Bruce (1999: 95-96) affirms Sherkat‘s 
conclusions, pointing to the low level of importance that Europeans give to various church 
activities. He shows that more importance is placed on maintaining cemeteries, preserving church 
buildings, and offering services on religious holidays and rites of passage, than offering weekly 
church services, regularly partaking in Holy Communion, or being involved in international 
missionary work. One needs to question whether religion really is as important to many as 
rational choice theorists assume.        
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Conclusion 
 The purpose of this chapter was to clearly delineate the trajectory of and relationship 
between rational choice theories in sociology in general and in the study of religion more 
specifically. In doing so, I traced the development of rational choice thought along the lines of 
religious costs and rewards, religious supply and demand, as well as the social nature of religion. 
In general, proponents of rational choice theory suggest that humans make religious decisions in 
the same way they make non-religious decisions, by weighing costs and rewards. If the rewards 
are valuable enough, people will incur high costs to obtain them. When it comes to religious 
supply and demand, RCT is adamant that suppliers of religion have more power to influence the 
religious economy than religious consumers, evidenced in higher religiosity levels in nations 
where competition among religious suppliers is the norm. Further, throughout their theory, 
rational choice theorists insist that religion is a social phenomenon, most obvious in conversion 
and reaffiliation processes.  
From the criticisms that have been directed toward RCT we see some of the limitations 
and ambiguities that arise when rational choice theorists talk about costs and rewards, and we 
notice the heightened attention that some are calling for when it comes to religious demand and 
preferences (as opposed to religious supply). These concerns speak both to flaws in RCT logic as 
well as to the lack of empirical data to test and support RCT axioms and propositions. It is these 
things that I turn my attention to in the next chapter, drawing on my interviews with active and 
marginal affiliates. What do these interview findings tell us about religious decision-making 
processes, the social nature of religion, as well as religious supply and demand, how do these 
discoveries advance our understanding of the similarities between active and marginal affiliates, 
and ultimately, how do these observations help us to assess Bibby‘s renaissance thesis?   
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Chapter 4 
Rational Choice Theory and Religion in Canada: An Empirical Assessment 
Religious Decision-Making Processes 
Rewards and Costs 
 
 In the last chapter I introduced two questions regarding religious costs and rewards. How 
do active and marginal affiliates make sense of the religious rewards that they are pursuing and 
the religious costs involved in obtaining those rewards, and how do past exchanges with the gods 
and others influence current and future religious decision-making processes? To this end, I asked 
participants a series of questions about why they attend religious services when they do and why 
they believe and behave as they do outside of religious services. With these rewards in mind, I 
then asked about the perceived costs, trade-offs, or sacrifices that they incurred along the way. 
More than anything this was an exploratory exercise since, surprisingly, rational choice theorists 
do not demonstrate any exhaustive attempts to empirically measure religious costs and rewards 
(aside from the standard costs of time and money). The data and analysis in this chapter help to 
further compare and explain some of the similarities and differences between the active and 
marginal affiliates in my sample, and to test some of the basic rational choice propositions about 
religious belief and behaviour. These discoveries will also aid my assessment of Bibby‘s 
renaissance thesis in the next two chapters. 
Active affiliates identified a series of rewards that they receive from their religious beliefs 
and practices. These vary from individual gains, such as feeling good about themselves, knowing 
that they are loved by God and others, and experiencing a break from the strains and busyness of 
life when they pray, read the Bible, or attend church, to more social things, like participating in 
social justice initiatives (e.g., helping the poor in society) and carrying on the religious tradition 
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of their family and religious group.
1
 As we see in Figure 4.1, active affiliates identify three 
rewards that are of significant importance to them: participating in a like-minded community; 
receiving meaning, purpose, direction, and morals for daily living; and developing and affirming 
their faith by learning more about the Bible from a trained specialist and singing worship songs, 











The greatest benefit for active affiliates is the community that they experience with fellow 
believers. Fourteen of the twenty-one active affiliates mentioned this reward. Like Becky 
Eagleton, several active affiliates that I met spoke highly about the community that they 
experience in their congregation. A male in his late thirties, from an evangelical Protestant 
background states that the ―regular Sunday morning community is regular enough that it does 
kind of keep me grounded, reminds me of who I am, what I believe, and it surrounds me with 
others that hold those similar beliefs, so it does kind of give me that weekly grounding.‖ One 
                                                 
1 See ―Appendix B‖ for a complete list of rewards and costs that active and marginal affiliates provided, including 
how many affiliates cited each variable. Given the difficulty of measuring rewards and costs (reflected particularly as 
participants struggled to articulate rewards and costs), many of the rewards are simple motivations that people gave 













Community Meaning and Purpose Trained Specialist
Leading religious rewards that active affiliates 
associate with church attendance
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woman in her mid-sixties, also part of an evangelical Protestant congregation expresses the gains 
that she receives when attending religious services. She says, ―First of all, I gain friends . . . they 
do the same thing to me. There‘s people there when I‘m down to encourage me. You know, and 
you can count on them if something happens to me . . . they‘re there to help you. And I can do 
that for them, too. It just works both ways. And I believe that‘s what the Lord wants us to do. I 
think that‘s what the Bible teaches to do. Not to forsake meeting together.‖ 
 Experiencing community with like-minded individuals is important because it helps to 
remind individuals of what they believe and why they believe. It helps people to conform to the 
group‘s expected beliefs and behaviours. A Roman Catholic gentleman in his early sixties puts it 
this way: 
It kind of just adds a little bit of strength if you meet people of a like mind . . . If 
everybody‘s cheating on their income tax, and they tell you you should be, you‘re 
probably going to start cheating on your income tax, too. But if you meet a bunch of 
people that think that, ―It‘s serious, you know, doing your tax forms. You don‘t start 
cheating on them, monkeying around.‖ And you meet people like that, and you talk to 
them all the time, and what are you probably going to do? Do your tax forms correctly, 
and pay what you owe. 
 
Aside from knowing that others share similar views about the world, active affiliates also 
benefit from the social and spiritual supports that they establish at church. While only half of 
active affiliates have at least one close friend in their congregation, nineteen active affiliates are 
friends with those who are actually involved in a church and they benefit from these ties. One 
Baptist female in her late twenties shares of the benefits of participating in a small group: 
Yeah, accountability in our small group because we‘re really honest with each other. Gain 
friendship. People who will support you when you need it . . . you get just a sense of 
peace about things . . . when you pray and do your Bible study and you‘re being 
consistent and you‘re being faithful . . . you can handle life‘s problems . . . because you 
know that it‘s going to be okay. 
 
From this quotation (and others like it), we learn that active affiliates see their involvement in the 
religious community as an insurance of sorts that there will be someone there to help in times of 
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need, and vice versa. This mutual aid is reassuring for many, especially in a world where now it 
is even hard to count on the support of family (who may not be emotionally or physically 
present), let alone neighbours.  
Second, thirteen active affiliates gain from the meaning, direction, and purpose that they 
receive from regular involvement in their religious group. They believe that the combination of 
regular church attendance, belief in God, along with a host of private practices (e.g., prayer, Bible 
reading, meditation and reflection) provides a source of meaning in life. It gives them a 
framework to interpret their social roles in the home, at the workplace, and as a citizen of the 
world. Andrew Donnelly‘s narrative is a clear example of the many other active affiliates in this 
study who believe that their faith provides them with guidance in life. One male says that prayer 
―keeps me continually grounded in God. Therefore, it just helps me be a better husband and 
father and neighbour and worker. I mean, everything I do, I try to filter through my belief system, 
so it definitely benefits. I think it makes my life better because I try to do things that are wise and 
good . . . I believe that my marriage is better off for it. My family is better off for it. My finances 
are better off for it. My relationships, in general. My personal health, even, physically and 
emotionally.‖ Another female confidently declares that ―I‘ve always done well in my schooling . 
. . I was lucky to . . . stay on . . . honours . . . for junior high and high school, and I honestly 
believe . . . I put the effort in that‘s needed, but, like, even small things like that, I believe God, 
like, helped me through my schooling and has been, more than anything, the one to, I guess, give 
me the knowledge to attain the grades that I have.‖ One other male asserts that ―I‘m a business-
for-self guy, and I don‘t get paid unless, you know, I have deals coming in, and I‘ve just trusted 
God that he will provide all things for me . . . Throughout the whole Bible, God has provided for 
his people. He always says that He will provide and that He will look after. And I trust that a 
hundred percent, and I put that into practice . . . I believe that and live that, and I breathe that. I 
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believe that with all things.‖ In all of these examples we see that active affiliates believe that their 
lives are improved because they believe in God and they share in that faith with fellow believers 
on a regular basis. 
A third reward that ten active affiliates discussed is the development and affirmation of 
their faith by learning more about the Bible from the pastor, singing worship songs, and lifting 
prayers to God in a larger social setting. Active affiliates are drawn to their religious leaders who 
offer insights into the Bible that they would not have discerned on their own. As one elderly 
gentleman who attends a United Church of Canada congregation states, ―The points in Scripture 
have often been difficult to understand, and the guys at [Alpha Church] have been just 
tremendous in giving different insights into the meaning of Scripture.‖ Why is this perceived as a 
reward? For people like Andrew Donnelly and Becky Eagleton, who had a religious upbringing, 
they believe that it is important to know as much about God as possible, so that they can uphold 
the beliefs and practices common to their religious tradition. As will be seen later, this is partially 
related to their conceptions about the afterlife and what is required to obtain life after death. It is 
also linked to their perception that obedience to God results in favourable outcomes for their life 
on earth, such as happiness in their family, work, and social life. For others like Cam Bender, 
who did not grow up in a religious household, learning from a trained specialist is beneficial to 
learn the basics of the faith and to develop a deeper Christian worldview. 
In total, these gains are enhanced when individuals see people around them also learning 
and striving for the religious ideals that the pastor preaches about. The same can be said about 
singing songs and lifting prayers with others. As one person put it, ―Even though I can just stick a 
praise tape on at home if I want to or a praise CD in the car by myself, there‘s something more 
powerful about larger corporate worship times.‖ Another Roman Catholic woman in her forties 
indicates that ―there‘s more power than just being by yourself.‖ The strength, energy, and 
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development and affirmation of personal faith that people experience at church epitomizes the 
―collective effervescence‖ that Durkheim discusses in The Elementary Forms of the Religious 
Life (1915: 209-210): ―In the midst of an assembly animated by a common passion, we become 
susceptible of acts and sentiments of which we are incapable when reduced to our own forces.‖ 
He goes on to say that religious ceremonies function ―to bring men together, to put the masses 
into movement and thus to excite a state of effervescence, and sometimes even of delirium . . . a 
man is carried outside himself and diverted from his ordinary occupation and preoccupations‖ 
(1915: 383-383). For the active affiliates that I interviewed, they believe that there is a different 
level and quality of connection with self, others, and God when worshipping in a set apart time 
and place with other people. 
In light of the rewards they receive from participating in a religious group, half of active 
affiliates admit that their participation costs them friends, control over their life, time, and money. 
However, a critical finding that conflicts with RCT is that half of active affiliates in my sample 
indicate that they do not incur any costs for believing or belonging or they give up time and 
money, but do not see such things as a negative cost.  
Since sacrificing time and money are self-explanatory (i.e., people commit time to 
religious practices such as prayer, attending church, or volunteering for church activities, and 
people tithe money to their church) and they were mentioned by fewer people than the other costs 
(five people mentioned time and two highlighted money), and given that these themes have been 
examined by Iannaccone (1997a) and Iannaccone and Everton (2004) elsewhere, I will focus on 
the costs of friends and control over one‘s life. Starting with the most cited cost of relationships, 
which eight active affiliates mentioned, those raised in a religious home spoke of lost and 
strained friendships when they were teenagers because they had to choose between the activities 
of their religious and non-religious friends. Becky Eagleton‘s reflection on high school in chapter 
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two reflects this tension. For those who did not grow up in a religious home, they reflected on the 
odd looks and strange feelings that they received from non-religious friends and family. People 
saw them as deviant, strange, and part of an outside group. One woman that I interviewed says, ―I 
think there‘s an element of social . . . social isolation . . . something I‘ve sacrificed is people, like, 
‗Oh, you go to church? Really.‘ Or ‗You‘re one of the smartest people I know, and I can‘t believe 
you go to church.‘ Or ‗What are doing this weekend? Oh, you‘re . . .‘ You know? . . . And so that 
social awkwardness . . . People outside of the church really don‘t know how to react to people‘s 
participation in the church.‖ For some this led to abandoning certain relationships, while for 
others it strained, but did not end, friendships and family ties. 
The second cost that participants mentioned frequently was submitting control of their 
lives over to God (seven active affiliates discussed this). Andrew Donnelly‘s experience shows us 
that active affiliates believe this is part of the cost if one is to accept their religious status as the 
master status in their life. This worldview is grounded in a theological position that God is highly 
active in the world and that a Christian‘s life is no longer their own. Many believe that God 
actually leads people to the person that they marry, the job that they work at, and the friendships 
that they form, and they know it is God speaking to them because of the words they read in the 
Bible, the internal peace that they feel, the validation that others pass along, and their past 
experiences. The pursuit of religious practices such as Bible reading, prayer, meditation, and 
church attendance are all intended to help active affiliates to discern God‘s will for their life and 
to act obediently to what they believe God calls them to do, even if it means following paths in 
life that they would not otherwise choose on their own. When asked about the costs that she 
incurs as part of her religious faith, one woman states, ―It‘s inconvenient . . . sometimes God asks 
you to do stuff that doesn‘t make any sense . . . you give up control of your life.‖ She goes on to 
provide the following example: ―I committed to lead a team of college students to the Yukon this 
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summer for a prayer walk . . . and to church plant for six weeks . . . probably two months 
beforehand, I got pregnant and very, very, very sick . . . we had to cancel the trip completely, 
whereas . . . I had spent a year in prayer and preparation . . . that was terribly inconvenient . . . 
being very, very obedient . . . to what I had really believed God told me to do, and I ended up 
staying home all summer.‖ As she reflected on what she learned from this experience, she says, 
―I think that God taught me a lot about who I am in Him, and it‘s so much less about what I do 
than about what He chooses to do . . . that He‘s in control of all of those things.‖     
What I find most interesting and valuable is that half of active affiliates say that they have 
not incurred any costs to obtain desired religious rewards. When asked if he has experienced any 
costs in his pursuit of religious rewards, one male says, ―I don‘t think so . . . I don‘t think I‘ve 
had to sacrifice anything.‖ Another individual responds, ―I don‘t think so . . . I think it‘s all been 
a benefit, in terms of benefit to me, benefit to my family, benefit to others. I don‘t think that . . . 
that what I do and how I try to live my life, in a sense, costs me anything or . . . or deters from my 
life.‖ More than this, if they acknowledge that they have sacrificed time and money, they do not 
interpret these as undesirable or bad costs. An active affiliate, like others in my sample, shares 
that ―it costs money. Tithe . . . I don‘t necessarily think that those are all bad things . . . I don‘t 
think that the money is wasted, or anything like that.‖  
To summarize thus far, not everyone thinks about their religious decisions in terms of 
costs and rewards. More than this, if people do think about costs and rewards, it is done so in a 
highly subjective manner. These observations support Bruce (1999) and Bryant‘s (2000) 
criticisms levelled at RCT, and provide some concrete empirical evidence with which to move 
the conversation forward. For some active affiliates, giving up time and money for the sake of 
their religious group is understood as a bad cost, while for others they joyously give their time 
and money. While Stark and Finke (2000) might interpret these findings as evidence in favour of 
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their premise that people find ―strict‖ (i.e., expensive) churches desirable, their argument still 
hinges on the subjective meaning and interpretation that people attach to the ambiguous term 
―cost.‖ Yes, objectively one can simply calculate the number of hours given to religion relative to 
other activities and relative to what others do. But such calculations are only meaningful if the 
individual sees the forgone activities as some kind of sacrifice (and attaches the same level of 
significance or loss to that sacrifice as others do), and we know that people evaluate the quantity 
and quality of these ―sacrifices‖ differently. Simply put, there is no single criterion for measuring 
religious rewards and costs, and even if there were, the term ―cost‖ raises undue assumptions that 
costs are negative or bad. Therefore, the term ―cost‖ is not as neutral as is assumed in RCT.  
As we would expect, marginal affiliates attach very different rewards and costs to their 
religious decision-making processes. They provided me with twenty motivations and gains for 
why they attend religious services. These range from maintaining membership status for reduced 
funeral and burial rates, to the fear of going to hell, to avoiding the commercialism of Christmas, 
to reinforcing their morals and their belief in God, to feeling good about themselves.
2
 Without 
diminishing any of these or the other responses given, I will concentrate on Figure 4.2 and the 
three explanations offered most frequently: tradition, family pressures, and a connection with a 






                                                 
2 See Lamoureux Scholes (2003), Walliss (2002), and Zuckerman (2008) for additional research findings on 
motivations for those who attend religious services for religious holidays and rites of passage. Each study points to 













Starting with tradition, nine marginal affiliates observe religious holidays or rites of 
passage because they cannot imagine doing things any other way.
3
 As we saw with Emerson 
Cairns, he and his family attend church and then go for Chinese food every Christmas Eve, and 
the Chinese food is as important as the church service to this family tradition. One marginal 
affiliate declares, ―It‘s just a tradition. We‘ve done it for a lifetime, and I‘m not going to discard 
it.‖ Another individual that I interviewed says, ―when I do go, which is most Christmases, it‘s 
always part of . . . our tradition, our family tradition as part of the Christmas Eve experience.‖ 
One other male states, ―It‘s because of your Catholic upbringing and your parents and the way 
you were brought up, and that‘s why you go.‖ These examples are not unlike other traditions that 
individuals and groups hold on to such as cooking the Thanksgiving turkey the same way as our 
parents. This is just the way that things have always been done and people cannot even 
conceptualize what a different way would look like.  
                                                 
3 Phil Zuckerman‘s (2008: 8, 160) examination of life in Denmark and Sweden reveals that people observe religious 















Tradition Family Pressures Sacred Space
Leading religious rewards that marginal 
affiliates associate with church attendance
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Family also plays a role for eleven active affiliates who attend for religious holidays and 
rites of passage. One woman says that she and her sister attend church ―mostly out of respect for 
Dad . . . I think he would like his daughters to go to church.‖ Several people spoke of family 
pressures to get married in a church. One male says that his wife ―wanted to get married in a 
church . . . more to appease my parents, my family—my mom, especially—than anything else.‖ 
Put differently, and as Sherkat (1997: 73) conjectured and several others in my sample noted, 
family pressures are a source of motivation for people to observe rites of passage in religious 
settings.
4
 This is especially true when parents pay for the wedding. Needless to say, people value 
the reward of good healthy familial ties, and thus they will avoid offending a family member 
(e.g., in-laws or grandparents) by marrying in a church according to their family‘s wishes. 
Another facet of family life is also important. Some, like Emerson Cairns, indicated that 
attending services on religious holidays is a time to spend with family, particularly in a day and 
age with both parents working, children participating in a number of extracurricular activities, 
and extended families separated due to employment opportunities. One female explains her 
attendance patterns in the following way: 
I don‘t always see my family very often, so when we get together, I think it just kind of is 
good for us to all be there to kind of come together as a family and show that to each 
other and to God that we still all believe. 
 
I proceed to ask her if she gains any religious significance from these occasions, and she says 
―no.‖  
A third reason that people attend is because they connect to a higher power in a sacred 
place (eighteen people talked about this), which one Anglican gentleman in his fifties surmises is 
―a basic human need to want to believe in something bigger and higher than yourself.‖ For some 
                                                 
4 Emile Durkheim (1915: 190) asserted that people are religious because of a felt moral obligation to others in the 
group, including one‘s ancestors. Zuckerman (2008: 9) provides evidence that people baptize their children to please 
family members, not God.  
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people their connection to God is enhanced because they are surrounded by others who share the 
same basic beliefs about God, for others this connection to God helps them to better center 
themselves, and for some they feel that their rites of passage are more legitimate because they are 
performed in front of God in a sacred space. One thirty year-old female reflects, ―I just think I 
wanted to be around people that believed the same . . . it is sometimes nice to go, I guess, because 
when you‘re there, obviously, you feel closer to God than you would usually.‖ While almost 
everyone that I interviewed agrees that connecting to a higher power can happen outside the walls 
of a church, the quotation from Debbie Fisher in chapter two highlights the some people‘s special 
connection to God in a religious and sacred space: ―I feel a closer connection . . . when I‘m 
actually in the church  . . . or a chapel or whatever . . . It might sound funny, but it just feels more 
holy, a little bit more . . . stronger . . . a closer connection. You know, it‘s the house of God . . . 
it‘s what it resembles. It‘s a symbol . . . it just feels like I‘m in it and not outside of it.‖ 
 When it comes to costs, marginal affiliates advance one of the central observations when 
we looked at active affiliates: they do not think in terms of costs or they do not associate any 
costs with the rewards that they are after. Seventeen marginal affiliates gave responses to this 
effect with some showing confusion over the question (demonstrating the methodological 
challenges of measuring this abstract concept) and others outright denying that they have incurred 
any costs. Typical of others‘ responses, one individual says that ―there‘s been no costs as far as 
I‘m concerned. No sacrifices. No sacrifices. It‘s all been . . . I want to do it. You know, nobody‘s 
forced me to do anything. Nobody said, ‗You‘ve got to go to church on a Sunday. You‘ve got to 
be there.‘ No.‖ I asked him whether he believes that attending church for religious holidays is a 
cost of some sort in order to receive some type of benefit. He replies, ―No. I don‘t think God 
gives a toss whether I go and sit there on Sunday or whether I say a nice quiet prayer running on 
Sunday in the half marathon.‖ Another marginal affiliate that I interviewed says, ―I never felt like 
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I was sort of giving up anything for the way that I, you know, sort of worked on my spiritualism. 
Nope. I don‘t feel like I‘ve really sacrificed anything in my relationships or anything like that, 
you know. Nothing like that, no.‖ 
 A few marginal affiliates did indicate that if they took their faith more seriously, then they 
would probably incur costs mainly in the form of submitting control of their life over to God. But 
as the following marginal affiliate highlights, this is a fearful step that people are not willing or 
desire to take: 
I can imagine for some people . . . if you really took the rules and . . . actually tried to 
truly live up to them, I do believe there would be a lot of costs associated with it . . . I 
believe that, and I kind of fear that in the back of my mind . . . that if I truly, like, gave my 
life over to God completely and did what he truly desired . . . I imagine there would be a 
possibility of . . . some significant costs. Definitely. 
 
 
Past Exchanges with the Gods and the Churches 
 
As we saw earlier, Stark and Finke (2000: 96-102) theorize that religious decision-making 
processes are not only influenced by people‘s perceptions and experiences of rewards and costs, 
but also on past experiences when exchanging with the gods. Humans are more likely to pay 
higher costs if the gods can be relied upon (i.e., dependable), if the gods are concerned about and 
act on behalf of people (i.e., responsive), and if the gods have a far reaching set of powers and 
influence (i.e., of great scope). Already we have seen that active affiliates incur more costs in the 
religious decisions that they make. Therefore, if Stark and Finke are correct, theoretically we 
should find that active affiliates have a more favourable perspective that the gods are dependable, 
responsive, and of great scope, in turn leading them to respond with extended and exclusive 
exchanges with the gods. Even more than this, if we were to extend this theory to consider 
people‘s decision processes when choosing their level of involvement in a religious organization, 
something that Stark and Finke have not done in their theory, we could conjecture that religious 
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groups that are perceived to be more dependable and responsive could also expect its members to 
incur higher costs to be part of that group, manifested with extended and exclusive exchanges. 
Accordingly, if people believe that the gods and/or their congregation are dependable and 
responsive, then their exchanges are less risky than if they have low perceptions that the gods 
and/or congregation are dependable and responsive. For the most part, as we are about to 
examine, these hypotheses are true. 
 Nineteen active affiliates that I interviewed believe wholeheartedly that they can depend 
on God, and most have depended on God in the past. Eighteen also believe that God is 
responsive, that he is concerned about and acts in the best interests of humans. Some believe that 
God helps them to excel at school, work, or their relationships, and others provide stories of how 
God helps them in dire times of need. Among the many stories that I heard, one woman, whose 
type of story was not unique, shares that God prevented her from getting into a car accident 
during a snow storm. 
I couldn‘t move right, and I didn‘t want to go down this cliff. Well, all I could call is on 
the name of Jesus . . . you would not believe what happened . . . The Lord took me off the 
street, off the road, and I flew through the air like in a movie . . . I lifted off, and I went 
through the air . . . on that embankment, and then I landed . . . the Lord put this snow bank 
there, like a huge snow bank . . . I just hung behind the steering wheel and just thanked 
the Lord that I‘m still alive . . . I couldn‘t explain it. I didn‘t do anything . . . I believe the 
Lord heard my prayer, right then and there . . . And nobody can talk me out of it. And 
people . . . when I share with unbelievers . . . ―Oh, that was just a coincidence.‖ No, it 
wasn‘t. Not for me.  
 
For nineteen out of the twenty-one active affiliates that I interviewed, God is very active 
in the world and they can depend on Him, though some were quick to comment that humans also 
have a role to play in life; God helps those who help themselves. This was particularly noticeable 
when I asked participants about good and bad events in their life. Active affiliates were quick to 
credit God for the good things in their life, but were equally quick to shoulder the blame for bad 
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turns of events that could be explained by human error, such as a failed business venture or 
marital relationship.
5
 A man who owns his own business says to me: 
If I made a decision that was wrong or I did something that was . . . questionable by . . . 
ethics-wise, then I would blame that aspect on me. It had nothing to do with God. But, if 
everything‘s running smoothly, and I‘m . . . not making decisions that are . . . unjust . . . 
because I believe that if you‘re . . . to be men and women of integrity, and I think—once 
we‘re not—we open ourselves up to any possibility. And so I don‘t believe my business 
will fail because God is with me, and if there‘s anything that does fail because of it, it 
would have had to do something with the aspect of something that I did on the side of 
things. 
 
On the other hand, when it came to the death of a loved one, something that could not necessarily 
be reduced to human action, active affiliates often rationalized this on the grounds that everything 
happens for a reason (a stark contrast from marginal affiliates, as will be noted shortly). They 
offered similar explanations when losing a job, as the following active affiliates‘ story 
demonstrates: 
I lost my job on Tuesday . . . it was an action of one person, the choice of one person 
against, literally, a hundred others that caused me to lose my job, and I feel like God‘s 
will was in that, like God‘s blessing in that . . . that‘s actually God‘s desire, that God is 
going to renew me and take care of me . . . I have something overwhelming that I know 
like peace. Am I upset? Absolutely. Do I have millions of dollars saved? No. But I‘m not 
worried, and that‘s . . . it shocks me, you know what I mean? . . . And that‘s, to me, and 
example of depending on God.  
 
It was clear from the bulk of these interviewee‘s stories that they had been socialized at home and 
church to adopt these legitimations. 
At the level of sociological theory, what we find here is a clear illustration of Peter 
Berger‘s (1967) discussion of anomie and alienation. Briefly, Berger works from the social 
interactionist assumption that humans are co-creators of their social worlds (p.3-4). Humans 
                                                 
5 Max Weber (1963 [1922]: 32-33) makes a similar point when analyzing the relationship between gods, priests, and 
worshippers. When the gods do not satisfactorily respond to human prayers, priests rationalize this so that ―the 
responsibility falls, not upon the god or themselves, but upon the behaviour of god‘s worshippers . . . the problem of 
why god has not hearkened to his devotees might then be explained by stating that they had not honoured their god 
sufficiently, that they had not satisfied his desires for sacrificial blood or soma juice, or finally that they neglected 
him in favour of other gods‖ (p.33).  
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create culture and culture shapes humans. In this dialectical process humans strive for stability in 
their social worlds, particularly because of the anomie, or meaninglessness, that they experience 
in the face of chaotic and uncontrollable events in life, like death. However, this quest is an 
arduous one given the central role of humans, who are unstable, in the process (p.4-6). One way 
of staving off anomie is to provide the types of socially constructed explanations seen above, that 
God is in control and everything happens for a reason (p.22, 44, 53). Doing so provides a 
framework of meaning for individuals to interpret their social worlds. Berger suggests the 
problem that arises with this response is that humans incur the cost of alienation; they forget that 
they are the co-producers of the social world that they live in (p.81-101). As soon as individuals 
claim that God is the producer of their world, they abandon control over that world. According to 
Berger, the prospect that humans have no agency or control over their surroundings is scary 
because this sense of control gives people a feeling of stability. However, this is a double edged 
sword—they cannot manage the uncontrollable facets of life, and yet they give up power if they 
project control of those events on to God. In this, anomie and alienation are constantly held in 
tension against one another. Stated simply, most active affiliates are willing to be more alienated 
to stave off anomie, while, as we will see, marginal affiliates overwhelmingly incur anomie in 
order to stave-off alienation.  
One qualification to the above should be made regarding active affiliates in the United 
Church of Canada, who are rather anomalous. A few individuals indicated that they do not 
believe that God is active in the world and that humans control everything. In a related manner, 
these individuals are ambiguous about whether God even exists, they do not pray, and they are 
less likely to believe that there is life after death. Characteristic of others in my sample when 
asked if they believed that God was dependable, one active affiliate responds, ―I‘m not sure that 
there is a God or is not a God. If you accept the fact that there is a God, I believe that God gave 
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us free will and gave us the ability to use our brains and to do what‘s right. And that‘s why I 
think that God does not interfere in day-to-day activities of people.‖ His final statement suggests 
that he perhaps does believe in God, so I push him further and ask whether this means that he 
does believe in God. He clarifies his response by saying, ―I‘m not sure. I don‘t know. You know, 
I . . . I struggle with that, and, I guess, if I had to . . . if I had to make a choice, a definitive choice, 
I‘d say no.‖  
Although marginal affiliates are less likely to believe that they can depend on God or that 
God cares about people, just under half of those that I spoke with believe that they can depend on 
God and that He is concerned about humans. Some prayed to God during difficult times, such as 
when a family member died, or when life was stressful, believing that prayer made a difference. 
God helped them to cope, to experience comfort and peace, and to find new friends at different 
stages of life. In this, marginal affiliates were not any different from active affiliates. 
Still, about one quarter of marginal affiliates believe that they cannot depend on God, 
while an additional 25% hold a primarily humanistic outlook on the world. When I asked 
Emerson Cairns if he could depend on God, he states, ―I don‘t know if I can say yes or no to that 
. . .  I‘ve always been sort of a believer in, you know, put your head down. You can work through 
any problem or that sort of thing.‖ Another marginal affiliate asserts that ―you have to depend on 
yourself.‖ In Max Weber‘s discussion of monotheistic religions in The Sociology of Religion 
(1963 [1922]: 138-139), he states that ―the more the development tends toward the conception of 
a transcendental unitary god who is universal, the more there arises the problem of how the 
extraordinary power of such a god may be reconciled with the imperfection of the world that he 
has created and rules over.‖ He goes on to highlight an early 20
th
 century questionnaire findings 
from German workers who did not believe in a god because of ―their difficulty in reconciling the 
idea of providence with the injustice and imperfection of the social order‖ (1963 [1922]: 139). 
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Weber‘s findings resonate with some that I interviewed, speaking not only to rational choice 
theory‘s axioms about God‘s dependability but also about His scope of power and influence. For 
those who do not believe that they can depend on God, it is mainly because they believe that God 
has let them down before. One woman cites her husband‘s death at a young age as an example 
where God could have intervened, but for one reason or another, did not. For individuals with 
these experiences, they fear that God will let them down again if they risk depending on Him.  
In terms of those marginal affiliates who believe that humans have significant control 
over their lives, they were not unlike active affiliates of a similar mindset, except some marginals 
were more agnostic and atheistic in their views about the existence of God. They questioned, at a 
purely rational level, whether a god really exists, and if so, whether a god would intercede in 
human affairs. In general, these marginal affiliates concluded ―no‖ to at least one of these 
questions.  
It is hardly surprising that marginal affiliates, who already possess a low level of 
confidence in the gods, would want to pursue any extensive involvement in a religious 
organization, the supposed place where exchanges between humans and the gods are encouraged 
and supervised. However, I wanted to find out if this was definitely the case, and also whether 
any past experiences in a church influenced marginal affiliates‘ current levels of involvement in 
their congregation. Therefore, I asked active and marginal affiliates about whether they could 
depend on others in their congregation and whether their congregation was responsive to people‘s 
needs both inside and outside their congregation. 
An overwhelming majority of active affiliates (nineteen out of twenty-one) believe that 
they can depend on people in their congregation, and that people in their congregation 
demonstrate an authentic concern for its own members and people at large. For some, they have 
successfully asked others to pray for them, to help them in a volunteering capacity in the church, 
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to babysit their children, or to help them move homes. Others indicate that they can depend on 
people in their church, though they are more likely to turn to others outside their congregation 
whom they know better. Some suggest that they are not the type of people to ask others for help, 
though if push came to shove, they can turn to people in their congregation in a time of need. 
Looking beyond their own needs, active affiliates provided several examples of ways in which 
people in their congregation demonstrate genuine care and concern for others. These ranged from 
serving the ostracized in society, such as the homeless, the drug addicts, and the mentally ill, to 
providing for fellow congregants‘ practical financial, emotional, and spiritual needs. While active 
affiliates are highly optimistic about how dependable and responsive their congregations are, 
some also comment that their congregations act with the best of intentions, but are not always 
successful in meeting the needs of others. For instance, they note that every group in society has 
people who deviate from the groups‘ ideals, including politicians, educators, business executives, 
and social service providers. Sometimes people in church groups are too judgmental, other times 
they fail to respond to the needs of the homeless, and on some occasions they are too selfish to 
pay attention to the physical, emotional, or spiritual needs of others. 
When I asked marginal affiliates if they could depend on people in their congregation, 
they were far less positive than active affiliates (twelve out of twenty-one marginal affiliates 
responded affirmatively to this question). For some, this was due to the simple fact that they did 
not know others in their congregation. Personality and gender also factored into people‘s 
explanations. Some were just more independent in life and did not turn to anyone in times of 
need. Males sometimes indicated that it was more of a female response to turn to friends, thus 
church or no church, they (males) were less inclined to ask anyone for help. But for others like 
Debbie Fisher, their apprehension toward depending on others in their congregation was directly 
connected to bad experiences in the past where people in the church let them down, making them 
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almost hostile to the thought of having to turn to their congregation again. A Roman Catholic 
woman in her early fifties spoke of several negative experiences in different congregations. One 
experience especially stands out after she missed a few services:  
I missed a few Sundays, and I was shopping, and I ran into this lady, [‗Jane,‘] I think her 
name was. And I saw her, and I said, ―Hi! How are you?‖ And she looked at me. She said, 
―I don‘t have time to talk to you.‖ And I thought, ―There you go. She thinks that I don‘t 
have time for them. I don‘t have time for church. I don‘t have time for [‗Sister Mary,‘] . . . 
and to help anymore, and she‘s just going to give me the cold shoulder.‖ So, like, that‘s 
really hurtful.  
 
Later in the interview she described the lack of dependability among those in her congregation in 
this way: ―I felt . . . as long as I was saying the right things and doing the right things, showing up 
when I was supposed to, that I would be accepted. But if I made a mistake or, you know, any one 
of the human conditions, you experience from time to time, I was out. And that, in fact, is what 
happened.‖ One male in his late forties from an evangelical Protestant tradition shared this 
experience: ―There was, I guess, a lot of emotional turmoil in my life, and I sort of reached out to 
the church for support and got nothing back. In fact, I got chastised several times by the pastor 
for my lack of strength in the face of those things and was completely taken aback by it, shocked 
by it, very hurt by it . . . I was coming to terms with a lack of outreach by my church, and it was 
just, like, ‗Okay. Hold it. Enough is enough.‘‖  
Despite being sceptical that they could depend on people in their church, marginal 
affiliates (eighteen out of twenty-one) largely believe that their congregations are responsive to 
people‘s needs in their church and broader society. Overall they believe that churches genuinely 
desire to love and care for people, providing countless examples of how their church or other 
churches have done so (e.g., caring for the homeless and for immigrants). Yet, the negative things 
that churches are responsible for, such as sexual or financial scandals, wars, or corrupt leadership 
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remain on marginal affiliates‘ minds. The following Roman Catholic male highlights the 
perception of several others that I spoke with:  
I have a real thing with these Benny Hinn‘s and other zealots out there pushing people 
over and you‘re cured. I mean, ‗God blessed me with this‘; ‗God told me this.‘ And the 
people that just buy into this looking for something. Looking for a cure. Buying a vial of 
whatever-the-hell water they call it. Magical water . . . and the people who buy into it. We 
had a friend . . . he had been sending thousands of dollars down to Jimmy Swaggert . . . it 
behoves me to say that some people get sucked in . . . so much of that goes on . . . and, 
with all the promises of wealth . . . I mean you‘re in credit card debt when you send us a 
payment, and you‘re just going to disappear shortly thereafter. So they‘ll make their fifty 
dollar payment on this month‘s Visa card, pay the eighteen percent increase, which will 
keep accumulating, and think that the miracle spring water may bring this to an end. Do I 
have some issues with religion? Yes. Charlatans.  
 
Though not exclusive to this group, agnostics and atheists in my sample who strictly attend 
church services out of obligation to family members stress this negative side of religious 
organizations as a leading explanation for why they do not desire any further involvement in 
church life. 
These findings resonate with Kinnaman and Lyons‘ recent empirical discoveries in 
unChristian (2007). Through survey and interview data in the United States, they document six 
leading criticisms by non-Christians towards those who identify as Christians and attend religious 
services regularly. Non-Christians perceive Christians, particularly evangelicals, to be 
hypocritical, homophobic, sheltered within a Christian subculture, too political, judgmental, and 
motivated to make friends with non-Christians only because they wish to convert them. 
Christians are known not for what they stand for, but what they stand against. They are perceived 
as closed-minded, arrogant, and highly exclusive relative to the surrounding culture. Such 
perceptions are based in large part on people‘s first hand experiences, like those of the marginal 
affiliates that I interviewed, with Christians. As I highlight in chapter six and develop in chapter 
seven, when it comes to people‘s realities, social perception means everything and this negative 
perception among many in society towards Christians is probably the most significant challenge 
 112 
that religious groups face in contemporary culture. It is unsurprising then that there is a growing 
sympathy for prominent atheist writers such as Dawkins (2006), Harris (2006), and Hitchens 
(2007).  
To summarize this section, the empirical evidence highlights the strongly subjective 
nature of the religious decision-making process, evident in the variety of rewards and costs 
mentioned. This illustrates the challenge that exists when measuring rewards and costs. Still, we 
do gain some clarity of the rewards that people benefit from and the costs, if any, that they incur 
in the process. Active affiliates are more likely to attach religious rewards and motivations for 
their participation in a religious group, and they are more likely to say that they make sacrifices 
along the way. When it comes to past exchanges with the gods and the churches, active affiliates 
are more prone to say that God and those in their church are dependable, however both active and 
marginal affiliates believe that those in their congregation have a genuine care and concern for 
people within and beyond those in the group. These observations set the context for the following 
findings and analysis.    
Is Religion Really That Social? 
Recognizing that religious decision-making processes entails risk, Stark and Finke (2000) 
explore factors that might reduce the level of risk involved. They theorize that an individual‘s 
confidence in religious explanations is strengthened to the degree that others express confidence 
in the same explanations, that individuals participate in collective religious ceremonies, and that 
people conserve their religious and social capital (2000: 106-138). In other words, people will 
have greater confidence in the beliefs and practices that they adopt if people around them share 
similar beliefs and practices. 
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Sociologically, their theory makes much sense, as depicted earlier with Stark and 
Bainbridge‘s seminal study of conversion in several new religious movements. What is missing 
in Stark and Finke‘s theory, however, is a direct empirical study that links the above variables 
together. As I asked in chapter four: is it actually true that an individual‘s confidence in religious 
explanations is improved when others express confidence in them, when individuals participate 
in religious rituals, and when people conserve their social and religious capital? If this is the case, 
then to what degree and how precisely is this the case? Addressing these questions will both help 
us to empirically evaluate Stark and Finke‘s theory and further compare similarities and 
differences between the active and marginal affiliates that I interviewed.   
To obtain this information I asked participants a series of questions about the social nature 
of their religious lives. I asked about their friendships and how many of their close friends 
participate in the same congregation, another congregation within the same religious tradition, 
another religious group, or no religion at all. I asked whether they believe that religion is 
primarily an individual or a social journey and how that is reflected in their own religious life. I 
also queried about how influential religious groups should be in shaping people‘s religious 
beliefs and practices, and how influential their own group is in shaping their religious worldview. 
Finally, I solicited their level of confidence in the religious explanations that they adopt.     
We already know that active affiliates have a significantly higher level of social 
involvement in their religious life, mainly evidenced in weekly attendance patterns versus 
marginal affiliates‘ selective attendance habits. There are a few exceptions among marginal 
affiliates, one of whom participates in a weekly evangelical Protestant Bible study group and 




 However, on the whole marginal affiliates are not regularly involved in social 
activities relative to their faith. Given this, if Stark and Finke are correct, we should find that 
active affiliates are more confident in their religious worldview than marginal affiliates. 
In Figure 4.3 we see that active affiliates are much more likely than marginal affiliates to 
say that religion should be shared with others, or at the very least, religion is both an individual 










When asked about whether religion primarily is or should be an individual or social 
phenomenon, twenty active affiliates indicate that religion is primarily social in nature, or that it 
is a combination of an individual and social activity. One Roman Catholic male expresses it this 
way: 
Well, I think it should be shared with others because . . . it‘s a good process . . . and it‘s 
sort of like Alcoholics Anonymous . . . if somebody just threw a book at you and said, 
―Stop drinking,‖ . . . I don‘t think you‘d be successful . . . But if you had a bunch of 
                                                 
6 The Oneness movement is rooted in India dating back to 1984. It is based on the ideal of alleviating conflict and 
suffering in the world and avoiding the pursuit of material possessions and success, instead seeking oneness with 
self, others, and creation. Central to this movement is ―The Oneness Blessing,‖ where a Oneness Blessing Giver 
transmits energy through touch or mental energy to the receiver, which then enables the receiver to grow in 
consciousness about themselves, other people, and the world around them. It is believed that once a person receives 
―The Oneness Blessing‖ they are more enlightened and can live in fully harmonious relations with everything and 

















Would you say that religion is primarily an individual 




support people and said . . . ―We‟re going to do this‖ . . . And I think that‘s why you go to 
church together . . . at certain hours . . . because you‘re all together, and it‘s reinforcing 
each other‘s behaviour . . . rather than, if they just opened up the doors of the church and 
said, ―Everybody come by for a few minutes a week‖ . . . and then people probably 
wouldn‘t do that because . . . we‘re social animals, and we . . . suffer from the herd 
instinct, and we flock together . . . and that‘s the support we derive off of each other. We 
take . . . kind of, on the days I don‘t really feel like it, well, I will because I can see that 
the others are there, too.  
 
Others expressed similar things. One woman states, ―I think it has to be shared with others . . . I 
think humans are made to be in relationship with people, and any time you try and go solo . . . it‘s 
too small. Like, you need to talk to people and, I think, get other people‘s opinions and 
perspectives, and you need to love, and you need to be loved.‖ Another female says that ―as an 
individual, you make a decision, but when you make that decision . . . you make a commitment . . 
. to a group of people . . . to be a part of their family, you know, and family‘s not something you 
just abandon. You know, you‘re stuck with them. So both. I think we all have responsibility to 
each other, but we also have a responsibility to God individually.‖ Overall, active affiliates 
believe that they model these beliefs in their life. 
To the contrary, the marginal affiliates in my study demonstrate a strong leaning to 
religion as a solitary affair. Similar to Bibby‘s observations in 1987 and 1993 and Michael 
Adams‘ (2006) observations of Canadian life, most (fifteen) believe that religion is a private 
matter where they can create, customize, and arrive at whatever set of religious beliefs they want. 
Debbie Fisher says to me, ―I don‘t believe pushing anything onto anybody, I guess. I can talk 
about how I feel. I can talk about . . . what I believe and what I do, but I don‘t think I would have 
a right to push it onto somebody else . . . I think it‘s a very personal thing. It‘s a personal 
journey.‖ The marginal affiliates that I spoke with do not believe that others should be allowed to 
force their faith on another person, and they admit that they do not talk about religion with their 
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friends nor do some of them even know their friends‘ religion. Emerson Cairns spoke strongly 
against forcing one‘s faith on another: 
I‘m not a big fan of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints sending people 
through my neighbourhood every couple weeks . . . and then showing up with their whole 
family on my doorstep. I don‘t think that‘s fair . . . I think everybody‘s entitled . . . to 
believe what they believe, and, granted, they have to be exposed to it somehow. But I 
think people on their journey . . . will be drawn towards something . . . And there‘s 
enough influence out there that they‘ll gravitate towards something without people have 
to show up . . . and . . . they‘ll stand there all day . . . I understand that they‘re making a 
pitch, only with God . . . I appreciate that. I‘m the wrong guy, but I appreciate the gesture.     
 
A handful of marginal affiliates did indicate that religion is social or that it is both individual and 
social. Unlike active affiliates, they define ―social‖ as sharing their faith with others by modeling 
what it means to be a ―good‖ Christian. None of them gave the impression that this meant regular 
participation in rituals with fellow believers or that they needed to actively proselytize the 
―unsaved.‖ 
I proceeded to ask active and marginal affiliates about their religious groups‘ role in 
shaping their personal beliefs and practices. Was their group very influential, not influential at all, 
or somewhere in-between? Figure 4.4 reveals that active affiliates largely believe that their 
religious group should play a prominent role in shaping their religious beliefs and practices, 












Most active affiliates believe that their religious group, particularly the church leader‘s 
teachings, should strongly influence their personal religious worldview. One male in his late 
thirties puts it this way:  
I think they should be fairly influential because, as much as I believe the individual faith 
experience is important, if we‘re all just left to our own devices, it‘s very easy to be led 
astray and deceived . . . our sinful fallen nature is sort of wired to just go down the selfish 
route, so it‘s very easy to get selfish and ingrown . . . and that‘s not a Christ-like way to 
live . . . I think one way to counterbalance our fallen nature is to submit ourselves to a 
larger community of people and a larger authority . . . whether that‘s church or Scripture 
or denomination. Whatever larger authority outside of yourself so that you‘re not just 
doing your own little thing . . . it‘s a choice to acknowledge that . . . life‘s not just about 
me, and faith‘s not just about me. And it also takes trust because you have to have a 
certain amount of trust in your church, your denomination, your pastor, your community 
in order . . . to buy into what they‘re saying. If you don‘t trust them, then, you‘re 
obviously not going to be able to . . . and it‘s not about blind trust because you need to 
think for yourself, but you do need some trust because you‘re not always going to . . . 
believe everything, or you‘re not always going to agree with everything, but sometimes 
you just have to trust that these people leading are spirit filled, and these people leading 
you do have your best interests and the church‘s best interests in mind, even if, at this 






























How influential do you think religious groups should 




As active affiliates give significant authority to their religious group, they, especially those with 
some experience in an evangelical Protestant setting, also say that the Bible should inspire what 
their church teaches and what they ultimately believe to be true. 
When asked about how influential their religious groups actually are, thirteen active 
affiliates continue to say that their group is important. Some, like Andrew Donnelly in chapter 
two, qualified this, saying that their religious group was very significant during their younger 
years, but as they aged and developed a mind of their own, they take more ownership over their 
faith. In practical terms this entails that they might (and sometimes do) disagree with various 
church teachings (e.g., on homosexuality or women in leadership), still confident that they belong 
to and endorse the group‘s overall worldview. As a result, active affiliates in my sample, like 
Cam Bender, tend to seek congregations whose values conform to what they already believe to be 
true, rather than looking for a congregation that will radically change their religious views. 
Although some active affiliates in my sample may approach church authority in this 
individualistic manner, they continue to preserve their religious capital, or level of mastery and 
affinity with a particular religious culture over time, which Stark and Finke (2000: 120-125) 
discuss is important for increasing one‘s confidence in their religious perspective. 
The marginal affiliate emphasis on individualism is heightened when we look at Figure 
4.4 and the fourteen who believe that the individual, rather than one‘s religious group, should 
have authority over shaping a person‘s religious beliefs and practices. Participant after participant 
reinforced Emerson Cairns, Emily Foster, and Debbie Fisher‘s beliefs, including one male in his 
late fifties who says, ―Sometimes I don‘t agree with them. Sometimes I agree with them. 
Sometimes you cherry-pick, like everything in life, you know. There‘s not a lot of black-and-
white . . . You pick what you like: ‗I like that. That one would be suitable. I‘ll keep that. This is 
the way I‘ll face there.‘‖ 
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Before examining how confident active and marginal affiliates are in the religious 
explanations that they believe to be true, it is important to briefly look at their close friends‘ 
religious ties. Probably unsurprising, about half of active affiliates have at least one close friend 
in their congregation, while half are good friends with someone involved in another Christian 
congregation.
7
 Nearly half of the active affiliates that I interviewed, predominantly those who had 
no religious upbringing or who participate in evangelical Protestant traditions, are close friends 
with those who are not particularly religious. Before explaining why this is, we should remember 
that rational choice theorists suggest that converts typically cut off ties to people outside the new 
group and benefit from the ―institutional completeness‖8 and social ties in the new group (see 
e.g., Iannaccone 1994; Stark and Bainbridge 1985; Stark and Finke 2000). It is not surprising that 
those in this sample with no religious upbringing who became active affiliates (like Cam Bender, 
and others mainly in the United Church of Canada) have strong ties to those outside the group 
because they do not participate in groups that demand ―strict‖ separation from the ―outside 
world.‖ For very different reasons, the fact that evangelical Protestants form meaningful 
relationships with non-religious folk is not surprising given the evangelical theological impetus to 
evangelize ―outsiders‖ (see e.g., Bebbington 1989; Reimer 2003; Wuthnow 2004). We saw this 
in Becky‘s story, and we find this in a Pentecostal male (among others) in his early thirties. As he 
discusses his relationship with non-Christians and declares that there is only one way to heaven, 
through Jesus, he offers the following comments:  
We‘re supposed to be a light to the world. However, it hasn‘t been that I haven‘t shared 
the love of Christ with them. It‘s just that they have denied it and have decided to believe 
in what they want to believe, so that‘s a point where you‘ve just got to leave it, and then 
you‘ve just got to keep praying. And, through your actions and through the way we live 
                                                 
7 Other studies also reveal that people are close friends with others in their congregation (see Nemeth and Luidens 
2003; Olson 1989, 1993; Wuthnow 2004).   
8 ―Institutional completeness‖ refers to a group‘s ability to provide for all of its members needs, including things 
such as ―education, work, food and clothing, medical care, or social assistance‖ (Breton 1964: 194).   
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our lives . . . that‘s what needs to draw them in. Whatever . . . drew people into Christ was 
because of everything that he did and everything that he represented. So the same for us . . 
. we can never give up. But, ultimately, it always comes down to the people and their 
choice.  
 
Unlike active affiliates, marginal affiliates in my study are less likely to have close ties 
with people in their religious group. Only a quarter of marginal affiliates are good friends with at 
least one person who regularly attends the same congregation that they drop-in for a few times a 
year, and an additional quarter of marginal affiliates are close with someone who attends another 
congregation. Yet, most people that marginal affiliates are good friends with either attend 
religious services to the same extent that they do, do not attend at all, or marginal affiliates have 
no idea because they do not talk about religion with their friends. 
More than any other measurement on the social nature of religion, this question about 
people‘s social ties is at the heart of Stark and Finke‘s hypothesis about confidence in one‘s 
religious views. People in this study seem to conserve their social and religious capital in the 
sense that they surround themselves with people who are more or less like themselves in terms of 
religious participation. From this finding, and each of the other measurements on religion as a 
social phenomenon, one should expect the next paragraph to pronounce that active affiliates are 
significantly more confident than marginal affiliates. This is, after all, what rational choice 
theorists have led us to believe. But this is not so. Marginal affiliates express an equal confidence 
in the religious explanations that they hold on to. 
The overwhelming majority of active affiliates (nineteen out of twenty-one) indicate that 
they are highly confident in the religious explanations that they adopt, and as Heelas and 
Woodhead (2005) would have predicted following their analysis of the ―holistic milieu‖ in 
Kendal, England, most marginal affiliates (eighteen out of twenty-one) are strongly or somewhat 
confident in their religious worldview. Admittedly, some marginal affiliates point out that their 
 121 
spiritual search is always evolving, but that they are entirely comfortable with this approach—
this does not make the religious ground beneath them any less solid. When asked about his level 
of confidence in the religious beliefs and practices that he adopts, a marginal affiliate male that I 
interviewed says, ―I‘d say fairly confident, but because it‘s . . . an ongoing . . . exploration . . . it‘s 
not like I can say for sure that . . . that the afterlife exists . . . from my personal perspective, I‘m . . 
. confident that that belief works for me and is right for me in the space that I‘m in right now.‖ 
These findings raise a host of further questions that deserve sociological attention. For 
instance, what do these findings tell us about the social nature of religion? Can a person privately 
believe and practice, for the most part, without continual social reinforcements?9 Can a person 
sustain private beliefs and practices in the absence of ongoing social gatherings? Those like 
Bowen (2004), Bruce (2002), Durkheim (1915), and Smith and Snell (2009) offer a definitive 
response that religion must be social, while Bibby (2002), Dillon and Wink (2007), Heelas and 
Woodhead (2005), and James (2002 [1902)]) leave open the possibility that people can sustain 
their religion in the absence of consistent social gatherings. Maybe we are witnessing a both/and 
situation. Could it be that people‘s worldviews are shaped at a younger age in a social context, 
and once established can be maintained in private? If this is so, maybe this helps to explain how 
and why marginal affiliates, like Emerson, Emily, and Debbie are able to hold on to their 
religious beliefs and practices in a relatively autonomous and private way today. Similarly, 
perhaps this explains how and why active affiliates, like Andrew and Becky can continue to 
                                                 
9 Of course, an individual‘s social networks reinforces mainstream societal values of individualism and thus in this 
sense people‘s beliefs and practices are shared. However, when I reference private belief and practice, I am 
following Roof and McKinney‘s (1987: 40) point about ―individualistic religion‖ as ―an autonomous believer, one 
who is on a spiritual journey, on his or her own quest, and often with little involvement in or connection with a 
particular religious community.‖ The result of this approach to religion is an emphasis on individual experience apart 
from the religious establishment, an egalitarian approach to understanding self and the divine, and an opposition to 
religious organizations‘ authority over individual belief and practice (p.49-50). In total, Roof and McKinney (1987: 
52) argue that ―privatism thrives on freedom from pressures of conformity and orthodoxy, and thus allows for a 
range of possible accommodations.‖  
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attend regularly, all the while holding on to beliefs that they developed at a younger age which 
may conflict with the reigning views of their current congregation. Maybe RCT is correct to 
assert that one‘s confidence in religious explanations is strengthened to the degree that others 
reinforce those values, but that the timing of those social influences is fluid. That is, might we 
conclude that social ties either from the distant past or the present are equally influential for 
stabilizing a person‘s religious beliefs and practices and consequently their level of confidence in 
their religious worldview?         
As we will see in chapter six, this finding on one‘s confidence relative to the social nature 
of their religious life is important to the supply-demand argument. Religious suppliers (and 
rational choice theorists) conjecture that groups can offer something more stable and meaningful 
for those who are not actively involved, but this logic becomes difficult when the people that they 
are ―marketing‖ to do not give any indication that they are looking for a worldview that is more 
―solid.‖ This observation is especially problematic for Bibby‘s renaissance thesis.  
The Failure of Supply-Side Logic 
In chapter three I summarized the rational choice view that people have an inexhaustible 
demand for religion, particularly for life after death, and that people are more willing to join 
―high cost‖ religious groups if the rewards that groups offer are worthwhile and desirable. With 
these things in mind, I raised some theoretical questions about religious supply and demand such 
as, do people have an inexhaustible demand for rewards that only religion provides and do people 
turn to religious groups primarily for religious reasons? Is the supply of religion the main 
variable to consider in shaping people‘s religious preferences and motivating them to commit to a 
religious organization? The rational choice response to these questions is ―yes,‖ but these claims, 
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which underpin their entire theory, lack much in the way of empirical verification. The following 




In terms of belief in the afterlife, we see in Figure 4.5 that there is reason to question the 




Nearly all active affiliates (nineteen out of twenty-one) believe in life after death, while two-
thirds of marginal affiliates (fourteen out of twenty-one) believe in the afterlife. What I think is 
important about this finding is that some do not believe in the afterlife, a finding that creates a 
small leak in the rational choice argument that there exists an ongoing demand for the main thing 
that religion supposedly has to offer. When we look closer at my interview data, we find that 
agnostics and atheists who attend religious services out of respect for family members are least 
likely to believe in an afterlife, followed by marginal affiliates who tragically lost a loved one. 






















them from dying contributes to their lack of belief in life after death. Looking beyond my data, 
there is evidence that not everyone believes in the afterlife or has a strong desire for life after 
death. Zuckerman‘s (2008) research in Sweden and Denmark reveals that many people are not 
troubled by ultimate questions of life and death. Many do not even think about the meaning of 
life. In fact, Sweden and Denmark are two of the top three happiest nations in the world (2008: 
66), despite having one of the lowest percentages of those who believe in life after death (30% 
and 33% for Danes and Swedes, respectively) (2008: 24).  
What about people‘s desire for the afterlife? Is there anything to indicate that individuals 
have a strong desire for life after death, as rational choice theorists posit, so much so that it drives 
their religious decision-making processes? Despite the fact that nineteen out of twenty-one active 
affiliates that I spoke with indicate a desire for life after death, it is not a strong desire for most. 
They do not want to escape this life in anticipation of a much better next life, and most did 
suggest that life after death is not the motivating factor for being religious. Instead, some say that 
life on earth is more important, either in the rewards that they receive right now, or in the 
possibility of bringing about ―God‘s Kingdom on earth as it is in heaven.‖ One Roman Catholic 
female says, ―I don‘t think I desire it. No . . . I look forward to a time to . . . figure out what it 
would be like to be in heaven with God. But I don‘t . . . I don‘t desire it. I‘m not just waiting for 
it.‖ When asked if she desires life after death, an evangelical Protestant females replies, ―Sure. If 
it‘s good, sign me up . . . if it sucks, keep me out. I just . . . do I go there sometimes? Sure, I go 
think about all the angels singing and thinking about it, and maybe there‘s still just a begrudging 
of my charismatic days where I refuse to let that be the driver. I believe more strongly on ‗Your 
Kingdom come. Your will be done on earth as it is in heaven,‘ meaning that God‘s kingdom is 
here with us, and the power of Christ is effective in my day today.‖ 
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Fewer marginal affiliates show a desire for life after death. Aside from the third who do 
not believe in life after death, another third do desire life after death, and an additional third 
indicate that life after death is inevitable or that they are unsure of what life after death looks like, 
thus questions about desire are irrelevant. For those who do desire the afterlife, I did not get the 
sense that there was a strong desire for it, except for a couple of individuals who wanted to either 
resolve issues with deceased family members or spend eternity with departed family members. 
One gentleman says, ―I have a lot of unresolved issues with, I‘m going to say, God, family 
members . . . both my parents are deceased, but I have a lot of issues I would like to be able to get 
through to them, I guess, face-to-face rather than me talking to the air. I‘d love to go and see 
them again, to tell them why I feel the way I do, again, rather than just laying in bed saying it to 
whatever.‖ Among those who believe that life after death is inevitable, there is a general 
sentiment along the lines of one woman who says, ―I don‘t have any questions about death. I 
never question death, so when that happens, I think that‘s going to be awesome, but I don‘t have 
a desire. I just have a knowing . . . that‘s what it‘s going to be.‖ 
Findings about the afterlife are clearest when respondents spoke about what is required to 
obtain life after death. Over half of active affiliates, mainly from Roman Catholic and evangelical 
Protestant backgrounds, believe that proper belief and practice are necessary to move on to the 
next life. In terms of belief, these active affiliates, similar to Becky Eagleton in chapter two, 
assert that individuals must believe in Jesus Christ, that he was crucified on a cross for people‘s 
sins, and that people need to repent and ask Jesus for forgiveness for their sins. They also need to 
proclaim that Jesus will guide their life, so that their entire worldview is shaped by the Godly 
things that are typically outlined in the Bible and learned at church. When it comes to practices, 
active affiliates, especially evangelical Protestants like Becky Eagleton, were hesitant to say that 
one can earn their way into heaven by religious practices (a belief that several interviewees, 
 126 
active and marginal, associate with Roman Catholicism),
10
 pointing instead to God‘s grace that is 
extended to humans who earnestly desire to ―have a relationship‖ with Him. In other words, 
church attendance was not a prerequisite to go to heaven. Yet, they maintained that true and 
proper belief inevitably leads to proper practice too. These include not only spiritual practices 
such as praying, reading religious texts, and serving the less fortunate, but also moral practices of 
being kind and loving and honest in all circumstances. 
The remaining active affiliates, disproportionately from the United Church of Canada, 
either indicate that they are unsure of what is required to obtain life after death or do not believe 
in the afterlife. This was clear in some of the quotations cited in chapter two. Also, a couple of 
others, surprisingly from the Roman Catholic Church and evangelical Protestant tradition, hinted 
that one does not need to be Christian to go to heaven. One just needs to believe in God, 
whatever that god might look like and pursue a connection with this transcendent being. As one 
active affiliate male says to me, ―I do believe it‘s a gift of God, and I believe that God pulls 
people to . . . the afterlife when they die . . . regardless of faith or religion . . . I believe God 
speaks to all people. I believe God‘s breath of life is in all people . . . I believe there‘s a small 
percentage of people in all kinds of religions that are deeply connected to the spirit of God.‖  
In contrast to the rational choice position that religious organizations ―are social 
enterprises whose primary purpose is to create, maintain, and supply religion to some set of 
individuals and to support and supervise their exchanges with a god or gods‖ (Stark and Finke 
2000: 103), the marginal affiliates in my sample do not make a connection between making 
exchanges with the gods (e.g., to obtain life after death) and church involvement. Excluding the 
                                                 
10 For example, Cam Bender says, ―I knew I didn‘t want to become Catholic, because . . . I don‘t believe that . . . 
going and confessing your sins to a priest will help or going and . . . doing any other rituals or doing any other sort of 
performances or anything like that or . . . you can‘t buy your way into heaven. You can‘t be good enough . . . I don‘t 
think that there‘s anything that . . . I can do . . . to obtain that.‖  
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six marginal affiliates who do not believe in the afterlife and the four who are unsure of what is 
required to obtain life after death, eight of the remaining eleven marginal affiliates believe that 
being a good person is the main criterion for entering the next life. For them this entails following 
the Ten Commandments and being generous, friendly, cheerful, and honest, while avoiding the 
major sins such as murder, rape, and stealing. Put another way, a definitive belief in a god or a 
supernatural being, or active involvement in a religious group is not a requirement for obtaining 
life after death. People of all religious faiths or no religious faith at all can move on to the next 
life if they are good, upright, moral people.  
In his book Sex in the Snow (2006), Environics President Michael Adams plausibly argues 
that a relationship exists between Canadians‘ increased orientation toward ―this-world‖ and 
declining desires for the afterlife (or fear of the afterlife). Commenting on the impact of 
technology and the sense of urgency and immediacy that it has created for many Canadians in 
most facets of life, Adams states:  
[Canadians are a] population that is unwilling to defer gratification to the next life, that 
wants to ―have its cake and eat it too.‖ What is the point, after all, of having a cake you 
don‘t eat, or waiting till it‘s stale? Canadians are increasingly focused on immediate 
gratification, and have pretty much given up on the promises—and threats—of an 
afterlife . . . Canadians are no longer willing to wait for gratification until death‘s door 
delivers them into an afterlife they‘re not even sure exists (2006: 31, 124).  
 
Adams‘ ideas ring true on two fronts. The first is in the plain fact that several marginal affiliates 
and some active affiliates do not believe in or desire life after death, and even among those who 
do desire life after death the intensity of that desire is rather small. Second, the reality that every 
single person that I interviewed mainly offered ―this-worldly‖ rewards for maintaining some 
level of religious belief or practice is indicative of the limited role that ―other-worldly‖ rewards 
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play in Canadian religious decision-making processes.
11
 That is, the reward of life after death is 
not a critical variable that many consider when deciding to be religious, or deciding how religious 
they will be. Therefore, in terms of religious supply and demand, these findings suggest that 
maybe there is a lack of demand for the things that religion has to offer in terms of life after 
death.  
If my interpretation of the data is correct, it is hard to understand why rational choice 
theorists constantly stress the critical role that religious groups play in an individual‘s pursuit of 
religious rewards such as life after death. Realistically, how are religious groups supposed to (a) 
convince people that there is an afterlife, (b) encourage individuals that they should strongly 
desire the afterlife, (c) persuade people to believe that life after death will somehow be better if 
they incur more costs along the way, and (d) influence affiliates to connect all of the above with 
necessary active involvement in their congregation? In my view the answer is simple: they 
cannot. If people do not believe in the afterlife, or they do not desire the afterlife, or they believe 
that they can obtain life after death without attending religious services regularly, then it matters 




Another limitation of the supply-side argument concerns the notion that people are 
attracted to strict churches and that strictness helps to explain why conservative congregations are 
growing versus declining liberal congregations (Iannaccone 1994; Kelley 1972). In response to 
many church leaders, academics, and the media who believed that religious groups needed to 
liberalize to stay relevant and succeed, Kelley‘s classic book Why Conservative Churches are 
Growing (1972) demonstrated that the opposite was true. He argues that strict conservative 
                                                 
11 This conclusion echoes Marx (1970), Norris and Inglehart (2004), and Zuckerman (2008) who believe that 
advances in modernity and material security leads to lower levels of religiosity.    
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congregations are so successful because they offer definitive answers to questions of ultimate 
meaning, giving members a sense that God is on their side if they subscribe to the group‘s beliefs 
and practices. Such churches also provide clear boundaries between ―insiders‖ and ―outsiders,‖ 
so that those on the inside are required to commit to ongoing belief in and loyalty to a unique 
way of life. These features facilitate a mutually supportive environment, rooted in common 
beliefs, which tend to motivate individuals to subordinate personal desires to the group. As a 
result, ―free riders,‖ or those who are not fully committed to the group, are left on the outside. 
Iannaccone (1994: 1197) goes on to reason that ―increased strictness (or distinctiveness, or 
costliness) leads to higher levels of church attendance and church contributions, closer ties to the 
group, and reduced involvement in competing groups.‖ This is because the benefits, this-worldly 
and other-worldly, that people associate with strict congregations, such as definitive answers to 
questions of ultimate meaning, are greater than those found in less strict congregations. 
Accordingly, the stricter a church is, the more likely it is that people will incur higher costs, such 
as those associated with greater participation.  
Kelley and Iannaccone‘s explanation of strict religious groups are widely accepted. The 
idea is used to explain both the struggles of Canadian mainline Protestant congregations over the 
last half-century, as well as the continued stability of Canadian evangelical Protestantism. 
However, what if strictness proves to be a barrier to active involvement in a church, and 
furthermore, if low strictness levels are attractive and foster greater participation? In his 
discussion of the impact that rigid family backgrounds have on long term religious commitment, 
Wade Clark Roof (1999: 231-232) highlights that while exposure to strict parenting styles help 
some children to maintain the conservative religious values and behaviours of their childhood 
into their adult years, authoritative parenting can also lead to ―heavy baggage resulting in 
resistance, if not outright rejection‖ of those religious values. Dillon and Wink (2007: 34) 
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conclude that ―although religiously strict churches are effective in attracting and maintaining new 
members . . . our data suggest that the aggregate logic behind this does not necessarily persuade 
all individuals, nor is it transmitted intact across generations.‖ Data from my study support these 
contrary views, which raise doubts about the persuasiveness of the rational choice emphasis on 
the causal linkage of strictness and levels of religiosity. Several marginal affiliates spoke about 
Roman Catholic and evangelical Protestant congregations, among other groups such as 
Mormons, Jehovah‘s Witnesses, and Muslims, and their strictness as a turn-off for considering 
more involvement in their congregation. They were disgusted with these groups‘ exclusive views 
about women in church leadership, women‘s roles in the home, abortion, the treatment of 
mothers who had abortions, and homosexuality. One male, in his early seventies, who is 
marginally affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church repeatedly discussed strict views towards 
women in religious groups: 
Women make up over fifty percent of the world and still they have no say? . . . And so 
why would you exclude them . . . in the Catholic Church and a lot of other—like, you take 
the Mormons and all that—they‘re still . . . in a way, they still can‘t vote in the church, so 
they‘re non-entities . . . and then you go back to the Muslims. Well, they‘re totally shut 
down, there. The women. And I think, you know, to make the world run, we need them 
both.  
 
Other marginal affiliates that I spoke with are upset with the self-righteous attitudes among 
Christians in general. They disagreed with groups that claimed to have an exclusive hold on truth, 
that their way of thinking about God, humanity, or the afterlife is the only acceptable way of 
thinking. Emily Foster laments, ―I think that some religions—and, I would say, especially 
Catholicism—you‘re either in the box or you‘re out.‖ Several marginal affiliates cited wars over 
the course of history as indicative of strict religious groups‘ oppressive nature, most recently 
evidenced in the Christian Right in the United States and Islamic extremism. Combined, these 
examples of strictness are enough to push and keep marginal affiliates away from organized 
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religion, particularly when they believe that they can experience and contact God outside the 
churches without trained specialists holding their hands along the way.
12
 These marginal affiliates 
can still experience the religious rewards that they are after without participating in a religious 
group that lives in high tension with the surrounding society.  
Beyond strictness keeping people away from regular church involvement, congregations 
that are less strict influenced some, like Cam Bender and others mainly from the United Church 
of Canada, to pursue active involvement in a church. As Melissa Walker (2003) highlights, 
United Church of Canada congregations are increasingly filled by people who have no prior 
exposure to the United Church, attributing much of this to the denominations‘ cultural sensitivity 
toward Canadians. David Nock states that ―by the 1990s the United Church of Canada had 
become one of the most liberal and undemanding of churches in Canada, with a wide variation in 
belief and practice‖ (1993: 44), and Douglas Cowan echoes this by saying ―in terms of costs 
incurred, for example, it can be demonstrated that within mainline Protestantism in Canada the 
United Church is among the least ‗expensive‘ to join‖ (2000: 9) (also see Best 1994; Graham 
1990; Milton 1991; O‘Toole et al. 1993). Even though Cowan reinforces Kelley and 
Iannaccone‘s thesis that religious groups with lower costs tend not to grow (which the evidence 
in Cowan‘s article supports), I would submit that there is a niche within the Canadian religious 
marketplace whereby the least expensive groups, theologically, are actually the most attractive 
groups. This is not to suggest that low cost religious groups will grow on mass because of their 
lower cost, as they clearly are not. However, maybe we should not be so quick to accept the logic 
that people are necessarily attracted to strict churches. The active affiliates that I interviewed who 
were attracted to the United Church of Canada valued that the denomination did not take an 
                                                 
12 Still, marginal affiliates want trained religious leaders to be available and offer guidance for important religious 
holidays and rites of passage (see Roof 1999: 234).  
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exclusivist position when looking at the world. They were drawn to seminars and discussion 
groups that explored other religions and worldviews, working towards a more holistic and 
informed understanding of the world. Ralph Milton expresses it this way: the United Church does 
not ―expect you to park your brains outside when you come in the front door‖ (1991: 15). Others 
that I interviewed were enticed by the inclusive posture toward minorities, particularly 
homosexuals, women in leadership, and the homeless. One woman in her late twenties spoke of 
these things in the following way:  
Their inclusive views was one of the big things that actually drew us there . . . we went 
because we saw the rainbow on the . . . sign of the little poster that we were interested in. 
Neither of us had ever heard of a church that was as inclusive, so in terms of just different 
types of families and . . . more importantly, what their view in terms of poverty and that 
sort of social focus was probably the most important thing to me . . . I think on paper, the 
fact . . . that they marry and that it‘s not seen as a negative to be a homosexual person is a 
really big part of it. So that was, sort of, the first one that I understood it as, but now I see 
by that kind of affirmation . . . I see that they‘re a more accepting church because of that 
and that other groups that might be marginalized, although not officially, would be 
attending there, as well. So that‘s a big part of it.  
 
Another male spoke of the appeal to the United Church of Canada:  
 
The United church . . . open, as in open to all groups of people, race, gender, religion. I 
guess, religion‘s kind of, you know, we‘re all Christians, but, you know, we don‘t have 
anything particularly against other religions. The United Church itself is very progressive, 
as in open to same-sex marriage . . . like, it‘s been at the forefront of those issues, like 
same-sex marriage, ordination of gay ministers, big push by the United church in the 
sixties for Medicare. In the thirties, the United church was the first church in Canada to 
ordain a woman . . . the United church is talking about climate change, poverty, war, all 
those sorts of things, as well as being a little bit more open . . . spiritually speaking. 
Congregation, same thing. A lot of . . . it‘s a variety of people . . . I‘m not going to say 
variety of people because . . . it is mostly white people, but there are . . . a few Asian 
people, a few African Canadian people, a couple Aboriginal people. You know, there‘s 
gay and lesbian couples . . . I really like that about the United church and that particular 
congregation.  
 
Others reinforced these perspectives, drawn to their church‘s broad-mindedness and 
openness to social justice issues. While Roman Catholic and evangelical Protestant congregations 
might also be involved in social justice issues, these active affiliates‘ perspective was that their 
 133 
church approached social justice issues with a ―no strings attached‖ framework. When they serve 
the poor in society, for example, it is not done so with the assumption that people must hear the 
gospel before they are fed or given a place to sleep. On a personal level, a few years ago I 
volunteered on a regular basis with a United Church, serving food to the homeless. I was told that 
evangelism would have no place in this ministry and that if I tried to evangelize the homeless, I 
would be asked to stop volunteering. Clearly, all of these findings support Kinnaman and Lyons‘ 
(2007) discoveries in unChristian that Christians, especially evangelicals, are perceived as 
hypocritical, homophobic, sheltered, overly political, judgmental, and insincere. 
These findings have not led me to altogether dismiss the notion that strict churches are 
appealing, and that this is why such churches are so successful in terms of numerical growth and 
commitment. However, the interview data is suggestive that strictness could be one, of many, 
explanations for why marginal affiliates are choosing to participate less in religious 
organizations, and that less strict congregations could be one motivating reason, among others, 
for why some people choose to pursue active involvement in a church. Returning to Kelley‘s 
argument, it could be that that both liberal and strict approaches to religion are appealing to 
different segments of the population. In Canada especially, the cultural influences of 
individualism, pluralism, and relativism reign supreme. As Adams (2006) documents, with 
advances in technology and the growing multicultural reality in Canada, Canadians prefer to have 
complete control over constructing their identities, to shape their beliefs and practices without 
external authorities attempting to do so for them. Thus, for these people in my sample, and like 
some of those who became actively involved with the United Church of Canada, liberal 
congregations are a better fit. Conversely, there remain many who are troubled by the 
uncertainties of life and desire black-and-white interpretations of ultimate questions, for which 
stricter congregations are more enticing. Many of the social benefits that come along with stricter 
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organizations, outlined earlier in the chapter, could also help to explain the value of strict 
churches for some in society. Maybe there is truth in both strict church and liberal church 
arguments, at least in the Canadian context. 
 
Religious Groups and Competition 
 
Another weakness of RCT is its insistence that religious suppliers should (and often do) 
think in competitive terms when marketing to current and potential religious consumers, and 
adjust their supply accordingly (Finke and Stark 2005; Stark and Finke 2000; Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994). The data that I collected does not speak directly to this issue; however, results 
from two recent sociological studies cast a shadow over this aspect of RCT, supporting my 
growing uncertainty of supply-side theory. The first study, conducted by sociologist‘s Janice 
Aurini and Linda Quirke (2009), does not deal with religion, but an analogous circumstance. It is 
a study of the non-elite and non-religious private education sector—a sector that, like for-profit 
businesses, operates without direct funding from any external source. They set out to test and 
challenge the ―market hypothesis,‖ a hypothesis which suggests that schools make intentional 
strategic decisions, such as improving curriculum or hiring the best teachers in the field, to win 
potential customers away from educational competitors, by comparing the views of owners and 
representatives from independent tutoring businesses, learning center franchises, and private 
schools. Despite conventional wisdom, that such organizations would strategically alter their 
supply of education to beat out competitors in profit and efficiency, Aurini and Quirke (2009: 13) 
discovered that ―competitive pressures do not shape short and long-term decision-making, nor are 
they the levers that drive how entrepreneurs conduct their everyday business or interaction with 
clients.‖ In fact, most were unaware of their ―competitors‖ in the surrounding neighbourhoods 
and beyond. Instead, they rationalized their marketing actions around their niche market, 
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presumably a market that lacks competition. They also stressed that their ethos was about 
providing quality service that met people‘s needs, not that generated a profit. Finally, they saw 
their roles as educators, not business entrepreneurs, and thus did not think of their organization in 
terms of market competition. Aurini and Quirke (2009: 18) summarize their findings by saying 
that ―competition in and of itself was not the driving force behind their short- and long-term 
decision-making. Instead, these responses were rooted in their commitment to their clients and 
self-concept as educators, rather than as educated business people.‖         
Aurini and Quirke‘s findings are corroborated in another study, in the area of religion. 
From several email exchanges, I have learned that in their recent study on Canadian evangelical 
congregations, Sam Reimer, Michael Wilkinson, and Andrew Grenville asked evangelical pastors 
a series of questions on a range of topics, some of which measured the pastor‘s sense of or 
activity in competition with other congregations.13 Similar to Aurini and Quirke, they discovered 
that pastors did not think in competitive terms, favouring instead a theological impetus to ―save 
souls‖ and encourage people in their religious and spiritual journeys, whether in their 
congregation or another. When churches do sharpen their supply with livelier music, more 
relevant preaching, or more dynamic programs, their motivation is not to steal people from other 
congregations. They are moved with the desire to best facilitate a person‘s set of exchanges with 
God, particularly among those who do not currently attend a church. Moreover, pastors cited 
examples of how they cooperate with other congregations in joint services, social service 
projects, or evangelism events. Here too the goal is to expand and represent the entire Christian 
community, not a particular congregation or denomination per se. 
                                                 
13 Data for this study was recently collected, thus no publications or presentations have been made on this data yet 
(hence my reliance on email exchanges, which I was given permission to cite for the purposes of this dissertation).  
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If we combine the findings from these two studies and think about religious suppliers in 
similar terms to the private educational sector, we could logically posit that religious leaders and 
suppliers do not see themselves in the same way that hard-nosed business entrepreneurs see 
themselves. There are alternative motivations for why religious suppliers supply religion in the 
ways that they do, aside or in place of profit (measured not only in dollars but by human 
resources). Building on Aurini and Quirke‘s observations, churches are a different type of 
organization that exists to service people‘s needs rather than turn a profit. 
In the next two chapters I speak to the issue of religious supply head on, in particular 
dealing with Bibby‘s assertion that marginal affiliates desire greater involvement in their 
religious group and that adjustments to the supply of religion is a key step that will lead to their 
eventual return. As will be seen, most marginal affiliates like Emerson Cairns do not actually 
desire greater involvement, and for the few like Debbie Fisher who do, the factors that would 
lead to more involvement are largely beyond religious groups‘ control. Discussion of this data 
will expand what I think is a growing body of evidence against the rational choice supply-side 




 In this chapter I set out to test some of the most fundamental axioms and propositions in 
RCT about costs and rewards, the social nature of religion, as well as religious supply and 
demand, assertions that lack strong, if any, empirical support. In addition to documenting several 
exploratory observations about RCT assumptions that could and should be developed in future 
studies, the findings in this chapter both confirm and challenge elements of RCT that move us 
further along in our comparison of active and marginal affiliates. Beginning with the religious 
decisions that people make, active affiliates, in general, demonstrate a stronger propensity to 
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attach religious as opposed to secular rewards to their religious beliefs and practices. This is 
evident when we consider that active affiliates like Andrew Donnelly, Becky Eagleton, and Cam 
Bender are largely motivated to attend religious services to experience religious community, to 
receive meaning and purpose for daily living, and to develop and affirm their faith, while 
marginal affiliates like Emerson Cairns and Emily Foster are largely motivated to attend religious 
services because of tradition or family pressures. In terms of religious costs, while active 
affiliates are more prone to say that they sacrifice something in exchange for desired rewards, the 
finding that is perhaps most instructive is that many people that I interviewed do not think that 
they have sacrificed anything, or they do not think of supposed costs as a bad or negative thing. 
Methodologically, this last finding supports Bruce (1999) and Bryant‘s (2000) criticisms against 
RCT, that religious costs are measured subjectively and they need not entail ―bad‖ or 
―undesirable‖ sacrifices. 
 In terms of how dependable, responsive, or powerful the gods are, active affiliates in this 
study have a more favourable view that the gods will ―look out‖ for them, with the exception of 
some active affiliates from the United Church of Canada who tend not to believe that God is 
actively involved in the world—or at least not in a direct manner. Accordingly, in contrast to 
marginal affiliates, most active affiliates believe that God is active and powerful over all of the 
world‘s events. The marginal affiliate reluctance to agree with this position is largely shaped by 
past experiences where God did not seemingly care for them and their wishes. When I extended 
Stark and Finke‘s theory to consider people‘s perceptions of their congregations, I found that 
active affiliates are more likely to think that they can depend on others in their congregation. For 
marginal affiliates, their general negative response to this indicator is because they either know 
nobody in their congregation or they have had negative experiences in the past with others in 
their church. However, both active and marginal affiliates are optimistic that people in their 
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congregations have good intentions when it comes to caring for people at large. Combined, these 
findings validate rational choice theorist‘s assumption that past experiences with the gods, and 
now the churches, help to explain people‘s current religious views and behaviours. 
 One question that arises is how and why active affiliates who experienced tragedies in the 
past do not also adopt less than positive views of God? This is where the findings on the social 
nature of religion are important. Although both active and marginal affiliates in this study tend to 
associate with others who are like themselves, religiously, active affiliates are in social settings 
that offer religious explanations for the chaotic and uncontrollable events of life. Active affiliates 
and those they are close with turn to God for divine intervention and interpretation, believing that 
everything in life happens for a reason and that God has a plan. These religious legitimations, 
grounded in the social, help to distinguish active from marginal affiliates in this sample. 
In terms of confidence in religious explanations, contrary to what one would expect, 
based on the rational choice claim that one‘s confidence is correlated with their association with 
others who share similar beliefs and practices, active and marginal affiliates equally show high 
levels of confidence in the religious beliefs and practices that they adopt. This observation led me 
to suggest that social components of the religious life are important for enhancing one‘s 
confidence, but that the timing of those social encounters can vary. That is to say, marginal 
affiliates are confident in their religious explanations because at a younger age, when their minds 
were more malleable, they cultivated their current beliefs in the context of family and friends 
who shared similar worldviews. This strong grounding enables them to continue to believe and 
belong in a rather private manner (i.e., they do not regularly gather with other like-minded 
individuals to reaffirm their religious groups‘ beliefs and practices) (see Roof and McKinney 
1987). Moving forward, it would be good to ask active and marginal religious affiliates more in-
depth questions about their religious upbringing and socialization, to better understand the many 
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and varied factors that contributed to their religious worldview (similar to Dillon and Wink‘s 
(2007) longitudinal study of religious change over the life course in the United States). It would 
also be helpful to know more about the phase of life where individuals decide which aspects of 
their religious upbringing they will take or leave. Do their beliefs solidify when they move out, 
when they pursue an education, when they marry, when they have children, or when they lose a 
loved one? What exactly contributes to the point at which people draw the line in the sand 
regarding what they believe about religion?    
 With respect to religious supply and demand, I advanced a couple of reasons for why 
supply-side logic is flawed and why demand-side interpretations ought to receive more attention 
in the sociological study of religion. In doing so I demonstrated that people, particularly marginal 
affiliates, do not have an inexhaustible demand for religious rewards, such as the afterlife, and 
people do not necessarily turn to religious groups for religious reasons. Consequently, I question 
how much influence religious suppliers can actually have to attract new members, or encourage 
existing marginal affiliates to pursue greater involvement in the future. In large part, these are 
some of the central issues that I pursue in chapter‘s five and six on secularization.
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Chapter 5 
The Contours of Secularization Theory in Studies of Religion 
Introduction 
In this chapter I move toward a more complete understanding and evaluation of Reginald 
Bibby‘s religious renaissance thesis in the context of a broader sociological discussion on 
secularization. I begin by outlining the main evidence and rationale behind Bibby‘s renaissance 
thesis. Again, Bibby‘s forecast builds on many of the RCT assumptions detailed in the last two 
chapters, especially that religious demand is constant and that changes to religious supply should 
lead to greater church attendance. I then discuss some methodological problems behind Bibby‘s 
thesis (and secularization theory in general) that limit our ability to precisely and correctly 
identify the current and possible future state of religion in Canada. For instance, from quantitative 
data alone, it is unclear what meanings and motivations lay behind individuals‘ religious beliefs 
and practices. Such knowledge may help us to more accurately assess the likelihood of a potential 
religious renaissance. In addition, I document the various ways that sociologists have defined the 
term ―secularization,‖ and the subsequent challenges that emerge when scholars conceptualize 
and operationalize secularization differently. As a result, I turn to Karel Dobbelaere‘s three-level 
analysis of secularization and argue that the renaissance-secularization debate at the heart of 
Bibby‘s thesis mainly concerns secularization at the individual level. Accordingly, this is the 
level of secularization that I will deal with in this chapter as I summarize several theories of 
secularization in the sociology of religion, accounting for those who support or reject 
secularization theory.
1
 The reason for presenting the theories at all is because theory helps to 
explain data, and data helps support or refute theory. The theoretical overview in this chapter will 
                                                 
1 See Oliver Tschannen‘s 1991 article, ―The Secularization Paradigm: A Systematization,‖ Jose Casanova‘s 2007 
article, ―Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective,‖ and Berger, Davie, and Fokas‘ book, 
Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations (2008) for well-rounded summaries and comparisons 
of several secularization theories.  
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set up the discussion in chapter six, where I turn to my data to evaluate Bibby‘s renaissance thesis 
and to speak to the potential future of religion in Canada. Together these chapters also will help 
us to further understand some of the major similarities and differences between active and 
marginal affiliates.  
Setting the Context for the Renaissance-Secularization Debate 
In contrast to his own conclusions during the 1980s and 1990s, Reginald Bibby surprised 
many in Restless Gods (2002) when he argued that Canada was experiencing a renaissance of 
religion, particularly in the churches, and that this was all to be expected. Drawing extensively on 
Rational Choice Theory and supply-side logic, he rejects that secularization is the best concept 
for describing the state of religion in Canada. Citing realities inside the churches, interest in 
religion and spirituality outside the churches, and indicators that Canadians are open to greater 
involvement in their religious group, Bibby claims that there is evidence that religion is alive and 
well. I will not review all the supporting statistics here, as that has been done elsewhere (Thiessen 
and Dawson 2008). Rather, I will just briefly account for Bibby‘s general conclusions as they 
pertain to secularization, moving toward a theoretical and empirical response to the second main 
question of this dissertation: how are we to assess the degree of religiosity or secularity in Canada 
in light of active and marginal affiliates‘ religious beliefs, practices, and involvements? 
 Optimistic about what is happening in Canadian churches, Bibby records ongoing 
stability in church membership and slightly higher weekly attendance patterns among adult 
evangelical Protestants since the 1950s (2002: 73), and among teens since the 1980s (2002: 87-
88). In mainline Protestant settings, despite significant declines in membership (2006: 198) and 
weekly attendance (2002: 75) since 1990, he notes that the drop appears to have stopped, 
possibly signalling an imminent turn upward, as already noted in monthly attendance figures 
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(2006: 199). Among Roman Catholics, he points out that nearly 50% of all Canadians continue to 
identify as Roman Catholic, similar to the  figure for 1871 (2002: 78). Outside of Quebec, 
declining numbers attend mass weekly today when compared with fifty years ago (2002: 78), and 
the same can be said of weekly mass attendance inside Quebec since the 1950s (2002: 80). 
However, Bibby observes, the actual numerical loss in weekly attendance is minimal (e.g., 1.6 
million people attended mass weekly in Quebec in 1990, compared with 1.2 million in 2000). 
There are also marginal increases in monthly attendance outside of Quebec since the 1990s 
(2006: 196). 
 Beyond the churches, Canadians continue to demonstrate an interest in and acceptance of 
various religious and spiritual beliefs and practices. Bibby shows that as of 2000, between 60 and 
70% of Canadians ask questions about meaning in life, 70% ask questions about life after death, 
and over 90% ponder issues of happiness and suffering. Over 80% of Canadians believe in God, 
nearly 50% of Canadians claim to have experienced God, and only 26% never pray (Bibby 2002: 
93-146). In 2005, Bibby documents noticeable numbers of Canadians who believed in astrology 
(33%), in extra sensory perception (57%), in communicating with the dead (31%), and in 
psychics (55%) (Bibby 2006: 188). 
Yet Bibby‘s most pertinent finding is that high percentages of Canadians continue to hold 
on to and place some value in their religious affiliation, despite not attending on a regular basis. 
This is evidenced in the fact that 80% of Canadians who do not attend religious services regularly 
(representing 75% of the Canadian population) continue to turn to their religious tradition for 
important religious holidays and rites of passage and they have no intention of switching 
religious traditions (Bibby 1987: 84).
2
 Not only this, but Bibby argues that 55% of those who 
                                                 
2 The raw data from Bibby‘s 1995 survey, one of two used to produce Restless Gods (2002), yields similar 
observations. This raw data is available online at http://thearda.com/Archive/Files/Codebooks/PC1995_CB.asp. 
 143 
attend less than monthly are open to being more involved in their religious tradition, if certain 
ministry, organizational, and personal factors are addressed (2002: 220). For example, if religious 
groups had more relevant preaching, livelier music, more and improved programs, and focused 
on helping individuals to live their lives and to feel loved and cared for in a community, then 
some Canadians would consider greater involvement. Put differently, if religious groups adjust 
their supply of religion, then we are more likely to witness greater church attendance. 
Bibby‘s optimism has re-engaged a debate that some thought was over, thinking that 
secularization had reached Canada and was here to stay. On one hand, quantitative studies 
indicate that weekly attendance at religious services and the social influence of religious 
institutions are markedly less today than they were fifty years ago (e.g., Baum 2000; Bibby 1987, 
1993; Bowen 2004; Egerton 2000; Lyon and Van Die 2000). On the other hand, many Canadians 
still pray in private, believe in the supernatural, identify with a religious group, and attend 
religious services at least a few times a year (Bibby 1987, 1993, 2002, and 2006). Further, as 
Bibby asserts, some marginal affiliates supposedly desire to be more involved in their religious 
group (Bibby 2002, 2004). So what are we to make of this paradox? Is this state of affairs 
evidence for or against secularization? 
Part of the confusion (and criticism) surrounding secularization theory stems from its 
reliance on macro quantitative data, which can only tell us so much. Numbers tell us how many 
people claim to believe something or behave a certain way and how frequently or strongly this is 
the case. What is missing is the story within the story. What do those numbers actually mean to 
the individuals who circle ―strongly agree‖ or ―somewhat disagree?‖ When Emily Foster claims 
that spirituality is very important to her, but religion is not, what does this mean? When Emerson 
Cairns or Emily Foster attend religious services out of respect for tradition or family, but not 
necessarily because they are seeking religious rewards, how should we interpret their behaviour? 
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What about Debbie Fisher who indicates a desire for greater involvement in her religious group? 
How intense and realistic is this desire and what stands in the way of greater involvement?  
Thought of in a different way, consider the recent attention given world-wide to 
environmental concerns. Canadians, like many in Western countries, have responded by using 
energy efficient light bulbs, appliances, and building materials in their homes. At the surface it 
would appear that Canadians are increasingly conscious of their impact on the environment, 
desiring to be ―eco-friendly.‖ What if we found out that Canadians are adjusting their habits 
primarily for economic reasons, to lower their monthly bills in light of rising energy costs? How 
might this change our interpretation of people‘s attitudes and practices? Instead of suggesting that 
Canadians are making changes because of their care for the environment, we could conclude that 
Canadians are following the capitalist ethic that is so strongly engrained in our culture. In fact, 
families might not care at all about their impact on the environment. The same principle applies 
when it comes to religious beliefs and practices. How are we to interpret the fact that marginal 
affiliates continue to associate with a religious tradition, selectively turn to their group for 
religious holidays and rites of passage, indicate no desire to change religious traditions, and 
possibly desire to be more involved? What motivates these beliefs and behaviours? We need 
answers to these questions to determine what these responses tell us about the strength or 
weakness of religion in Canada. Regrettably, quantitative data does not provide us with answers 
to such questions, questions that sorely need to be addressed in order to adequately test Bibby‘s 
renaissance thesis. The strength of qualitative data is that it does yield answers to these types of 
questions, which is affirmed in the data from this study. While addressing these questions will 
not suddenly resolve the secularization debate as it pertains to Canada, it is a step in the right 
direction, especially in the context of Bibby‘s renaissance thesis. 
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Evaluating secularization theory is complicated because of the different and inconsistent 
ways of measuring secularization. Karel Dobbelaere‘s (2002) three-level analysis of 
secularization is instructive here. Dobbelaere argues that scholars have different ways of 
conceptualizing and operationalizing the term ―secularization‖ and that we need to be clear about 
what type or level of secularization we are talking about. For some scholars secularization refers 
to the separation of church and state and religion‘s decreasing influence over public matters. For 
others, it entails modernizing religious beliefs and practices toward a secular worldview. Still, 
there are others who reason that individual beliefs and practices diminish with time. This 
inconsistency prompted Dobbelaere to seek clarity in his influential 1981 article, ―Secularization: 
A Multi-Dimensional Concept.‖ He later developed his ideas in Secularization: An Analysis at 
Three Levels (2002). When speaking of secularization, Dobbelaere challenges us to consider 
three levels—societal, organizational, and individual—and to be clear about what type of 
secularization we are trying to define, measure, and analyze.
3
 
 Societal secularization refers to ―the shrinking relevance of the values, institutionalized in 
church religion, for the integration and legitimation of everyday life in modern society‖ 
(Dobbelaere 2002: 19). This level of secularization can be both a latent (unintentional) and 
manifest (intentional) consequence of larger social change. For example, the Protestant 
Reformation unintentionally influenced the spread of secularization, while the First Amendment 
in the American Constitution was an intentional attempt to keep religion from the public square.   
                                                 
3 Jose Casanova (1994: 7; 2007: 101) also distinguishes between three types of secularization: secularization as 
religious decline, secularization as differentiation, and secularization as privatization. However, I will use 
Dobbelaere to move this discussion forward because he was the first to clearly discuss secularization at different 
levels, and as will be seen in this section, his ideas are more specific and relevant for addressing Bibby‘s renaissance 
thesis (i.e., secularization at the individual level). Casanova‘s Public Religions in the Modern World (1994) is an 
excellent example of how to apply and evaluate secularization theory, however his primary focus is on secularization 
at the societal level (i.e., privatization), not the individual level. 
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Organizational secularization refers to the ―modernization of religion‖ from within 
(Dobbelaere 2002: 21). The clearest theoretical depiction of this is found in Weber (1963 [1922]), 
Troeltsch (1960), and Niebuhr (1951) who each distinguish between ―sect‖ and ―church.‖ 
Organizational secularization occurs when a sectarian group transforms into a church group, 
modernizing and accommodating its positions to better fit the culture around. In her book 
Religion in Britain Since 1945 (1994: 33-36), Grace Davie contends that the greatest threat that 
religious groups face in the modern era is the internal shift away from orthodox beliefs. This shift 
blurs the boundaries between the sacred and profane, this-world and other-world, insiders and 
outsiders, which makes it difficult to establish and sustain distinct requirements for membership 
in the group. 
Individual secularization includes any ―decline in involvement in churches and 
denominations‖ (Dobbelaere 2002: 18). While church attendance is a critical component to 
individual secularization, I would go further and suggest that individual secularization should 
also include other personal beliefs and practices such as belief in God, religious affiliation, or 
prayer. In fact, these additions are at the heart of the unsettling question about secularization in 
Canada, and the United States and Europe. How are we to interpret the secularization thesis when 
marginal affiliates do not attend religious services regularly, but continue to maintain a nominal 
association with their religious tradition, and maintain some degree of belief and practice in 
private? Again, the meanings and motivations behind individuals‘ beliefs and practices are of 
utmost importance for evaluating Bibby‘s renaissance thesis. 
There is no doubt that a separate dissertation could be written to account for the various 
levels of secularization in Canada and around the world, but I will limit my discussion and 
analysis to individual levels of secularization. I do this mainly because Bibby‘s renaissance thesis 
deals primarily with individual religious attitudes and behaviours, not societal or organizational 
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secularization per se. Furthermore, my data collection centers on individuals‘ religious beliefs 
and practices, not on church-state relations or the theology and practices of religious 
organizations. While examining the other forms of secularization may lead to interesting 
observations, it would go beyond the purposes of this dissertation. 
Secularization Theory 
Few theories have gained as much attention in the sociology of religion as secularization 
theory (see e.g., Berger 1967; Berger, Davie, and Fokas 2008; Beyer 1999; Casanova 1994, 2007, 
2008; Chaves 1994; Cox 1966; Dobbelaere 2002; Gorski 2000; Heelas and Woodhead 2005; 
Lechner 1991; Luckmann 1967; Lyon 1985; Martin 1969, 1978, 1991, 2005; Neuhaus 2009; 
Swatos and Christiano 1999; Tschannen 1991; Yamane 1997). Proponents of the theory often 
hail from Europe where there is little doubt that the strength of religion (at the individual level 
especially) has dramatically declined in the modern era (e.g., Bruce 2002; Crockett and Voas 
2006; Davie 1994; Voas 2009; Voas and Crockett 2005; Wilson 1982, 1985, 2001). This is 
largely attributable to features that coincide with advances in modern society, such as 
societalization, rationalization, structural and social differentiation, diversity, individualism, and 
relativism. Those who oppose the theory typically come from America, one of the most religious 
nations in the modern Western world (e.g., Casanova 1994; Finke and Stark 2005; Hadden 1987; 
Stark and Finke 2000). They often point to the growth of new religious movements, the resurgent 
strength of evangelical Christianity in America, the increasingly public presence of religion, the 
ongoing existence of ―spirituality,‖ and the cyclical nature of religious belief and practice due to 
the relationship between religious suppliers and consumers. 
There is not enough space to document everything that has ever been written on 
secularization, thus I limit the following overview to those theories (for and against 
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secularization) that directly help us to assess individual levels of secularization.
4
 When 
appropriate, I highlight other theories of secularization that intersect with these ideas. I begin by 
discussing Peter Berger5 and Steve Bruce, who are two of the most influential proponents of 
secularization theory, and whose theories help us to understand secularization at the individual 
level. With respect to those who reject secularization theory, I single out Jeffrey Hadden and 
Rodney Stark. Jeffrey Hadden is important to this discussion because until the 1980s it was 
difficult to find sociologists who rejected the secularization paradigm, and his work sparked a 
reconsideration of the accepted secularization views among sociologists. Although Glock and 
Stark (1965), Martin (1969, 1978), Glock and Hammond (1973), and Hammond (1985) each 
attempted to challenge secularization theory, it was Jeffrey Hadden‘s 1987 article in Social 
                                                 
4 David Martin and Jose Casanova are two prominent theorists in the secularization debate, but I do not cover them 
in detail because their theories do not mainly or directly deal with individual levels of secularization. For instance, 
David Martin (1969, 1978, 1991) is best known for suggesting that there is no universal process called 
secularization, nor are there uniform causes of secularization that apply across time and space. Secularization, and 
modernity for that matter, looks different around the world because of the specific historical and contextual 
differences of nations. In addition, in response to the claim that modernity inevitably brings about secularization, 
Martin argues that several regions of the world that are modern are also increasingly religious (or at least have 
remained highly religious in the face of modernization), such as the United States, various countries throughout Latin 
America, and the Middle East. Jose Casanova‘s (1994, 2007, 2008) examination of the relationship between religion 
and modernity leads him to reject secularization theory, mainly because of the strong public (and global) presence of 
religion, since the 1980s especially. For example, he references the Iranian Revolution, the Solidarity Movement in 
Poland, the Catholic involvement in Latin American political conflicts, and Protestant Fundamentalism in American 
politics (1994: 3). To explain his position, Casanova, like Karel Dobbelaere, identifies three levels of secularization: 
―secularization as differentiation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms, secularization as 
decline of religious beliefs and practices, and secularization as marginalization of religion to a privatized sphere‖ 
(1994: 211). While Casanova agrees that the first two levels of secularization are present in many modern societies, 
he rejects assertions that the third level of secularization is also present. Instead, he argues that we are witnessing the 
―deprivatization‖ of religion in the modern world. By ―deprivatization‖ he means, ―the fact that religious traditions 
throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role which theories of modernity as well as 
theories of secularization had reserved for them‖ (1994: 5). Casanova claims that ―deprivatization‖ arises for a 
variety of reasons. Some groups like the Roman Catholic Church hold the doctrinal conviction that they have a God-
ordained commandment to assert themselves in the public sphere (e.g., to speak out on issues like abortion). Some 
like the Christian Right in the United States are fearful that their religious beliefs and practices have little impact in 
modern society, and thus seek to revitalize and reform their religious traditions by reasserting themselves in the 
public square (e.g., aligning political law with religious values). Other transnational groups like Islamic 
fundamentalists attempt to utilize forces of globalization to spread their influence over individuals and entire 
societies (e.g., via terrorism). Even in nations that are considered more or less secular (e.g., France or the United 
Kingdom), Casanova (2007, 2008) argues that religion is at the center of their public debates over immigration and 
religious diversity. 
5 Berger would later recant his theory in 1998 and 1999. Still, his original theory remains useful and is cited by many 
today (e.g., Bruce 2002; Heelas and Woodhead 2005; Hervieu-Leger 2000; Neuhaus 2009).  
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Forces, ―Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory,‖ that finally initiated a wider rebellion 
against the secularization paradigm in sociology (most scholars who reject secularization 
reference Hadden‘s influential 1987 article). Rodney Stark is important because he is one of the 
most forceful and influential critics of the secularization proponents. Stark proposes an 
alternative theory of secularization that draws extensively on RCT assumptions, assumptions that 
are central to Reginald Bibby‘s renaissance thesis and discussion of religion at the individual 
level. 
Prior to outlining each theory, it is vital that the reader, particularly the non-sociologist, is 
reminded of the descriptive and explanatory role of sociologists. The fact that a theorist supports 
or rejects the secularization thesis does not mean that they personally celebrate or lament such a 
process (see Bruce 2002: xiii; Wilson 1982: 148 and 1985: 11). The sociologist is plainly charged 
with the task of objectively describing, theorizing, and analyzing social realities based on 




 In Peter Berger‘s classic The Sacred Canopy (1967), he advances that secularization, ―the 
process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the denomination of religious 
institutions and symbols‖ (p. 107), is occurring in the modern Western world. Berger makes a 
case that secularization is a consequence of increased emphasis on rationalization in industrial 
and modern societies that result in lessened religious influence and control over modern Western 
nations. For instance, at the societal level, increasing societal specialization and fragmentation 
meant that Christian churches gradually lost control over running social institutions such as 
education, healthcare, and the law. At the cultural level, Berger notes declining religious content 
in art, music, and literature. Yet, what is most important about Berger‘s theory of secularization 
 150 
for our purposes is his emphasis on secularization at the level of individual consciousness. Berger 
offers the following observation:  
Secularization has a subjective side as well. As there is a secularization of society and 
culture, so is there a secularization of consciousness. Put simply, this means that the 
modern West has produced an increasing number of individuals who look upon the world 
and their own lives without the benefit of religious interpretations (Berger 1967: 107-
108). 
 
For Berger, secularization at the societal level inevitably leads to secularization at the individual 
level. This troubles Berger because one of the main functions of religion is to unify a society 
around a common worldview. If a society lacks common values, beliefs, and symbols, then what 
will hold members of a society together? In the following discussion I summarize Berger‘s 
explanation of secularization, including what he believes are the causes of secularization and the 
subsequent consequences of secularization for individuals and societies. 
To demonstrate how and why secularization develops, Berger distinguishes between 
internal and external causes of secularization. Internal causes of secularization entail 
secularization from within a religious organization, occurring mainly when religious groups seek 
to adapt to the external secular culture. As will be seen shortly, Berger claims that several beliefs 
and practices within Protestantism (going back to Old Testament forms of Christianity) 
contributed to the advancement of secularizing processes. External causes of secularization refer 
to the imposition of secular realities and values on to the religious beliefs and practices of 
individuals and entire religious organizations. In particular, Berger isolates pluralism as a major 
cause of secularization, and privatization, relativization, and subjectivization as consequences of 
external secularization. 
Berger, following Weber, begins his explanation of secularization by pointing to factors 
internal to religion, namely Protestantism (along with Old Testament forms of Christianity), that 
contributed to fewer people viewing the world through a religious lens. When comparing Roman 
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Catholic and Protestant beliefs and practices, Berger notices that Protestantism ―appears as a 
radical truncation, a reduction to ‗essentials‘ at the expense of a vast wealth of religious contents . 
. . Protestantism may be described in terms of an immense shrinkage in the scope of the sacred in 
reality, as compared with its Catholic adversary‖ (Berger 1967: 111). In an attempt to place more 
emphasis on God‘s majesty and sovereign grace, Protestants abolished many sacraments, gave 
less significance to miracles, eliminated intercession through the saints, and reduced the central 
role of the priest for the individual‘s religious life.
6
 These sacred features found in Roman 
Catholic settings were viewed as ―extras‖ or secular options for the Protestant‘s religious life. 
Berger suggests that the unintended result of such changes was a widened gap between sacred 
and supernatural forces and the human or natural world: 
The Protestant believer no longer lives in a world ongoingly penetrated by sacred beings 
and forces. Reality is polarized between a radically transcendent divinity and a radically 
―fallen‖ humanity that, ipso facto, is devoid of sacred qualities. Between them lies an 
altogether ―natural‖ universe, God‘s creation to be sure, but in itself bereft of numinosity. 
In other words, the radical transcendence of God confronts a universe of radical 
immanence, of ―closedness‖ to the sacred. Religiously speaking, the world becomes very 
lonely indeed (Berger 1967: 111-112). 
 
As Berger‘s closing words indicate, the outcome for many is an increasingly solitary and 
fragmented approach to religion that isolates individuals from the religious community and the 
divine. While the Catholic has several channels to mediate their connection with God (e.g., 
sacraments or intercession of the saints), the Protestant‘s access to the sacred is essentially 
reduced to the Bible and individual prayer. In sum, the sacred does not penetrate the Protestant‘s 
everyday consciousness to the same degree that it does for the Catholic. As we will see, Berger 
contends that the Protestant‘s limited access to God is extremely tenuous in a pluralist social 
milieu. 
                                                 
6 Weber refers to these changes as the ―disenchantment of the world.‖  
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 While Berger pinpoints Protestantism as a carrier of internal secularization, he traces the 
sharp separation between the empirical and supernatural world back to the religion of ancient 
Israel in the Old Testament. He does this by discussing three concepts: transcendentalization, 
historization, and ethical rationalization. Transcendentalization refers to the Israelite belief that 
there is a clear distinction and gap between a monotheistic God and human beings, where God is 
completely transcendent and outside the empirical world (Berger 1967: 115-117). Although the 
Israelites believed that God was actively involved in the events of the physical world, they were 
keenly aware that He existed beyond the universe. For instance, God had no genealogical ties to 
the Israelites and He could not be coerced with magic. He commanded obedience from His 
followers, yet He was not dependent on their obedience in order to exist. God was entirely self-
sufficient, without need for human companions. This perspective on God stands in stark contrast 
to the broader Egyptian and Mesopotamian belief of the time. Their polytheistic deities were 
physically and locally present in human affairs, and the supernatural and physical worlds were 
closely intertwined. Humans could manipulate the gods to do what they wanted and events in the 
physical world influenced events in the supernatural realm. For example, Berger discusses how 
human disobedience toward the god-king of Egypt negatively impacts the divine realm. Defiance 
results not only in punishment for the individual, but also for the entire society so that national 
security against foreign aggression is threatened or farmers do not receive the necessary rain for 
their crops. 
Historization builds on the idea of a transcendent God who acts in human history, giving 
it a meaning and purpose (Berger 1967: 117). The Old Testament is filled with historically 
specific events where God acts in human history, such as delivering the Israelites out of Egypt or 
forming a covenant with Moses and the Israelites on Mount Sinai. This historical orientation was 
important to the Israelite religion for two reasons. First, unlike the non-transcendent polytheistic 
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deities, a historical God meant that individuals began to see themselves as individual actors 
before a transcendent actor. As Berger says, ―Individual men are seen . . . as distinct and unique 
individuals, performing important acts as individuals . . . [individualism] provided a religious 
framework for a conception of the individual, his dignity and his freedom of action‖ (Berger 
1967: 119). In this, an individual‘s actions did not impact other people‘s interactions with God, 
such as disobedience toward the god-king of Egypt did for the Egyptians and Mesopotamians. 
Second, a memory of God‘s historical acts imparted a sense of linear progression to history, so 
that God‘s past interactions with humans shape future exchanges with them. Religious rituals and 
festivals, such as The Passover, mark past events in history, and individuals‘ faith in God, 
documented throughout the Old Testament, was frequently based on God‘s past activities in the 
world. This historical orientation to the world is unlike the Egyptian and Mesopotamian belief 
that the gods deal arbitrarily with individuals, and hence past or present exchanges have no 
impact on future exchanges. 
Ethical rationalization is the culmination of transcendentalization and historization. Once 
more departing from the dominant Egyptian and Mesopotamian polytheistic religious practices, 
the God of Israel did not act erratically or inconsistently with humans. Instead, God provided a 
set of unwavering commandments and ethical laws that followers needed to obey. As the 
Israelites were aware of their separation from the transcendent God, and they were mindful that 
covenants made with God in the past would impact their future relations with God, they 
developed a system of rationality to ensure that their attitudes and behaviours were in line with 
God‘s commandments (Berger 1967: 120). For example, the priestly ethic formalized God‘s 
commandments into religious laws that group members followed. The Israelites were encouraged 
to devote their life to serving and pleasing God, so they became methodical in their exchanges 
with God, and they rationalized all facets of life. However, Berger contends that ethical 
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rationalization contributed to secularization because over time, rationalizing life became an end 
in itself. The ultimate heirs of the Israelite legacy, the Protestants of modern Europe became so 
focused on rationalizing all aspects of their life, that they gradually forgot their original religious 
motivations for rationalizing life in the first place. As such, ethical rationalization worked against 
their all-encompassing religious orientation to the world (see Weber 1963 [1922] and 2002 
[1920]). 
In addition to these internal causes of secularization, Berger also identifies several carriers 
and consequences of secularization in modern society that are external to the control of religious 
groups, including pluralism and privatization. Berger contends that the differentiation of religion 
from all other sectors of society (a process that is a consequence of other social forces such as 
rationalization, societalization, structural differentiation, and societal differentiation) results in 
religious and social pluralism. Without the state endorsing any particular religion, religious 
groups are left to fend for themselves as multiple religions converge in a single society. 
Moreover, religious groups must contend with non-religious voices in society, all of which call 
for individuals‘ devotion. In this pluralist setting, religion, which was formerly a ―leading‖ 
institution, plays a peripheral role, both for the organization of society as a whole and for 
individuals and their meaning systems (Berger 1967: 130). According to Berger, religious groups 
lose their ―natural‖ or taken-for-granted status in a pluralist society. 
Berger claims that pluralism opens the door to increased religious choice for individuals, 
thus undermining religious objectivity in the process. Since religion (or at least a single religion) 
is not reinforced throughout the many institutions in society, individuals and families are left with 
immense freedom to decide for themselves if they will be religious, and the degree to which they 
will be religious. One consequence of this freedom is the privatization of religion, where 
individuals limit religion to the confines of their home and personal relationships (Berger 1967: 
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133-135). When religion is privatized, even very religious individuals choose to keep their 
religious perspectives from their public life at work or in politics. Accordingly, Berger states, 
―Religion manifests itself as public rhetoric and private virtue . . . insofar as religion is common it 
lacks ‗reality,‘ and insofar as it is ‗real‘ it lacks commonality‖ (Berger 1967: 134). Emerson 
Cairns and Debbie Fisher‘s accounts in chapter two seem to support Berger‘s prediction that in a 
religiously and socially pluralistic context, religious beliefs and practices tend to be isolated to 
one‘s private world.  
For Berger, the secularizing element of pluralism and privatization is that religion no 
longer provides a ―common world within which all of social life receives ultimate meaning 
binding on everybody‖ (Berger 1967: 134). He suggests that in a pluralist context, one‘s religious 
worldview becomes less plausible or believable in the face of competing worldviews. This occurs 
as individuals, aware of the religious and social pluralism around them, become suspicious of 
their own and others‘ religious beliefs and practices, so that the plausibility structures that 
religion once provided for an entire society gradually withers away. Expressed differently, 
individuals are less likely to possess an ultimate meaning system that is grounded in shared 
religious beliefs and practices when larger social structural shifts have displaced religion in 
society, marginalizing it. 
In the context of pluralism and privatization, Berger (1967: 140-149) argues that religious 
groups must market themselves if they desire to remain competitive in the religious and social 
marketplace. The specifics of such efforts go beyond our interests here, except to highlight that 
due to marketing initiatives different and potentially conflicting beliefs and practices exist within 
and between religious traditions. For example, liberal and conservative religious groups 
emphasize their particular beliefs as a way to differentiate themselves from other religious 
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groups, and to hopefully convince individuals that their religious orientation to the world is the 
one that individuals should choose. 
What is more relevant to note is that the combination of pluralism, privatization, and 
marketing sets the context for what Berger identifies as relativization and subjectivization—
indicators of secularization at the individual level. Relativization implies that people think of 
their beliefs, behaviours, and experiences relative to others. For instance, Berger (1967: 157-158) 
shows that in some Protestant contexts, emphasis on pietism results in individuals who turn to 
their personal experiences, rather than formal religious dogma that is believed to be codified in a 
religious text, as their source of religious legitimacy. Subjectivization involves individuals 
subjectively appropriating elements of religious institutions‘ dogmatic structures for themselves. 
To some degree we see relativization and subjectivization at work among each of the active and 
marginal affiliates that we met in chapter two as they draw on personal experience as the source 
of authority over personal beliefs, even if those beliefs appear to conflict at times with their 
church or religious leader‘s teachings. The secularizing feature of relativization and 
subjectivization is that individuals and groups constantly think of their beliefs and practices 
relative to other people‘s attitudes and behaviours that, in turn, make it difficult for people to 
share a common worldview. And if a society, or even subgroups within society, lack a common 
worldview, it is unlikely that religion will have much, if any, personal or social significance. 
Individuals will struggle with a ―crisis of legitimacy‖ whereby they do not know definitely 
whether their individual beliefs are right or wrong.
7
  
 In The Heretical Imperative (1979) Berger discusses three possible responses to this crisis 
of legitimacy in a pluralistic context. Some choose the deductive or Neo-orthodox approach, 
                                                 
7 Harvey Cox (1966) also documents a similar process. Cox suggests that pluralism decreases the likelihood of any 
single religious worldview dominating a society, resulting in many who question their own beliefs and practices 
relative to others.   
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reaffirming the authority of the existing religious tradition (e.g., the Christian Right in the United 
States). The advantage of this is that individuals find a level of finiteness and stability in the 
authority of their religious tradition in the face of multiple other options. Others pursue the 
reductive or modernizing response, seeking to reinterpret the tradition in light of modern realities 
(e.g., the United Church of Canada). The benefit to this approach is that it reduces the cognitive 
dissonance that individuals experience between religious and modern worldviews. Finally, some 
turn to the inductive and experiential approach to authority, which ultimately accepts personal 
experience as the sole authority over one‘s worldview. Berger expresses the inductive approach 
this way: 
When the external (that is, socially available) authority of tradition declines, individuals 
are forced to become more reflective, to ask themselves the question of what they really 
know and what they only imagined themselves to know in the old days when the tradition 
was still strong. Such reflection, just about inevitably, will further compel individuals to 
turn to their own experience: Man is an empirical animal (if one prefers, an anima 
naturaliter scientifica) to the extent that his own direct experience is always the most 
convincing evidence of the reality of anything. The individual, say, believes in X. As long 
as all people around him, including the ―reality experts‖ of his society, ongoingly affirm 
the same X, his belief is carried easily, spontaneously, by this social consensus. This is no 
longer possible when the consensus begins to disintegrate, when competing ―reality 
experts‖ appear on the scene. Sooner or later, then, the individual will have to ask himself, 
―But do I really believe in X? Or could it be that X has been an illusion all along?‖ And 
then will come the other question: ―Just what has been my own experience of X?‖ (Berger 
1979: 32-33). 
 
Berger argues that individuals will inevitably rely on personal experience as the source of 
authority in a pluralist society, likely reinforcing people‘s crisis of legitimacy and individual and 




 Steve Bruce, the strongest contemporary proponent of secularization theory, begins his 
book God is Dead (2002: xii) by claiming that ―liberal industrial democracies of the Western 
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world are considerably less religious now than they were in the days of my father, my 
grandfather, and my great-grandfather.‖ He points to: 
the declining importance of religion for the operation of non-religious roles and 
institutions such as those of the state and the economy; a decline in the social standing of 
religious roles and institutions; and a decline in the extent to which people engage in 
religious practices, display beliefs of a religious kind, and conduct other aspects of their 
lives in a manner informed by such beliefs (Bruce 2002: 3).  
 
Bruce (2002: 4) charts out a twenty-two variable secularization paradigm to explain how and why 
secularization exists.
8
 In short, Bruce contends that individualism and relativism together 
facilitate a widespread societal vulnerability to attitudes and behaviours that delegitimize 
traditional, universal, and exclusive religious beliefs and practices. Not only this, Bruce suggests 
that unless religious beliefs and practices are reinforced in social settings on a regular basis, it is 
unlikely that the existing remnants of religious belief will continue.  
 It is not important for our purposes to provide particular statistics of religious decline in 
Britain, but Bruce (2002: 62-73) builds his defence of the secularization paradigm, especially at 
the individual level, by pointing to declining figures in the following areas in Britain: church 
attendance, church membership, Sunday school attendance, and the number of full-time clergy. 
Bruce also shows that fewer people are turning to religious groups for rites of passage, smaller 
                                                 
8 Bruce‘s secularization paradigm captures several elements of Peter Berger‘s theory of secularization. For this 
reason I do not detail every facet of Bruce‘s theory in the main text. Still, it is worthwhile to footnote other variables 
that Bruce considers are central to the problematic relationship between modernity and religion. Following in the 
footsteps of Max Weber and Peter Berger, Bruce begins by looking at how monotheism served as a catalyst for 
rationalization and the everyday conscious organization of thought and action amidst a new worldview that separated 
the natural and supernatural worlds. He reinforces this rationalizing orientation in the West when outlining Weber‘s 
Protestant Ethic thesis, a theory that suggests ascetic Protestants structured their lives in rational ways to constantly 
glorify God in the world in hopes that they were part of God‘s chosen ―elect.‖ Drawing on sociological heavyweights 
such as Talcott Parsons, Karl Marx, Peter Berger, and Daniel Bell, among others, Bruce highlights how structural 
differentiation and social differentiation are logical outcomes of the aforementioned modernizing processes and with 
these follow individualism, social and cultural diversity, compartmentalization, privatization, and relativism. 
Furthermore, changes in religious groups (e.g., sects and schisms) and advances in economic growth, science, and 
technology make it increasingly difficult for religious worldviews to remain salient in a culture that places increasing 
importance on Enlightenment and modern ideals, ideals that tend to reject religion as a legitimate source of 
knowledge. He is mindful that secularization can slow down, as when religion serves non-religious functions, when 
religious groups feel threatened by the surrounding culture and re-assert their presence in response, or when religion 
serves as a system of meaning to help groups through transition (such as immigrants), but he concludes that these 
retarding tendencies are temporary and should not be the basis for rejecting secularization theory.                 
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numbers of people are attracted to any type of religious belief, and while new religious 
movements may be growing, their growth pales in comparison to the losses experienced in 
mainstream religious groups. 
Bruce identifies two factors that influenced the spread of secularization: structural 
differentiation and social differentiation. Similar to Berger (and others like Durkheim and 
Parsons), Bruce (2002: 8) identifies structural differentiation as the fragmentation of social life 
among institutions to the degree that societal features and functions that were once controlled by 
a single institution (e.g., religion) are now divided among many specialized institutions (e.g., 
politics, economics, education, and family). Building on Karl Marx, Bruce (2002: 9-10) 
highlights that structural differentiation gives way to social differentiation. Social differentiation 
refers to the geographic and social separation of individuals, and the emerging hierarchies and 
inequalities that accompany the societal-wide pursuit of new economic and life opportunities. As 
institutions are specialized and social life is fragmented, individuals‘ beliefs and roles within and 
between institutions are separated to the point that the common worldview (often grounded in 




                                                 
9 Bryan Wilson outlines a similar process that he identifies as ―societalization.‖ Societalization occurs when ―a 
collectivity of communities and individuals are drawn into complex relationships of interdependence in which their 
role performances are rationally articulated‖ (1982: 154) (also see Durkheim‘s (1984 [1893]) distinction between 
mechanical and organic solidarity). To illustrate his point, Wilson draws on the classic Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft 
distinction, first introduced by Ferminand Tönnies (1957). Gemeinschaft, or a traditional community, is described as 
a society where trust, loyalty, respect for seniority, clear patterns of authority, individual significance, goodwill, and 
morality are vital to everyday interactions and social stability. This type of society is distinct because of its common 
understanding that these values are rooted in supernatural sources and that individuals and groups legitimate their 
attitudes and behaviours as such. This is contrasted with Gesellschaft, or a modern society that is built on impersonal 
associations, coordination of skills, formal and contractual patterns of behavior, role obligation, and duty and role 
performances that are based on the demands of a rational structuring in society. In this society, people rely on 
individualism and rationalism instead of custom and tradition to legitimate their beliefs and practices. Wilson‘s 
(2001) fear is that without religion as the source of community, demoralization is the logical outcome. He points to 
increased selfishness, individualism, hedonism, poor manners, social division, and crime in post-industrial societies 
to support his point. 
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Bruce asserts that one of the major consequences of these processes is individualism. In 
particular, Bruce comments on a subtler form of secularization that takes place within religious 
groups where a group‘s beliefs and practices merely reflect broader cultural values of 
individualism. According to Bruce, movements that are especially guilty of this type of 
secularization include New Age spirituality, Eastern religious movements in the West, and 
charismatic movements. For instance, among New Agers and Westerners who adopt Eastern 
religions there are beliefs that the individual is innately divine and holy; that no authority is 
greater than the individual self; that individuals can select what beliefs and practices work for 
them; that holism is good; that intuition is sometimes more valuable than rational thought; and 
that personal health, wealth, and self-confidence is the ultimate goal of religion (Bruce 2002: 82-
85, 120-121). Within charismatic movements, Bruce (2002: 179-181) scrutinizes the emphasis on 
personal experience over shared doctrine, the importance of a personal relationship with Jesus 
Christ that serves a therapeutic and inward need, and the lessened sense of awe from humans 
toward Jesus (e.g., Jesus is viewed by some as their ―homeboy‖). Bruce‘s point is that 
individualism, a feature of the secular modern culture, has an elevated place in contemporary 
religious life to the extent that it is difficult to clearly identify the boundary between what is 
religious and what is secular. Recent scholarly attention given to these movements (Miller 1997; 
Heelas and Woodhead 2005; Roof 1999; Wuthnow 2007), including those who cite such 
religious activity to refute the secularization argument (Jenkins 2002; Heelas and Woodhead 
2005), validate Bruce‘s point.  
 Related to individualism is the rejection of authority. It is no secret, and many of the 
vignettes in chapter two reveal this, that many in Western society are offended when those in 
authority infringe on individual rights and tell people what they should believe and how they 
ought to behave. It is not surprising to Bruce then that people are attracted to religions that are 
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highly individualistic, to groups that offer little accountability between members (e.g., the New 
Age practice of paying for a religious product such as palm reading or tarot card reading without 
any expectation for ongoing exchanges), little if any external religious authority, and not much 
formal or binding dogma.  
 Bruce contends that individualism and the rejection of authority are linked to larger social 
features of pluralism and relativism. Similar to Berger, Bruce comments that in a pluralist setting, 
not only are religious groups competing with external belief systems, religious and secular, but 
religious groups and individuals are fostering eclectic beliefs and practices internally. If 
individualism is rampant within religious organizations whereby there is no central authority to 
guide and determine a group or individual‘s set of beliefs (or at least where individuals instead 
choose to turn inward for religious authority), no single belief or group of beliefs can possibly be 
viewed as ultimately true or binding for all people. This reality sets the stage for the crux of 
Bruce‘s conclusions about secularization. 
 Bruce (2002: 148-150) argues that without constant religious socialization and 
reaffirmation from others, religions (and religious individuals) will struggle to exist in the face of 
an individualistic, diverse, and relativistic culture. He proclaims that ―the privatization of religion 
removes much of the social support that is vital to reinforcing beliefs, makes the maintenance of 
distinct lifestyles very difficult, weakens the impetus to evangelize and encourages a de facto 
relativism that is fatal to shared beliefs‖ (Bruce 2002: 20). Later Bruce labels this new religious 
orientation ―diffuse religion,‖ suggesting that it is hard for diffuse beliefs to have much social 
impact on the individual, and it is very likely that beliefs one does hold dear will be diluted and 
trivialized with time (Bruce 2002: 91). Following a similar stream of thought, Peter Beyer (1999: 
296-297), Canadian sociologist and theorist on globalization, posits that this kind of privatized 
―invisible religion‖ cannot possibly generate much social influence beyond the individual 
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because it lacks the communicative resources that are necessary for any ideology or institution to 
have an impact on society (also see Bowen 2004). Grace Davie (1994: 199) contends that it is 
difficult for people to maintain their religious beliefs and practices without ongoing attachment to 
a religious organization. These are important points because as will become clear in the next 
chapter, the ongoing presence of private spirituality causes some like Bibby to believe that 
secularization is not taking place, while others like Bruce suggest that private spirituality will 




 In contrast to Berger and Bruce, Jeffrey Hadden, whose ideas were far from definitive or 
conclusive, prompted scholars to re-consider the widely accepted secularization narrative. 
Hadden begins his challenge of secularization theory by arguing that the origins of European and 
American sociology contained an inherent bias towards secularization, which prevented scholars 
from critically, systematically, and empirically evaluating the secularization thesis to the same 
degree as any other subject of inquiry. Hadden states the following: 
Secularization theory has not been subjected to systematic scrutiny because it is a 
doctrine more than it is a theory. Its moorings are located in presuppositions that have 
gone unexamined because they represent a taken-for-granted ideology rather than a 
systematic set of interrelated propositions (Hadden 1987: 588).   
 
For instance, in Europe, the prevailing Enlightenment ideals of science and reason and Darwin‘s 
evolutionary perspective that challenged the role of religion for individuals and society, 
influenced sociologists so that they did not or could not see past the dominant secular realities of 
the modern world and of their discipline. In the United States, Hadden reveals (drawing on a 
landmark study by psychologist James Leuba in 1914) at the beginning of the discipline, few 
sociologists believed in God. Possibly motivated by their non-religious background, most 
American sociologists wanted to establish a clear line between sociological aims and religious 
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aims. This sentiment was best captured in William F. Ogburn‘s presidential statement to the 
American Sociological Society in 1929: ―sociology as a science is not interested in making the 
world a better place . . . science is interested in only one thing, to wit, discovering new 
knowledge‖ (Reed 1975: 122). Hadden‘s point was that the secular tone among academics and 
sociologists inclined sociologists to sacralize secularization theory as a given reality rather than 
an idea that required further examination. 
Since European and American sociologists failed to adequately scrutinize ideas about 
secularization, Hadden challenges the very notion that secularization is considered a theory at all. 
Aside from the conceptual ambiguity that exists among the different proponents of secularization 
(i.e., secularization means different things and is measured differently by researchers), Hadden 
asserts that secularization is more of a proposition than a theory. Secularization ―theories‖ are 
purely descriptive statements that, in part, connect modernization with religious decline, but few 
sociologists actually offer a thorough and systematic set of hypotheses that are testable across 
time and place. 
To demonstrate the importance of empiricism to the secularization debate, Hadden 
references data in the United States to refute the secularization thesis. He shows that levels of 
religiosity have been stable, as evidenced in levels of belief in God, membership, attendance, 
personal devotion, and financial giving. Religion has also changed (but not secularized), which is 
apparent with the fluctuating percentages of Americans who believe that the influence of religion 
in society is increasing, or the decreasing numbers of those who believe that the Bible should be 
interpreted literally. Still, people continue to believe in God and affiliate with a religious group. 
Recently, more scholars are endorsing the position that religion is changing, but not secularizing, 
with the advances of modernity (see e.g., Heelas and Woodhead 2005; Houtman and Aupers 
2007; Wuthnow 2007). For example, Heelas and Woodhead‘s (2005) ―subjectivization thesis‖ 
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tries to explain both the secularization (decline of ―life as‖ or churched forms of religion) and 
sacralization (rise of ―subjective life‖ spirituality) of modern society. Their thesis claims that 
religions which emphasize the subjective life, a prominent feature of modern western culture, will 
succeed. Hence, religious institutions that stress hierarchical and authoritative dogmas and 
obligations have struggled, while broader non-institutional cultural appeals to subjective 
spirituality have expanded (also see Miller 1997). 
 Hadden also comments on the influence that new religious movements have had both on 
the American religious landscape as well as the sociological study of religion. As Stark and 
Bainbridge (1985) demonstrate, the fact that new religious movements are more likely to emerge 
in places where conventional forms of religion are lowest (e.g., the West coast in Canada and the 
United States) suggests that the disappearance of religion altogether is unlikely. Hadden also 
discusses the increased scholarly attention given to religion because of new religious movements. 
Such insights have been worthwhile in their own right, while also contributing to the social 
scientific understanding of religion in general.  
 In addition, Hadden responds to secularization theorists who suggest that religion is 
increasingly privatized. He highlights the central role that religion plays in politics around the 
world. From the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, to the violence between Protestants 
and Catholics in Northern Ireland, to the Jewish-Muslim-Christian tensions in the Middle East, to 
the clashing of Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs in India, to the rise of the Christian Right in the 
United States, religion is inextricably linked to significant global challenges and thus it is foolish 
to conclude that the world is secularizing or even that religion is predominantly privatized. 
Scholars like David Martin (1978, 2005), Jeffrey Hadden and Anson Shupe (1989), Jose 
Casanova (1994), Peter Beyer (1994, 1999), Peter Berger (1999), and Peter Berger, Grace Davie, 
and Effie Fokas (2008) are other influential advocates of this position. 
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 Finally, Hadden conjectures that sociological discussion about secularization will 
dissipate, but that if secularization theory is going to be useful, it will need to be clearly 
conceptualized and specified in the way that Karel Dobbelaere proposes.10 
 The kinds of arguments that Hadden initiated against secularization theory prompted 
influential sociologists like Peter Berger (1998 and 1999) to reverse their stance on the theory of 
secularization. Once scholars began to openly question secularization accounts, one of the most 




In chapter three I outlined part of Rodney Stark‘s reason for opposing secularization 
theory. To summarize that material, and building on the theoretical and empirical foundation 
established in Acts of Faith (2000) and The Churching of America (2005), Stark argues that 
nations with a religious monopoly have lower levels of religious belief and practice than places 
with many religious options. This is because religious suppliers compete rigorously for people‘s 
allegiances when there is a chance that individuals could choose to belong to another group. 
Rational choice theorists believe that greater competition leads to better religious products and 
thus greater rewards for religious consumers. This is contrasted with religious monopolies where 
there is no need for competition or improvements to a group‘s religious product, resulting in lazy 
clergy and lazy members. There is more to Rodney Stark‘s theory of secularization, however. 
In their book Acts of Faith Rodney Stark and Roger Finke (2000: 57-79) summarize and 
ultimately reject what they believe are five arguments common to most secularization theories. 
                                                 
10 A recent working paper by David Smilde and Matthew May, titled ―The Emerging Strong Program in the 
Sociology of Religion‖ (2010), suggests that more attention is being given to religion within sociology in recent 
decades. They document the modest increase of articles focused on religion in the leading American sociology 
journals (journals that do not specialize in religion). They also note the increased presence of religion as an 
independent variable in journal publications, along with increased funding (private and public) for projects where 
people study religion.       
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The first assertion that secularization proponents claim is that modernization is the causal engine 
for secularization. As societies modernize in areas of economic development, urbanization, or 
education, levels of religiosity inevitably decline as individuals‘ material security increases and 
people become enlightened about the world around them (i.e., they realize that they no longer 
need the supernatural to explain things). Stark and Finke reject this claim without reservation, 
citing evidence both in the United States as well as Europe. In their book The Churching of 
America (2005), Finke and Stark declare that Americans are becoming more religious with the 
spread of modernization. Rejecting the belief that there was a religious ―Golden Age‖ before that 
has now disappeared, they document noticeable increases in the number of seminarians, clergy, 
congregations, missionary efforts per congregation, and new religious movements over the course 
of American history. They also show that there is an increase in the number of religious 
adherents, church attenders, and those who hold religious beliefs. In Europe, Stark and Finke 
(2000: 62-63) contend that there is no evidence to support the claim of long-term decline in 
Europeans‘ religious involvements, and moreover, Europeans continue to be religious, at least 
nominally, with many continuing to believe in God or a supernatural being (also see Davie 1994). 
In addition, Stark and Finke (2000: 63-68) question how religious Europeans really were during 
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. For example, they assert that people mainly attended 
church for rites of passage, and many of those who did attend more regularly, attended for non-
religious reasons (e.g., to meet members of the opposite sex). For Roman Catholic adherents, 
Stark and Finke raise the point that many did not understand Latin, thus how beneficial was 
attending church for their religious lives. Many congregations were also without a clergy member 
and there were very few seminaries to train more clergy leaders. They conclude, ―The evidence is 
clear that claims about a major decline in religious participation in Europe are based in part on 
very exaggerated perceptions of past religiousness‖ (Stark and Finke 2000: 68). 
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Second, although secularization proponents are mindful of the different levels of 
secularization, they are most interested in declining levels of individual piety and religious belief 
as the chief indicator of secularization. Similar to the type of data that Bibby draws on to support 
his optimism for religion in Canada, Stark and Finke (2000: 71-72) base part of their rejection of 
secularization theory on the notable presence of subjective religiosity in Western society. They 
begin by referencing Grace Davie‘s (1994) popular ―believing without belonging‖ thesis in 
Europe, which states that individuals continue to believe in God and in many of their religious 
group‘s teachings, though they do not actively observe religious practices, such as church 
attendance, in their religious tradition. Stark and Finke go on to highlight subjective religiosity in 
Iceland, one of the supposedly most irreligious nations in the world. There they demonstrate that 
despite very low church attendance rates, individuals continue to turn to a church to observe rites 
of passage, many believe in life after death, several believe in reincarnation, most pray 
sometimes, and very few claim to be committed atheists. In other words, Stark and Finke 
challenge sociologists who mainly look to church attendance to measure secularization, 
documenting many areas how many non-churchgoers continue to be quite religious. 
Third, advocates of secularization theory generally argue that of the many features of 
modernization, science is the most problematic for people‘s continued religious belief and 
practice. That is, the fundamental principles of science, such as rationality and empiricism, 
conflict with the superstitious notions and faith that are common in religious settings. Stark and 
Finke (2000: 52-55; 72-73; 77) refute this position, drawing on several empirical studies that 
compare levels of religiosity among American professors and scientists. They show that high 
percentages of professors describe themselves as religious and attend religious services regularly 
compared to those who either never attend religious services or identify themselves as non-
religious. In fact, American professors were as likely to attend religious services regularly as the 
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average American. Stark and Finke also emphasize that those in the ―hard‖ sciences (e.g., 
mathematics, physical sciences, and life sciences) are more religious than those in the ―soft‖ 
sciences (e.g., sociology, psychology, and anthropology). This finding is affirmed in James 
Leuba‘s 1914 study, which reveals that nearly half of American scientists claim to believe in 
God. In response to the common claim that individuals doubt the legitimacy of their faith because 
of scientific facts, Stark and Finke reference a study by Smith, Emerson, Gallagher, Kennedy, 
and Sikkink (1998) who note that very few people doubt religious claims because of science. 
Instead, people cited personal tragedies, evil in the world, or human hypocrisy as the cause of 
their doubt. 
Fourth, secularization theorists tend to claim that once secularization sets it, it is 
irreversible. Stark, building on the supply-side logic inherent in RCT, centers his rejection of this 
point by discussing two concepts: religious revival and religious innovation. Stark begins by 
acknowledging that religious suppliers are not always effective in supplying religion to 
consumers (Stark and Bainbridge 1985: 435). Over the course of time, he argues religious groups 
relax their beliefs and practices to appeal to a wider audience and in the process lose their level of 
strictness and the ―costs‖ that Rational Choice Theory associates with high levels of belief and 
practice. The result is a widespread decline in religious fervour among congregants. While some 
interpret this as a sign of secularization, Stark sees this as a catalyst for religious revival and 
innovation. Religious revival consists of new religious groups that reassert the fundamentals of 
an existing religion, values that religious groups have seemingly strayed from (Stark and 
Bainbridge 1985: 444-48). Commonly referred to as ―sects,‖ these revivalist groups are very 
demanding, require significant sacrifices on the part of their members, and exist in high tension 
with the surrounding culture (e.g., Mormons). Religious innovation, on the other hand, is 
characterized by the creation of new religious traditions that are culturally sensitive and cater to 
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the current beliefs and interests of a culture (1985: 435-39). These groups, identified as ―cults,‖ 
possess the same qualities as sects, only the basis of cult beliefs and practices are quite different 
from mainstream religion in the local culture (e.g., Scientology). High cost and high tension 
groups are so successful because individuals desire the definite rewards that they associate with 
the high costs of sects and cults. 
Yet, what happens when sects and cults eventually modernize their beliefs and practices 
and decrease their level of tension with culture, looking much like any other conventional and 
culturally approved religious group? Stark maintains that individuals grow discontent with 
―cheap imitations‖ of sects and cults, which leads to the emergence of new sects and cults (Stark 
and Bainbridge 1985: 437-444; Stark and Finke 2000: 205-207). Here we see that secularization 
is a cyclical process. Low cost and low tension conventional religious groups give way to high 
cost and high tension sects and cults, which over time evolve once again into low cost and low 
tension groups, leading to the further formation of high cost and high tension groups. Therefore, 
society cannot be fully secularized because the cycle of new religious groups rising and falling 
will never come to an end; people will always demand the rewards that religious groups offer. To 
summarize, society is not becoming less religious, but rather different forms and expressions of 
religious life are appearing and disappearing in a steady religious economy. 
Finally, secularization theorists apply their theory not only to Christianity, but to all 
religious groups across the world. They declare that belief in any supernatural power will wane 
with time. Here too, Stark and Finke and Stark and Bainbridge offer evidence to the contrary. 
Stark and Finke (2000: 73-76) note that atheism never flourished in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union as many predicted. They show that over time, fewer people claimed to 
identify as atheists, and more people attended church on a monthly basis. In Islamic countries, 
Stark and Finke highlight that commitment to Muslim beliefs and practices is positively 
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correlated with education and occupational prestige. The same can be said of those who practice 
Asian ―folk‖ religions. In Japan, Shinto religious traditions are more commonly adopted today 
than in the past. In Taiwan there are more folk temples than any previous time in history and 
more people are frequenting those temples. In Hong Kong and Malaysia, Chinese folk religions 
are also increasingly popular. As in Islamic nations, it is the well educated and urban folk who 
are turning to religion, not the poor, uneducated, rural peasants. In the United States and Canada, 
Stark and Bainbridge (1985) document that sects and cults continue to emerge in places, such as 
the West coast, where few people practice conventional religion. 
The combination of empirical data and the logic in RCT leads Stark and others to reject 
secularization theory, ultimately concluding that with modernization we will also witness 
increased levels of religiosity. 
Conclusion 
Mindful of the second main research question in this dissertation (how are we to assess 
the degree of religiosity or secularity in Canada in light of active and marginal affiliates‘ religious 
beliefs, practices, and involvements?), my first goal in this chapter was to summarize Bibby‘s 
renaissance thesis and to highlight a couple of the major challenges that arise when evaluating his 
thesis. I began by demonstrating how and why quantitative data is not necessarily the best or only 
source of information for supporting or rejecting the renaissance or secularization theses. Instead, 
I suggested that we ought to also look at the meanings and motivations behind people‘s attitudes 
and behaviours, a task best fulfilled with qualitative research methods. I then identified the 
problems that exist with the different and inconsistent ways of measuring secularization that too 
often result in conversations about different kinds of ―secularizations.‖ I favour Karel 
Dobbelaere‘s clear distinction between societal, organizational, and individual secularization, and 
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suggested that Bibby‘s renaissance thesis deals primarily with secularization or religious 
resurgence at the individual level. 
Upon identifying these limitations in Bibby‘s renaissance thesis, and secularization theory 
in general, I turned my attention to several influential theoretical discussions of secularization in 
the sociology of religion. When it comes to proponents of secularization theory I could have 
discussed any number of individuals and perspectives, yet I limited my discussion to those who 
deal most directly with secularization at the individual level. Steve Bruce is the most ardent 
contemporary scholar in this camp, whose theory is a logical extension of Peter Berger‘s 
secularization theory. In sum, these theorists agree that societal differentiation and specialization 
leads to a series of subsequent social realities, such as pluralism, individualism, and relativism 
that make it difficult for individuals to believe and practice. This secular reality is particularly the 
case because of the missing plausibility structure or sacred canopy that once existed over all of 
society and bound individuals together. As a result, individuals lack the needed social 
reinforcements for ongoing and consequential religious belief and practice. 
Among those who oppose secularization theory, again I could have covered a series of 
theorists and ideas, but centered my overview on the main individual to move the conversation 
forward, Jeffrey Hadden, along with the strongest current critic of the secularization paradigm, 
Rodney Stark. Briefly, Hadden argues that from sociology‘s inception, sociologists were 
inherently biased to accept the secularization narrative without systematically evaluating or 
testing the core arguments common to most secularization theories. When Hadden carefully 
examined the secularization argument he noted that religious groups are not actually secularizing, 
they are changing, and there are many signs that religion is not fading away, pointing to new 
religious movements and the public role that many religious groups play around the world. Stark, 
applying rational choice principles, argues that there is an ongoing demand for the things that 
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religious groups offer, evidenced in the empirical data on the continued strength of individual 
belief and practice, and in the emergence of sects and cults where conventional religious groups 
are weakest. 
In light of the methodological, theoretical, and empirical uncertainties that surround the 
secularization debate and Bibby‘s renaissance thesis, I turn to chapter six and attempt to clearly 
delineate how we should evaluate secularization theory in the Canadian context based on my 
interviews with marginal affiliates, the very group that Bibby argues may return to the churches 
as part of an emerging religious renaissance in Canada. What are the meanings and motivations 
behind their religious attitudes and practices, and in light of their responses, how do the theories 
outlined in this chapter help to explain those findings and/or in what ways do the following 
observations support or refute these theories? 
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Chapter 6 
What Religious Renaissance?  
Introduction 
 Marginal affiliates like Emerson Cairns continue to hold on to their religious affiliation, 
show no desire to switch religious allegiances, and regularly turn to their religious group to 
celebrate religious holidays and rites of passage. Some like Debbie Fisher are even potentially 
interested in greater involvement in their religious tradition. With such evidence in hand, it is 
logical to agree that Bibby‘s renaissance thesis may be true, or at least to reject the secularization 
thesis in the Canadian context. On the other hand, the fact that fewer Canadians attend religious 
services on a weekly basis today (Bibby 2006: 192, 205) combined with the growth of those who 
claim to have ―no religion‖ (Statistics Canada 2001) can also lead one to plausibly suggest that 
secularization is alive and well in Canada. 
As I have argued, quantitative data can only take us so far in this debate, and in-depth 
qualitative data and analysis is needed to shed light on the meaning, processes, and context of the 
responses to surveys that researchers so eagerly use to support or reject secularization theory. To 
this end, I set out to ask marginal affiliates about their religious identities. Why do they attend 
religious services for select occasions? What meaning do they draw from such ceremonies? Is it 
true that they desire greater involvement, and if so, what might lead to greater involvement? Have 
they ever tried to get more involved? What is the intensity of their desire for more involvement? 
This chapter documents their responses, which will aid our ability to comment about the present 
and future place of religion in Canada, especially at the individual level. 
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Understanding and Explaining Marginal Affiliate Attendance Patterns 
Religious Upbringing and Transitions 
 
One of the first things to stand out in the data is that seventeen marginal affiliates attended 
religious services regularly with one or both of their parents in their childhood, while three others 
attended with neighbours or friends. Only one person attended only for religious holidays or 
when they visited a grandparent. This suggests that most marginal affiliates made conscious 
decisions to attend less frequently, but not to abandon their religious ties altogether.
1
 Looking 
ahead, whether or not teens will actually have a religion to abandon is questionable, given 
Bibby‘s (2009: 162-187) recent revelation that, outside of several non-Christian faiths, fewer 
teens today identify with a religious tradition, attend religious services or express an interest in 
spirituality.
2
 This makes sense when we consider that their parents, similar to the marginal 
affiliates that I interviewed, are likely attending very little, if at all. Yet the question that concerns 
us here, relative to secularization, is why marginal affiliates who once attended regularly in their 
younger years decided to no longer attend on a regular basis?
3
  
As we see in Figure 6.1, they provided six main reasons for this, four of which support 
demand-side explanations of religious behaviour and two of which bolster supply-side 
interpretations.  
                                                 
1 Phil Zuckerman (2008: 93) shows that many irreligious or quasi-spiritual adults in Denmark and Sweden had a 
religious upbringing, but gradually lost their faith.  
2 A 2010 Pew Research Center report in the United States reveals similar findings. Fewer people under the age of 30 
identify with a religion today compared with young people in the past (going back to the early 1970s). Similar trends 
are noted with respect to attendance at religious services, daily prayer, the importance of religion to their personal 
life, and belief in God.    
3 One of the best Canadian attempts to address this question comes from well-known journalist and author, Pierre 
Berton (1965). He offers an insightful autobiographical account for why he stopped attending the Anglican Church. 
He explains how he prayed to God, but God did not answer (akin to marginal affiliates who cannot depend on God). 
He acknowledges that he left the church largely out of apathy; other things in life were more important. He is also 
critical of the many congregations who preach different and potentially conflicting messages, yet each claims to have 
the sole truth, or nations who go to war in the name of religion, each believing that God is on their side. In addition, 
Berton chastises Christians for being silent on, or delayed in their response to, issues of race, sexuality, business 
ethics, and science and modernity. Lastly, he takes the churches to task for their archaic ways of presenting their 





Beginning with the demand-side, over half stopped their ongoing involvement because 
they were too busy or too lazy. One male expressed that his church involvement decreased 
because of university commitments: ―When I was attending school, there wasn‘t even time, most 
of the time, to even make yourself a good meal. You were always studying.‖ Another woman, 
now in her eighties, reflects on her younger years after her husband unexpectedly died of a heart 
attack. She was a university student, caring for her children now as a single mother, and was 
working in order to pay the bills. Church attendance, she felt, could not possibly fit into her 
schedule. Emily Foster‘s experience of losing her father at a young age and working several jobs 
while attending university to help her family reflects how busyness partially influenced her 
church involvement. Now she largely attributes her infrequent involvement to a lack of desire to 
drive in from the outskirts of the city to church after her family already commutes during the 
week for work and other commitments. Others similarly point to the hectic pace of life between 














Too Busy or Lazy Tension with 
Others
Individualism Social Influences Doctrine, Style, or 
Location
Question Faith
Reasons why marginal affiliates decreased 
their levels of church attendance 
 176 
errands and perform chores. One man declares, ―Now Sunday is everything else. Like, there‘s 
hockey, and you go to hockey and take kids here and do that. Dancing competition . . . you go all 
the time . . . Sunday‘s a busy day.‖ Another marginal affiliate reflects, ―You work your butt off 
all week . . . sometimes you have to work two jobs so you get to come home, kiss the kids 
goodnight, have a bath, go to bed yourself, and then, all of a sudden, next you know, it‘s 
Saturday, and you‘re going grocery shopping, trying to catch up on stuff you‘ve done all week, 
and then Sunday, honestly . . . you don‘t feel like it. You‘re too tired.‖ Such people value their 
Sunday as a day of rest where they do not need to get up early, dress up, and rush out of the 
house (see Dillon and Wink 2007; Smith and Snell 2009; Wuthnow 2007: 215).   
Second, just under half say that some form of individualism led them away from active 
church involvement. Three marginal affiliates in my sample suggest that they attended less when 
their parents gave them the option to attend during their teen years, never to return. A fifty-one 
year-old male recalls that ―as we got into our mid to late teens, we were sort of just let loose to 
decide what we wanted to do . . . keep going if you want. Nobody‘s forcing you to be there. Go 
find another religion if that‘s what you want to do.‖ A forty-eight year-old male says that he first 
stopped attending because of the absence of ―the driving force of . . . my mother trying to get us 
to go. And once . . . we hit teenage years, I think she pretty much left it up to us to decide . . . we 
weren‘t forced, like, ‗You have to go to church every Sunday‘ . . . she left the decision up to us. 
And I guess I just didn‘t find it relevant enough.‖ 
Similarly, two participants who are parents themselves stopped attending when their own 
children complained about going to church. One gentleman says, ―We got tired of fighting the 
kids to go to church. That‘s not an excuse, I guess, but it‘s a fact.‖ Another woman speaks about 
her children: ―For about three months before I stopped going, they would just sit there not even 
looking up. They‘d just kind of sit there . . . like they were bored out of their skulls. And I 
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thought, ‗Well, I could go by myself, or I could just not go.‘ It just kind of fell apart after that.‖ 
From these examples, we see that some parents place greater importance on their children‘s 
ability or right to make religious decisions for themselves, rather than imposing either parental or 
religious authority to force their children to observe certain religious practices, such as attending 
church.     
Others indicate that they did not want to submit to the church‘s rules and authority, 
choosing instead to develop their spirituality beyond the church walls. As one woman highlights, 
―People are finding the truth, and they‘re finding that it‘s not found in a church. It can be under a 
rock. It‘s in the rock. It‘s within ourselves.‖ This last finding, in particular, validates much of 
what scholars have said about religion and spirituality for some time, that personal experience, 
beliefs, and practices increasingly exist to the exclusion of organized religion in a social context 
(see e.g., Barna 2005; Bruce 2002; Davie 1994; Dillon and Wink 2007; Heelas and Woodhead 
2005; Luckmann 1967; Roof 1999; Roof and McKinney 1987; Smith and Snell 2009; Wuthnow 
1998).  
Berger (1967) and Bruce (2002), who each analyze the impact of structural differentiation 
on individual religious beliefs and attitudes, can help to explain the strong link between 
individualism and the approach of marginal affiliates to religion. For instance, most active and 
marginal affiliates over the age of fifty-five in my sample commented that when they were 
young, attending church weekly, getting baptized, and marrying in a church were non-negotiable 
facets of social life. Church attendance was a socially desirable activity that was normalized in 
the home, at school, and in the community. One sixty-two year-old male says: 
When I was growing up, the stores were closed on Sunday, and people felt compelled to 
go to church. And that might have been bad for a lot of people—feeling compelled to go 
to church and having all the stores closed—but now I think it‘s gone way too far the other 
way. Now there‘s no significance to religion hardly at all, anymore . . . when I was a 
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young guy, if you didn‘t go to church, that was your business, but people kind of looked 
at you as if you‘re some kind of a . . . degenerate type. 
  
However, as society has changed and institutions have increasingly specialized, religion has 
moved to the ―peripherary,‖ as Berger predicted, including individual levels of belief and 
practice. One impact of this social change is that individuals no longer interpret church 
attendance as a socially desirable or necessary activity, especially if it gets in the way of making 
more money, spending more time with family, participating in extracurricular activities, or 
enjoying leisure time. 
In a related manner, Berger‘s prediction that pluralism would lead to competition between 
religious and secular worldviews and activities is clear among those that I interviewed, given that 
lack of time and individualism are the leading explanations for decreased attendance at religious 
services (also see Davie 1994: 194; Putnam 2000: 182-284). As both Berger and Bruce argue, 
rationalization and structural differentiation together pave the way for the convergence of 
individualism, rejection of authority, relativization, subjectivization, pluralism, and relativism, all 
manifested to some degree among those who say they left the church under the influence of 
individualism. These processes are magnified in a Canadian context that values diversity, the 
preservation of individualism in a democratic, pluralist society, the belief that what is right and 
wrong varies by individual, and the avoidance of imposing one‘s views on another. In sum, many 
marginal affiliates have opted for the inductive and experiential approach to authority that Berger 
(1979) argued was unavoidable in pluralist societies.  
A third reason that seven marginal affiliates cited for reducing their church involvement 
was because those around them either stopped attending or discouraged active participation in a 
church. In three cases either good friends moved away or the marginal affiliates themselves 
moved away, leaving individuals with no close friends in their congregation. They decided to 
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abandon church attendance. One thirty year-old female recalls, ―I don‘t really just want to go by 
myself . . . when it was convenient . . . and I had friends going, I would go to church.‖ This 
finding resonates with the observation in chapter four that community and belonging with others 
are some of the most common rewards that active affiliates associate with their church 
involvement. It seems that for marginal affiliates, who were active affiliates in the past, losing 
this important reward is a serious impediment to their continued involvement. This does raise a 
question about motivations for attending religious services among both active and marginal 
affiliates. Are people drawn to active participation in a church because of the community that 
they find, because of the common beliefs that they share with other people, because of the 
religious rituals that they experience, or some combination thereof? Of course the answer is 
probably a combination of these factors (and others). However, it is worth raising the question 
because clearly for those who leave their religious group when they do not have close friends in 
the congregation,
4
 the religious rituals are not enough to keep them actively involved, nor are the 
other congregants who supposedly share similar beliefs. This might point to the simple fact that 
forming and establishing relationships is a chief explanation for some people‘s involvement in a 
church. If this is the case, should this be interpreted as a religious motivation for church 
involvement and is this a sign for or against secularization in Canada? This too is an important 
question because it gets at whether or not religious groups are actually fulfilling religious 
functions (such as encouraging and supervising exchanges with the gods, as rational choice 
theorists contend) or whether they are mainly attractive for quasi-secular reasons, as Sherkat 
(1997: 73-77) and Bruce (1999: 95-96) suggest. Are churches just another club that people join to 
make friends? Is this further evidence of ―organizational secularization,‖ which Dobbelaere 
(2002) theorized about, and Bruce (2002) contends is ravaging religious groups today? This 
                                                 
4 It is difficult to know how common this is on a larger scale, and further research into this would be helpful.  
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finding and the subsequent questions that arise demonstrate why we need qualitative research to 
get at the motivations behind people‘s beliefs and practices, to have a more informed base of 
information with which to address the secularization issue. If someone does not attend for 
religious reasons, is it accurate to interpret such behaviour as religious in nature? 
Aside from those whose friends move away, four marginal affiliates abandoned church 
involvement because friends or family members disapproved. Debbie Fisher‘s experience reveals 
that her husband is unsympathetic and borderline antagonistic to her desire for greater 
involvement and that this is the greatest thing that keeps her from pursuing more involvement. 
Another individual, a male in his early fifties from an evangelical Protestant congregation, talks 
about social restrictions:  
My social group . . . doesn‘t really allow for it . . . for me to continue on. I‘d almost have 
to abandon family. So you have to have a really strong belief, be it them or anybody else, 
any other religion . . . if I wanted to be [more involved], I believe I‘d have to cut ties with 
my family. I‘d have to change my whole lifestyle, my whole life, who I am, what I am, 
where I come from. Yeah, nothing against [‗XYZ Church‘] or anybody else. It wouldn‘t 
matter who it was. I think that the group that . . . or the life that I have, I‘d have to 
abandon it in order to partake . . . in the other thing.    
 
As evidenced in chapter four, and articulated in Bruce‘s ideas on secularization, we notice once 
again that one‘s social ties contribute to a person‘s level of religious involvement. 
Finally, three marginal affiliates left their churches because of personal experiences that 
caused them to question their faith in God, and consequently their perceived need for the church. 
A few individuals that I interviewed lost a family member to accidents or diseases. One Roman 
Catholic male recounts how his brother‘s death in a car accident at the age of twenty-four was a 
catalyst for declining involvement at church: 
When you get a phone call so early in the morning . . . saying that something happened . . 
. you do go to church after that. But then, after a while, you start questioning it: ―Why did 
this happen?‖ and ―Was there a reason for it all?‖ And, you know, there‘s no answers 
because . . . you don‘t normally get answers, right? . . . indirectly, somewhere along the 
line, you do get an answer, but you don‘t know that it was . . . I kind of tapered off. 
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Two other marginal affiliates, like the following Anglican, speak of the natural inclination for 
young adults to question everything in life, including religion, which leads to a gradual change in 
one‘s worldview: 
I think that at that age, when you‘re young like that in the world, you tend to rebel a bit 
against it . . . And you question religious doctrine. You question why this is like that . . . 
and I probably went through a lot of questioning . . . just like normal kids do when they‘re 
that age . . . you scratch your head. If you think a little bit, you think, this doesn't seem 
right . . . this is stupid. And all in the name of bloody religion. You know? So I went 
through a lot of that. Yes, yes. Yeah, there was a lot of questioning . . . I didn‘t find 
myself going to church on a regular habit.  
 
In addition to these demand-side reasons, marginal affiliates provided two supply-
oriented explanations for their declining involvement. The first concerns interpersonal and intra-
organizational tension. Eight marginal affiliates had negative experiences with religious leaders 
and fellow congregants, as evidenced in the discussion of dependable congregations in chapter 
four, which contributed to people leaving their congregation and the church altogether. In a 
related manner, three individuals did not believe that their church possessed a warm or safe 
atmosphere, an observation raised by several single females who felt alienated in a religious 
group that is dominated by male leadership and that normalizes people who are married and have 
families. One woman recalls a church that she tried to attend regularly, after not attending church 
for quite some time: ―I started going every Sunday for a while, and I found out that it was no 
place for a single woman. The priest was afraid to look at you or talk to you. The families were 
afraid to look at me or talk to me. I just didn‘t fit in, so I just felt so isolated that I stopped going.‖ 
I asked her whether people in the church said or did specific things that made her feel this way:   
There was no talking. They just didn‘t even see me. People didn‘t see me. They saw 
husband, wife, kids. Old ladies. Old men. Things like that. Teenagers. That sort of thing. 
But they didn‘t see a woman in her thirties . . . that was just a little too dangerous. They 
didn‘t quite know what to do with me. Was I going to steal their husband? Was I going to 
do inappropriate things with the priest? What‘s she all about here? So they just kind of 
didn‘t even really look at me or talk to me. So I was kind of on my own. And I would see 
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other people talking to one another and stuff, but they wouldn‘t talk to me. I would smile 
and be kind of friendly. I didn‘t know what to do with them, either, I guess.  
 
From my conversation with this interviewee, it is difficult to tell whether members of her 
congregation actually communicated attitudes or behaved in ways that would justify her 
perception of alienation. However, the social sciences are instructive here when considering 
William I. Thomas‘s (1966: 301) words that ―situations that are defined as real are real in their 
consequences.‖ Put another way, regardless of whether or not a religious group does something 
to offend someone, the fact that someone believes that they have been offended and thus 
responds accordingly (i.e., by leaving their congregation) is sufficient. The result is the same 
whether we are dealing with realities or mere perceptions. True, this may appear to be a 
―demand‖ issue, but when it comes to people‘s social perceptions, we know that perceptions can 
change. In this case, it seems obvious that religious organizations can and do have a major role to 
play in changing people‘s perceptions. Religious groups should heed this idea carefully. I will say 
more about this in the concluding chapter as it relates to the strong negative social perceptions 
that exist towards Christians (see Kinnaman and Lyons 2007).  
 The second supply-side critique levelled against churches concerns their location, their 
style and the relevancy of church services, and doctrine. When it comes to location, a few people 
stopped attending because their church moved from one rental property to another in a different 
part of the city, or their church closed because of dwindling attendance or insufficient numbers of 
ministers, or because they could not drive and no churches were in the neighbourhood. Emily 
Foster‘s narrative in chapter two revealed that her church closed due to inadequate resources to 
keep the church doors open and after that she was unwilling to drive long distances to go to 
church. Another male that I interviewed said, ―I stopped going when the church moved . . . they 
moved it somewhere else . . . then it just became inconvenient, again . . . honestly, I quit going.‖    
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 In terms of the style and relevance of the religious service, a couple of people left because 
the music was either too traditional or too modern, and others were displeased that sermons were 
not relevant to everyday experiences. As one male said: 
How relevant is this to my life today? You know, if you were some Joe Blow who‘s 
trying to get a job or working in Calgary and, you know, that kind of stuff, how relevant 
is this? How relevant is the doctrine and how relevant is, you know, the virgin birth and 
all these kind . . . How relevant is this to my life, you know? I mean, if I‘m living a really 
hectic life, and I‘m balancing career and children, a family . . . you know, all this kind of 
stuff, the church . . . their challenge is to become relevant to their day-to-day life . . . 
instead of depending on dogma, like a lot of churches have been, you know: ―You believe 
in me because that‘s the way it is.‖ You know? They‘ve got to become more relevant and 
bring you in, you know.  
 
 Doctrinal issues were problematic for some, as people questioned the legitimacy of 
televangelist teachings, exclusion of women from leadership, exclusive claims to salvation, and 
strong opposition to homosexuality and abortion. I provided several examples and quotations in 
chapter four of the aversion that some marginal affiliates have toward doctrinally strict churches, 
which has contributed to the exodus from Canadian congregations. 
In total, the combination of reasons that people give for no longer attending regularly 
suggests that both supply and demand explanations are at work. However, as the evidence 
unfolds in this chapter, I think it will become clear that religious supply may have more influence 
over keeping existing participants in a religious group, while demand has more power when it 




After asking marginal affiliates their reasons for leaving behind active involvement in a 
church, I wanted to test whether they do, in fact, adopt a ―fragmented‖ approach to their religion, 
which Bibby appropriately suggested in 1987 is a sign of individual secularization. I did this by 
posing his insightful survey question to those in my sample: ―Some Canadians suggest that they 
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draw selective beliefs and practices from their religious tradition, even if they do not attend 
frequently. They indicate that they do not plan on changing religious traditions, but they will turn 
to religious groups for important religious holidays and rites of passages. How well would you 
say that describes you?‖ Sixteen marginal affiliates say that this describes them fully, two 
indicate that it represents them in part (they turn to the religious group selectively and do not plan 
on changing traditions, but do not see themselves as drawing selective beliefs and practices from 
the tradition), and three do not believe that this characterizes them. The majority of marginal 
affiliates responded with statements like, ―That would be me;‖ ―Yep. I think that‘s pretty much it. 
I definitely have chosen bits and pieces;‖ ―To a tee. Yeah, basically, absolutely everything that 
just says.‖ This discovery is useful because it validates previous findings about marginal 
affiliates‘ fragmented and subjective religious patterns, and it sets the context for then 
understanding why they believe and behave as they do.  
So, why do marginal affiliates attend religious services when they do? In chapter four we 
learned that the main reasons are because of tradition, family pressures, and God and sacred 
space. I think these findings are critically important and original to this dissertation because until 
now, no one has directly asked marginal affiliates why they bother to consistently show up to 
church once or twice a year. At the same time, the challenge of this exploratory study is that these 
discoveries lead to further questions about why tradition, family, or connecting with God in a 
sacred space serve to motivate marginal affiliates to attend when they do. What is it about these 
variables that bind and motivate marginal affiliates to attend for religious holidays or rites of 
passage? Unfortunately, concrete answers to these questions did not emerge in the interviews, 
and further research into such questions would be immensely valuable (something I hope to 
pursue with additional data collection after completing this dissertation). Still, I think there are 
some logical explanations and hypotheses that arise out of theoretical discussions, in various 
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disciplines, of tradition, family pressures, and sacred space that will help us to evaluate why these 
reasons are so powerful for marginal affiliates. Here I want to expand on these themes with the 
purpose of better understanding marginal affiliates‘ beliefs and practices, and then to use such 
knowledge to support my negative evaluation of Bibby‘s renaissance thesis.  
When it comes to tradition, the critical question to ask is why tradition holds people‘s 
current and future actions in its grasp? Why is it so difficult for people to abandon tradition, 
particularly for those who attend religious services occasionally, and yet do not find religious 
meaning in those services? Drawing on Berger (1967), Shils (1981), Giddens (1991), and 
Hervieu-Leger (2000), I think there are four possible explanations. The overarching explanation 
may have to do with the interplay between identity and stability in a chaotic world. As we saw in 
the vignettes in chapter two, identity is a critical variable in people‘s religious beliefs and 
practices, and tradition is believed to inform one‘s identity. The following statement 
demonstrates that people‘s current sense of self is strongly grounded in their memories of past 
activities, of traditions that have stood the test of time to shape who they are today:  
The individual has a sense of himself as a continuously existing entity essentially more or 
less identical through time; fundamentally he sees himself as being what he was . . . the 
individual‘s image of himself is constituted from what has been deposited in his memory 
from his own experiences of the conduct of others in relation to himself and the play of 
his imagination in the past. The stability of the individual‘s character, to an external 
observer and to himself, is possible only through the retention in memory of what he 
believed before, of what he experienced before. These things retained by memory are 
important parts of what he perceives himself to be. His sense of his identity is partly a 
present perception of his past (Shils 1981: 50).     
 
The reason that maintaining one‘s identity is so important can be understood in the context of 
Peter Berger‘s theory of human nature and Anthony Giddens‘ discussion of late modernity.  
In Peter Berger‘s (1967) theory of religion, we learn of the life-long world building 
exercise that humans engage in. Born ―unfinished,‖ because we lack the necessary instincts and 
knowledge to function in the world, humans turn to other individuals and to culture to learn the 
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social order and rules of social interaction. For instance, children learn from parents, teachers, 
and television programs that it is wrong to abuse others, and that it is good to show kindness to 
people. Beyond just surviving in the social world, the life-long socialization process is intended 
to help the individual to effectively and confidently achieve a stable identity and sense of self in 
their social world. Yet, seeking stability through socialization becomes problematic when one 
realizes that culture, which is shaped by individuals who are changing, is itself changeable. 
In addition, life is chaotic and uncontrollable at times, in ways that challenge the social 
order. People suffer and die from accidents, diseases, and sometimes people kill others, and 
unfortunately, humans cannot control these realities. The result is a sense of anomie, or 
meaningless and normlessness. A person‘s identity is shaken to the core because their social 
world is conflicted. Naturally, people turn to loved ones in times of uncertainty, hopeful that they 
will ease the pain and provide meaning and stability in the face of crisis. But here too, all close 
relationships end, due to the aforementioned uncontrollable realities of life, throwing one‘s 
identity into question once more. 
Applying Berger‘s theory to the question of why traditions shape present and future 
actions, one could logically say that tradition helps to stabilize and reinforce one‘s identity amidst 
one‘s effort to create a stable world. However, Berger‘s theory lacks some of the specificity of 
why this is so, something that can be found in Anthony Giddens‘ book Modernity and Self 
Identity (1991). Giddens posits that a fundamental feature of human nature is that people are self-
consciously aware of why they do what they do, and over the course of their life, they reflexively 
construct and reconstruct their identity in light of new information or knowledge about 
themselves and society. In contrast to identity construction in traditional societies where life is 
localized in the family and the immediate community, identity construction in modern society is 
filled with radical doubt whereby ―all knowledge takes the form of hypotheses: claims which 
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may very well be true, but which are in principle always open to revision and may have at some 
point to be abandoned‖ (1991: 3). In a scientific age, where empiricism and reason are valued 
over most other forms of knowledge and where many believe that science can provide increased 
assurance and stability in society, the reality is that ―expert systems‖ and current stocks of 
knowledge can be wrong or subject to change in light of new discoveries.
5
 In fact, as Hervieu-
Leger (2000: 73) argues, the fragmented nature of contemporary society has decreased the 
propensity for individuals to find an overarching meaning system that links them to the social, 
and as a result, we witness increased levels of insecurity and instability. David Lyon (2000) 
contends that instability in a fragmented postmodern culture prompts some to turn to religion to 
establish an overarching meaning system with which to interpret all of life. Although the 
marginal affiliates in my sample do not claim that their religion provides an overarching meaning 
system, some do indicate that attending religious services helps them in some areas of life, 
partially supporting Lyons‘ assertion. This applies to those who choose to baptize their children 
or get married in a church, to those like this marginal affiliate male who believes that church 
helps him to see ―right and wrong‖ in his life: ―I have an easier time actually seeing what‘s right 
and wrong . . . I need a pre-defined right and wrong. I need somebody to write it down for me . . . 
I have a set of guidelines. I need guidelines . . . I‘ll never live up to those guidelines, but at least I 
have something to . . . shoot for.‖ Similarly, a marginal affiliate female reflects: ―I just think it‘s a 
good way to kind of get yourself in check that just makes you slow down for a minute and think 
about what you‘re doing, how you‘re living your life. Are you contributing to the world . . . Like 
. . . with a missionary talking or something, and you‘re, like, ‗I‘m so selfish. Like, why am I not 
                                                 
5 Giddens (1991: 30) discusses how expert systems, which are intended to provide knowledge that is valid and 
certain, are not as expansive or true as many presume. Experts are only experts in a small area of knowledge, and 
even among so called experts there is variation in interpretations on any given subject. As such, ordinary individuals 
regularly ask how true, authentic, or legitimate expert systems really are.     
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doing more for the world?‘ I think it‘s a good time to kind of just reflect on how you‘ve been 
living your life and maybe how you should be living your life.‖ 
More than this, Giddens (1991) reminds us that individuals are exposed to increasing 
amounts of choice in modern society, from simple things such as food, housing, and automobiles, 
to jobs and relationships. Giddens states: 
On the level of the self, a fundamental component of day-to-day activity is simply that of 
choice. Obviously, no culture eliminates choice altogether in day-to-day affairs, and all 
traditions are effectively choices among an indefinite range of possible behaviour 
patterns. Yet, by definition, tradition or established habit orders life within relatively set 
channels. Modernity confronts the individual with a complex diversity of choices and, 
because it is non-foundational, at the same time offers little help as to which options 
should be selected (Giddens 1991: 80). 
 
According to Giddens, this surplus of choices opens the individual to radical doubt. For instance, 
when a person enters a new relationship, starts a new job, or moves between cities, they 
sometimes ask whether they made the right choice, and if not, what the consequences might be. 
Therefore, when comparing contemporary with traditional societies, people had choice before, 
but tradition and established habits in such societies reduced the real number and range of 
choices. In general, as tradition loses its hold, the level of choice increases. Combined, these 
contemporary realities open the door for uncertainty in a person‘s quest for stability; their identity 
potentially becomes meaningless as it is filled with anxiety about the unknown. 
Like Berger, Giddens (1991: 3) highlights that people fend off the fearful elements of 
choice and uncertainty by forming close ―trust systems.‖ As we saw in chapter two, Debbie 
Fisher turned to her husband in her young adult years as a way to cope with the emerging 
uncertainties of adult life: ―I was so young, still, at that time . . . he was kind of my support 
system.‖ Those who are close to us provide a protective cocoon against the dangers of unknown 
or unfamiliar worldviews that challenge our sense of self. As stabilizing as this can be, 
individuals are still mindful of the risks tied to relationships, either in that people die, or some 
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may choose to leave. It is here where tradition becomes central to human behaviours. In the face 
of uncertainty, people seek to preserve their ―ontological security,‖ or sense of continuity and 
order, by adhering to traditions:  
The maintaining of habits and routines is a crucial bulwark against threatening anxieties, 
yet by that very token it is a tensionful phenomenon in and of itself . . . the discipline of 
routine helps to constitute a ‗formed framework‘ for existence by cultivating a sense of 
‗being‘, and its separation from non-being‘, which is elemental to ontological security 
(Giddens 1991: 39).  
 
Giddens goes on to say that ―tradition creates a sense of firmness of things that typically mixes 
cognitive and moral elements. The world is as it is because it is as it should be‖ (1991: 48). With 
the inevitable uncertainties that arise in modern society, people fight even harder to have control 
over their world, both for the present and the future. Returning to the safe world of tradition is 
advantageous because predictable outcomes reduce possible contact with risk and uncertainty. As 
Giddens (1991: 79, 204) notes, rites of passage are convenient times for people to reflect on 
personal identity, to ponder possible opportunities and risks in life, and to take steps forward in 
self-understanding. This idea rings true for a marginal affiliate that I interviewed who expressed 
to me, ―I always think that religion is . . . it‘s important to have as . . . a prop to your life . . . it‘s 
sort of one of those sorts of things like on a wigwam . . . you‘ve got all these wigwams that keep 
it . . . coming up. And one of those is religion.‖  
Why do some turn to religious groups to mark these occasions then? Giddens suggests 
that sometimes people want the occasional reminder of basic religious truths that help to maintain 
their group‘s ―sacred canopy‖ for themselves. One woman that I met states, ―There are times, like 
when I‘ve been straying, I feel, like, when I‘ve been, maybe, partying too much or whatever . . . 
checking, like, ‗Oh, I‘m kind of getting off the path, so I want to go.‘ Yeah, that‘s probably the 
biggest thing.‖ Giddens asserts that others believe that religion offers black-and-white responses 
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in an age of uncertainty and risk, though no marginal affiliates in my sample offered this 
explanation for why they attend for rites of passage.  
A second reason that tradition may be important to marginal affiliates might have to do 
with their close social ties and the importance of those social ties for personal identity. 
Remembering that many marginal affiliates in my sample attend out of obligation to their family, 
is it possible that marginal affiliates observe tradition to please their family, to avoid losing the 
protective cocoon that their family provides in life overall? For instance, if it is not a big deal for 
someone to attend midnight mass on Christmas Eve, why risk disturbing a family member by not 
attending? The same can be said of those like Debbie Fisher who do not pursue greater 
involvement because those close to them frown upon such activity. Expressed succinctly, the cost 
of losing the bond with a close family member or friend over church attendance may be too high 
when one considers the overwhelming benefits of those ties for other, more serious matters that 
may confront an individual‘s identity. 
A third possible explanation for observing tradition is found in the following words from 
Shils: 
The existence of tradition is at least as much a consequence of limited power to escape 
from it as it is a consequence of a desire to continue and to maintain it. Human societies 
retain much of what they have inherited not because they love it but because they grasp 
that they could not survive without it. They have not imagined plausible replacements for 
it. They have neither the material resources, nor the intellectual nor the moral nor the 
visual powers to supply what they would need to find a home in the world if they were 
deprived of the furnishing of tradition. They accept what is given to them by the past but 
they do so gracelessly for the most part (1981: 213).  
 
The fear of abandoning tradition is not because of a deep felt loss of the tradition itself so much 
as it is the fear of the unknown in the absence of the tradition. It is not clear from my data what 
they might be fearful of, but pursuing this issue with marginal affiliates in the future would 
provide an excellent source of information for understanding their church attendance patterns.  
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Finally, some might turn to tradition to remember a golden age. Shils (1981: 70) says that 
traditions are ―the occasion for melancholy reflections on the transience of past happiness, on the 
superiority of the vanished past to the shoddy present.‖ These reflections highlight that ―the past 
times were golden ages, ‗good old times,‘ when life was free of the hideousness of scarcity and 
from the self-seeking and ugliness which are features of most advanced civilizations‖ (Shils 
1981: 207). Among the marginal affiliates that I spoke with, there are signs that observing a 
holiday or rite of passage in a church brings back a good nostalgia of growing up. It takes them 
out of the busyness, and perhaps sadness, of life at the moment, drawing their memory back to 
times of innocence and a care-free spirit. Characteristic of others that I interviewed, when I asked 
one woman if she gains any religious significance from the religious services that she attends, she 
replies, ―Childhood . . . it‘s just pretty carefree . . . memories . . . we were growing up that we had 
to . . . on Sundays we would sing and so on, and quite often . . . I have some favourite Christmas 
hymns, both Christmas music and early morning music. That‘s childhood . . . carefree.‖   
Connecting to God in a sacred place is yet another reason for why marginal affiliates 
claim to attend when they do. This raises a couple of questions. Why do marginal affiliates in my 
sample claim that they can connect to God outside of the church (which they prefer, as we saw in 
chapter two), and yet they equally contend that they feel closer to God on occasions when they 
are in a church? What function does sacred place serve for marginal affiliates? Why do they visit 
religious buildings for religious holidays and rites of passages? As with the discussion on 
tradition, no conclusive answers emerged from the interviews that I conducted, but there are 
some clues in the literature on sacred place that I think are suggestive. I could begin with a 
lengthy overview of sacred versus profane (see e.g., Durkheim 1915: 37, 47; Eliade 1959; Smith 
1987: 83; Turner 1979: 13) or sacred space versus sacred place (see e.g., Augé  1995; 
Brueggemann 1977: 4-5; Dillistone 1973: 85-102; McAlpine 2006), but in an effort to stay on 
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track with my overarching objectives of better understanding why people believe and behave as 
they do I will focus on the function and role that sacred place potentially serves for those who 
frequent religious buildings. Harold Turner‘s From Temple to Meeting House (1979) and 
William McAlpine‘s (2006) ―The Role of the Built Environment in Fulfilling the Mission of the 
Church: Towards a Missional Theology of Sacred Space‖ are appropriate places to begin.
6
 I want 
to focus on three functions that they raise, drawing on several other researchers on sacred place in 
the process: the sacred place as centre, the sacred place as meeting point, and the sacred place as 
microcosm of the heavenly realm (Turner 1979: 13-33).  
First, sacred place functions as a centre of reference either for the individual or the group. 
Similar to tradition, sacred place has the potential to be a centre of meaning and direction for 
actions, to reinforce identity in a fluid and fragmented world. Much like Berger‘s theory of 
human nature and religion, Sheldrake (2001: 2) reminds us that there is ―a crisis of place in 
Western societies – a sense of rootlessness, dislocation or displacement.‖ Turning to sacred place 
is one way that individuals and groups seek to be rooted, located, and placed in the world 
(Mitchell 1977: 117). Both Sheldrake (2001: 10) and Jonathan Smith (1987: 30) reference sacred 
places as ―home,‖ places where people feel safe against the threats of anomie and fragmentation.
7
 
Both active and marginal affiliates I interviewed used this term when talking about their church 
experience. One person says, ―It‘s like coming home.‖ Another woman reflects, ―It was kind of 
like a home thing. It was a home environment. It was a security . . . I needed that sense of 
security and that sense of home that you . . . lose when you start getting more out in the world.‖ 
                                                 
6 I am aware of William James (2002 [1902]) and Rudolf Otto‘s (1926) famous discussions of the numinous and sui 
generis experiences that individuals encounter before sacred or holy things. For the purposes of the research question 
at hand, however, their writings do not advance us toward a clearer understanding of why marginal affiliates turn to 
sacred places when they do; their work does not actually provide us with the function of sacred place for individuals, 
in the way that other scholars‘ work does.  
7 Although McAlpine (2006: 142) does not explicitly use the term ―home,‖ he does suggest that people are aware of 
their identity in different places based on perceptions (by themselves and others) of whether they are an ―insider‖ or 
―outsider.‖   
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Another interviewee states, ―It‘s calming. It‘s relaxing . . . it‘s like going home. It‘s like going 
home.‖ One male says, ―I feel at home when I go there.‖ 
One feature of a home is memory (McAlpine 2006: 133-134). Many times, family 
gatherings occur in homes where they recall memories of years gone by. Memories of important 
moments in life remind people of life decisions, goals, and dreams. Specific places are catalysts 
for people to think about momentous occasions in life, such as a baptism or wedding, and the 
importance of those moments to their self-concept (Twigger-Ross and Uzzell 1996: 218-219). 
Douglas Burton-Christie (1995: 2) reflects on places of memory as ―places into which I had 
poured myself and all the longings of my life and which reflected back to me the shape and 
texture of my life there.‖ Memories reinforce identity, by reminding individuals of rituals and 
values that have stood the test of time. In addition to the relationship between memory and 
individual identity, memory also helps to locate the individual‘s story as part of a larger narrative 
of stories in a particular place—positioning the individual as part of a ―chain of memory‖ 
(Hervieu-Leger 2000). As a marginal affiliate female expressed to me, ―I go to church now 
because I remember what it was like to believe it as a child. I have that nostalgia . . . going to 
church is very much for me like visiting your hometown.‖ Smith (1987: 13) and McAlpine 
(2006: 134) emphasize that forgetting memories can be catastrophic to the group who might then 
lack direction, purpose, and identity in the present or in the future. For this reason, Smith wisely 
makes a connection between place, home, and memory: ―Home is not, from such a point of view, 
best understood as the place-where-I-was-born or the place-where-I-live. Home is the place 
where memories are ‗housed.‘ As such, home is unique: ‗There‘s no place like home‘‖ (Smith 
1987: 29).         
Second, sacred place is a meeting point between heaven and earth, a place for 
communication between the divine and humans. This point is implicit in the first function of 
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sacred place, but is nuanced still. Eliade (1957: 36-39) speaks of an axis mundi, or a sacred place 
that lies at the middle of the world, or at least of one‘s social world, which connects heaven, 
earth, and the underworld. Jeanne Kilde‘s (2008) thorough survey of architecture and worship 
demonstrates that architectural features such as domes opening towards heaven, stained glass and 
natural lighting, tall steeples, and iconography are all intended to remind humans of the 
connection between the cosmic levels that Eliade discusses. Individuals believe that their prayers 
are captured in the dome and collected for God and that God resides in a special way in a set 
apart sacred place, enabling them to be closer to the supernatural than in profane places. Jonathan 
Smith summarizes it this way: 
Place directs attention . . . when one enters a temple, one enters marked-off space (the 
usual example, the Greek temenos, derived from temno, ‗to cut‘) in which, at least in 
principle, nothing is accidental; everything, at least potentially, demands attention. The 
temple serves as a focusing lens, establishing the possibility of significance by directing 
attention, by requiring the perception of difference. Within the temple, the ordinary 
(which to any outside eye or ear remains wholly ordinary) becomes significant, becomes 
‗sacred,‘ simply by being there. A ritual object or action becomes sacred by having 
attention focused on it in a highly marked way (1987: 103-104). 
 
More than this, entrances into religious buildings mark continuity and transition between the 
profane and sacred (Eliade 1957: 25). When people walk through doorways into sacred places, 
they are mindful of both the transition from the profane into the sacred, and perhaps more 
importantly, the transitions taking place in their life as a result of religious experiences (Kilde 
2008: 48-49). Some marginal affiliates that I interviewed attend church to connect ―with a higher 
deity‖ and to get ―reconnected‖ with God and self.  
Third, sacred place sometimes represents an earthly expression of the heavenly realm in 
its beauty, power, and stature. Religious buildings draw people‘s attention to the majesty and 
glory of the divine, to the beauty and splendour of creation and of Heaven on earth (Kilde 2008: 
69). Eliade‘s (1957: 68-113) analysis of sacred time helps to demonstrate why this is important 
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for individuals. For the religious person, time is seen as sacred; the past, present, and future are 
divinely connected and sanctified by the holy. Sacred time is particularly influenced by the 
ongoing struggle between life and death (a prominent theme within Christianity especially), 
which is reinforced when repeating religious rituals. Christian baptism, for example, marks one‘s 
death to self and to their old, sinful way of life, and the birth of a new self, a purer way of life.
8
 
Intertwined with themes of life and death are redemption and renewal, of making old things new 
again (Kilde 2008: 107). Among marginal affiliates, it could be that repeating religious rituals in 
sacred places reflects their desire to create things anew. As one Roman Catholic woman said to 
me, ―I had a couple of sins I thought I should probably go . . . get those out . . . so I told those.‖ 
One male says, ―If I don‘t attend then, I‘m going to hell . . . I swear, I drink, I do bad things . . . 
But I also ask for forgiveness every time I do it, and, let me tell you, there‘s a lot of times, but . . . 
as I was brought up, He will forgive all . . . for certain things. If you commit murder, well, then, 
forget it. But . . . I‘m not saying He won‘t, but I don‘t do bad enough things that He won‘t forgive 
me. Let‘s just say that.‖ Eliade references the human ideal of creating things anew on several 
occasions: ―for religious man of the archaic cultures, the world is renewed annually; in other 
words, with each new year it recovers its original sanctity, the sanctity that it possessed when it 
came from the Creator‘s hands‖ (1957: 75); ―since the sacred and strong time is the time of 
origins, the stupendous instant in which a reality was created, was for the first time fully 
manifested, man will seek periodically to return to that original time‖ (1957: 81); ―for to wish to 
reintegrate the time of origin is also to wish to return to the presence of the gods, to recover the 
                                                 
8 Eliade (1957: 144, 157, 191-192, and 201), Sheldrake (2001: 76, 89), and Kilde (2008: 32-33) each discuss the 
centrality of birth and death to religious rituals, especially in baptism and the Eucharist. Beyond the symbolism of 
death and life, Sheldrake (2001: 76) contends that these rituals move individuals toward reconciliation with self, 
others, and God, in an effort to strengthen one‘s identity in a fragmented and chaotic world.    
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strong, fresh, pure world that existed in illo tempore. It is at once thirst for the sacred and 
nostalgia for being‖ (1957: 94).  
If Eliade is correct, observing rituals in sacred places helps some to destroy the impurities 
and negative things in their life, and give birth to other renewed and refined things. The sanctuary 
is interpreted as a purifying place for people to overcome the struggles in their life (Eliade 1957: 
59). Religious nostalgia reminds religious folk of a pure beginning to sacred time whereby God 
created things anew, and religious rituals have the same potential to provide a fresh beginning for 
humans (Eliade 1957: 65). Sheldrake (2001: 95) speaks of religious utopias, conceived as a 
―world transformed where we may live in perfect harmony, free from suffering, divisions and 
injustice.‖ It could be that people long for a place of innocence, purity, and restoration, and 
attending religious services each Christmas or Easter, or holding one‘s wedding in a church, or 
getting baptized, all signify the possibility that marginal affiliates desire a closer connection to 
God and self in the confines of a sacred place, even if it is only periodically. Kaplan and Kaplan 
(1989) document that certain environments, such as sacred ones, assist people to clear the mind 
of the ―noise‖ of everyday life, to reflect on life‘s challenges and problems, and to ponder future 
goals and priorities in their life because such places are set apart for dedicated attention upon the 
sacred, away from the everyday, profane elements of the world. 
As I stated at the outset of this section, by discovering that tradition, family, and sacred 
space are three of the leading reasons that marginal affiliates give for attending religious services 
when they do, I have advanced our knowledge of religious behaviour in an area that, surprisingly, 
has not been addressed to date. This said, much more empirical work needs to be done to 
understand why these three variables are so important to guiding marginal affiliates‘ behaviour. I 
have attempted to start the conversation by turning to the literature on these three topics, offering 
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a variety of reasons for why tradition, family, and sacred space might be critical variables for 
explaining marginal affiliates‘ attendance patterns.     
     
What meaning and significance do you draw from these occasions?  
 
 Another way to assess the extent of religiosity or secularity among marginal affiliates is to 
ask them about whether they find religious services to be religiously meaningful and significant 
and if this is a motivating factor for why they attend.  
Figure 6.2 
 
In Figure 6.2 we see that eight people said they do find the services that they attend to be 
religiously meaningful because it helps them to connect with God, to lean on God as a crutch in a 
time of need, or to avoid the commercialism of Christmas. For example, one marginal affiliate 
states, ―Usually the sermons have more to do with the Christmas season, but I don‘t go for that 
reason. I just go at that time because I think I need to . . . deal with the more religious end of it 
because I‘m dealing with way too much of the commercial end of it, and it . . . bugs me so 















Always Sometimes Never Unclear
Do you find meaning and significance in the 
church services that you attend?
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of a reminder of why you‘re there or why it‘s Christmas, kind of thing . . . at the end of the night, 
you‘re singing, and your candle is lit, and then you‘re really just worshipping . . . I think that any 
time that you‘re worshipping . . . when I‘m singing, and everyone around you is singing, then it is 
. . . uplifting. You feel still closer to God . . . you‘re doing what He wants you to do. He does 
want you to worship.‖ 
Another four individuals indicated that sometimes the sermons or prayers connect with 
them, but that this is not the case each time and is not always a motivating factor for attending. 
When asked whether the religious services that he attends are religiously meaningful or 
significant, one gentlemen replies, ―Every time? No.‖ Emerson Cairns reflected on this question 
in the context of his wedding and offered the following response: 
No, we wanted the ceremony . . . I didn‘t want to do it in a field or this or that with just a 
Justice of the Peace or anything like that . . . I wouldn‘t say it was overly religious . . . it 
was shorter, and, to an extent, there were some . . . undertones, but there was no readings . 
. . He [the priest] said, ‗Pick one of these three.‘ It was, like, ‗Pick a box.‘ And so we had 
somebody do that and . . . in my mind, that‘s where you get married: you get married in a 
church . . . whether it‘s overly religious or not, we like to do it in a church in that . . . 
forum, I guess. And I don‘t know why . . . we wanted people sitting in pews . . . we 
wanted . . . we were up on . . . stage and that sort of thing, and . . . that worked for us.    
 
Eight of the remaining nine did not attribute any religious significance to these practices, 
seeing them more as cultural customs and traditions. When asked if the services that they 
attended were religiously meaningful, some marginal affiliates responded, ―Probably not a lot;‖ 
―Not with me personally;‖ and ―Christmas is . . . I don‘t know. You sing some carols, and . . . 
you see some old friends sometimes . . . but . . . I don‘t have any religious connections. I think 
Christmas is a little bit overdone. It‘s not like it‘s anything new.‖ 
In no way does this data offer conclusive evidence for or against the secularization thesis, 
but it does demonstrate that just showing up for church is not necessarily a clear sign that religion 
is alive and well or that a potential renaissance will emerge. The reality is that not everyone who 
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attends religious services does so for religious reasons and thus it is presumptuous to conclude 
that just because they are there, something is happening religiously (see Bruce 1999: 95-96; 
Sherkat 1997: 73-77). When discussing baptism, among other religious rites of passage in 
Sweden and Denmark, Zuckerman emphasizes: 
The majority of Danes and Swedes participate in the ostensibly and historically religious 
ritual of baptism for a variety of reasons—from pleasing the in-laws, to enjoying it as a 
nice tradition. But very rarely do they celebrate it with any beliefs about God swelling in 




In many ways this description is appropriate for at least some marginal affiliates in my sample.  
 
 
Desire more involvement? 
 
In part, Bibby‘s denial of secularization in Canada is pinned on the projection that 
marginal affiliates desire more involvement in their religious group (see Bibby 2002, 2004, 2006; 
Bibby, Russell and Rolheiser 2009) and that changes to the supply of religion will help facilitate 
future growth. I have never been convinced of this argument or his interpretation of his own data 
(Thiessen and Dawson 2008), and now there is data to support my position. I asked marginal 






                                                 









Do you desire more involvement 




Figure 6.3 reveals that only three individuals have a clear desire for greater involvement. 
Two people indicate that there is a chance that they would become more involved in the future 
(though I make a case that they do not really desire more involvement) and the rest unmistakably 
say that they do not desire greater involvement and that they are content with their current 
participation in organized religion. In and of itself, this finding raises questions about the 
potential religious renaissance that we will see in Canada based on marginal affiliates becoming 
active affiliates. When we dig beneath the surface, this observation crystallizes.     
In terms of what would make greater involvement worthwhile, we can logically return to 
the things that pushed people away from their church in the first place. If people are less busy, 
less individualistic, have more social influences that encourage greater participation, and have 
fewer experiences that cause them to question matters of faith, then maybe we would witness 
greater involvement. If we see shifts in the supply of religion, in areas of interpersonal and intra-
organizational tension or in the individual congregations‘ location, style, or doctrines, then 
maybe people would respond with more participation. Many marginal affiliates offered responses 
in these directions. Still, though they think that addressing these areas might lead people in 
general to pursue greater involvement, most admitted that changes in such areas would not lead 
to personal increased participation. Characteristic of other marginal affiliates in my sample, one 
male simply states, ―I have no wish to get more involved.‖ 
To be fair to Bibby and to those I interviewed, there are a few who do express a potential 
interest for more involvement. The three individuals who desire more involvement, and the two 
who ―perhaps‖ long for greater participation, mentioned six catalysts for possible increased 
attendance: (1) if friends and family members were more supportive (mentioned by three people); 
(2) if they were less busy (discussed by two participants); (3) if they were at a different stage of 
life such as kids either being born or kids moving out (highlighted by two individuals); (4) if a 
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church was nearby (stated by one person); (5) if a weekday service was offered (raised by one 
individual); and (6) if the style of service was different (referenced by two participants). 
Admittedly it is foolish to offer broad conclusions based on a few individuals, but the findings 
warrant some commentary.       
 What stands out is that the leading explanations deal with demand-side variables, things 
which the churches have no control over. Regarding social ties as restrictive to religious choice, 
Debbie Fisher‘s lived experience, outlined in chapter two, reveals that her husband is the greatest 
barrier between her and greater church involvement. The evangelical male quoted earlier in this 
chapter who fears he would have to abandon his family if he were to pursue greater involvement 
in his religious group also signals the restrictive nature of people‘s social ties over religious 
decisions. 
As for busyness, individuals in this study readily accept the old adage that we make time 
for the things that are important for us, and therefore greater religious involvement must not be as 
important to them as other things. When I asked if they would attend more if they had fewer 
commitments elsewhere, were less involved in other social groups, participated in fewer leisure 
activities, or volunteered less, they clearly stated ―no.‖ Still, as has been demonstrated in this 
chapter, they do acknowledge that it is difficult to make religion a more important facet of their 
life given the strains of work, parenting, household chores and errands, and the desire for some 
―down‖ time.  
Being in a different stage of life was a reason offered by a couple of people for potentially 
getting more involved. One woman, whose husband tragically died some time ago, and who is 
raising two children on her own, thinks when her children move out and she is on her own, she 
will ponder the meaning of life more regularly. She already expresses a desire for a more intense 
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spiritual connection with herself, with God, and with others, and expects to pursue these quests 
when she has more time after the kids move out. She shares the following with me: 
I‘m going through things in my own life, now, where, as the kids are getting older, they‘re 
going out more . . . I‘m going to be by myself . . . I think when my younger one is on her 
own more and out more, probably would think about that [greater involvement] more 
seriously . . . I mean, they‘re getting older, but they still need me in some ways, and they 
don‘t want to go to church . . . it‘s part of . . . that process . . . kids getting older . . . they‘ll 
still be in touch with me, but they won‘t be living under my roof, and I won‘t have half 
the cleaning . . . I think maybe that‘s it. I would maybe feel there‘s more of a hole when 
she‘s gone, too, than I do now. 
 
Wrestling with the meaning of life and one‘s existence is sometimes associated with baby 
boomers that live in a transitional phase of life where their kids move away, they ponder their 
own existence in the world, and their parents age (see e.g., Bibby 2006; Roof 1999).  
Another individual indicates that she will pursue greater involvement when she has 
children:  
I guess I just want them to be brought up the way that I was brought up, and, for sure, I 
want them to believe. I guess I feel kind of like when you‘re still learning and forming an 
opinion on everything, like, it‘s good to go. But it doesn‘t really fit in my life, now, but I 
would. If I had kids, I would go.  
 
Despite some signs that having children will lead to greater involvement (Bibby 2002: 221-223), 
research by Roof (1999: 117-118, 233) and Smith and Snell (2009) indicates that even if people 
do return, they tend not to stick around for long and their orthodoxy wanes with time. David 
Eagle‘s (2010) examination of Canadian General Social Survey data and Statistics Canada‘s 
National Survey of Giving and Volunteering and Participating data suggests that, at least since 
the 1950s, religious ―nones‖ do not eventually turn into religious ―somethings.‖     
 Only three individuals out of the entire sample seem to support the rational choice 
emphasis on supply-side interpretations of the religious economy. Yet, even the reasons that 
these individuals provided cannot be interpreted optimistically as future signs of life for the 
churches. True, some marginal affiliates identify location as an important factor for greater 
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involvement in their church, particularly for elderly individuals who cannot or prefer not to drive, 
or for people who are tired of driving long distances to work each week. However, except for one 
person, none of these individuals suggest that living closer to a church will increase their 
participation. 
For churches that are interested in repairing a supply-demand disconnect, this is an 
example of where they can help by coordinating rides to and from church, something that active 
affiliates in my sample would be more than willing to help out with if it meant that a marginal 
affiliate could turn into an active affiliate. In fact, active affiliates would do almost anything to 
bring people through their church doors. One woman says, ―Come and show us what you want. 
Whatever you want, we‘ll give you, and you can be the head of it. You can be in charge. We‘d 
love to have you.‖ Another individual says, ―What would you like to do . . . I mean, we‘re open 
to anything . . . how do you want to be involved?‖ Part of the problem, however, is that marginal 
affiliates do not raise their needs with their congregation, and it is difficult for the congregation to 
intuitively know of such needs when marginal affiliates only appear once or twice a year. In this 
circumstance, it is not that religious suppliers are aware of needs and just not meeting those; they 
are not even aware of them, and the responsibility for this disconnection between consumers and 
suppliers rests primarily on the shoulders of religious consumers.     
 For the one marginal affiliate who said not having to drive would make a difference, she 
also comments that if churches held services on a week night, when she is already in the grind of 
work and out of the house, she could still enjoy some time at home on Sundays to relax or 
complete house chores. Others pointed to this possibility too, but again they conceded that if they 
really wanted to be more involved in a church they could find a church with mid-week services. 
This woman admits that she has not looked for a church with alternate service times, once more 
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raising uncertainties about the intensity of marginal affiliates‘ desire for more involvement and 
the realistic possibility that they will seek greater participation. 
Finally, two individuals mentioned the style of worship service. One Roman Catholic 
woman comments that the music style at her church is too modern. She says that it feels ―like a 
Billy Graham crusade, and I‘m kind of sceptical about, you know, how much of that is really true 
. . . showing your belief in God more openly. I‘m kind of a quiet person, and so being open about 
all that . . . I hesitate.‖ She prefers the older, traditional ways of performing weekly rituals. Others 
commented on the music style too (that it is too traditional), but not to the point that they would 
pursue more involvement if churches changed their music style.  
Another woman, from the United Church, desires for the sermons to be more 
intellectually stimulating, which in part means that they should be less about Jesus:  
I think if they stopped talking about Jesus so much. I mean, the cross of Jesus is still cool, 
but he‘s been dead for two thousand years, and I have nothing. Like, what would Jesus 
say about a mortgage, really? I don‘t know. And I just get frustrated with this idea that 
Jesus was somehow unique or had all these revelations that no one‘s ever thought of 
before and that you really need Jesus in order to have, like, an orderly society, which is 
incredibly racist. 
 
As presented so far, there is very little evidence to suggest that the marginal affiliates that 
I interviewed long to participate more in their religious group, and as I hypothesized, any signs 
that they might pursue greater involvement point more toward demand rather than supply-side 
explanations. However, there is more information that helps to sharpen our interpretation of the 
few who show any possible desire for more involvement. In an attempt to extend rational choice 
theory to its logical end, I asked these select few if they have attempted to deal with their 
personal circumstances or find a congregation that supplies religion in the ways that they desire. 
For those with social ties that bind their religious activity, they say that the risks are simply too 
great to push the matter with family and friends. As mentioned earlier, busyness is frankly 
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interpreted as one of those things that people could adjust if they thought that more religious 
involvement was worthwhile—and it is not. And for those who are waiting until a different stage 
of life, there is little that religious groups can do to change their situation.        
  An examination of religious supply factors yields similar results. None of the marginal 
affiliates who indicated a definite or possible desire for greater involvement have sought to find a 
congregation that meets their individualized criteria. They also admit that they have not put forth 
much of an effort to make things work better at their existing church. If we apply rational choice 
theory, this is curious since the things that these people are looking for can be found in other 
congregations in Calgary (and the same applies to many others in urban centers too). There are 
churches that offer mid-week services, lively music, dynamic and relevant preaching to everyday 
concerns, such as finances, family, work life, and relationships. There are some churches that are 
theologically strict, while others are rather liberal on such contested issues as homosexuality, 
abortion, or salvation. This could suggest, as I hypothesized, that the intensity of their desire for 
greater involvement is not that great and thus that the churches should not expect to see marginal 
affiliates more involved in the future. Yet, building on rational choice terminology, it might also 
suggest that people feel restricted by the social and religious capital that they already possess. 
The Roman Catholic does not entertain a Protestant congregation that might meet each of their 
desires because the religious/cultural shift is too great, or the evangelical Protestant will not 
consider a mainline Protestant congregation. Of the three who cite supply-side factors as barriers 
for more involvement, one does not have a desire to look for a different congregation, one is open 
to any denomination (Roman Catholic or Protestant), and one limits herself to Roman Catholic 
parishes, but, until I raised the possibility in the interview, had not considered attending a 
different congregation. For this last participant, she explains that the Catholic tradition of 
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attending a parish in one‘s community has limited her from even considering a church in a 
separate district. 
The Future for Religion in Canada? 
No one can say for certain what the future of religion in Canada will look like, never mind 
make predictions based on a small sample of individuals from one Canadian city. We could 
witness growth (as Bibby hypothesizes), we could see decline, or levels of religious belief and 
practice might remain static. I think the findings from this study are suggestive that at the very 
least, Canada is not about to experience any type of renaissance, and it is likely that Canada will 
grow evermore secular at the individual level (at least as measured by regular church attendance). 
Before outlining why I think this is the case, I want to be clear that I do not think that 
modernization inevitably brings about secularization, nor do I argue that secularization is 
irreversible.10 Instead, I agree with Steve Bruce that it is more difficult (though not impossible) to 
remain highly religious at the individual level in the face of modernity, and once secularization 
sets in, it is incredibly difficult to reverse the trend.
11
 As outlined in chapter five, I hold this 
position because the pervasive social changes that accompany modernity, such as pluralism, 
diversity, individualism, and relativism, make it challenging to be religious, at least in any 
traditional sense, as Berger and Bruce argue. 
The most logical place to begin when speculating about the future of religion in Canada is 
with recent data on Canadian religious beliefs and practices. In addition to data already presented 
                                                 
10 David Martin (1978), Bryan Wilson (1985), and David Yamane (1997) comment that most secularization theorists 
deal with declines in religious belief, practice, and authority, not the extinction of religion. This is worth noting 
because those who reject secularization theory incorrectly attack secularization theorists for supposedly predicting 
the end of religion (e.g., Berger, Davie, and Fokas 2008; Casanova 2007; Stark and Finke 2000).    
11 Casanova (2008) attempts to argue that most nations remain religious as they modernize, but he primarily looks at 
public conversations about religious matters (e.g., public symbols of religious affiliation in France), not levels of 
individual belief or practice. When one looks at statistics on individual belief or practice (see e.g., Burkimsher 2009; 
Voas 2009), it is clear that secularization at the individual level is taking place. 
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in this dissertation, we know from 2001 Statistics Canada census data that 16% of Canadians 
claim to have ―no religion‖ (this figure has steadily increased since 1971, when 4% had ―no 
religion‖).12 A 2009 Ipsos Reid poll reveals that as few as 71% of Canadians believe in God, 
down from 84% in 2000 (Harris 2009). Sarah King-Hele‘s (2009) longitudinal analysis of 
Canadian General Social Survey data demonstrates that, on the whole, there are consistent 
declines in religious affiliation, weekly attendance, and level of importance attributed to one‘s 
religion with each successive generation since the early 1900s. In Figure 6.4 and Bibby‘s 2005 
national survey data (Bibby 2006: 192, 205), we see that 25% attend religious services weekly 
(down from 31% in 1975 and stable with the 24% reported weekly attendance in 1990), 9% go 
monthly, 43% visit yearly, and 23% never attend.
13









                                                 
12 The United States, the most religious nation in the western world, is also experiencing staggering growth in the 
―no religion‖ category. Recent data from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, the American General Social 
Survey, and the American Religious Identification Survey all indicate that around 15% of the American population 
claim to have ―no religion.‖  
13 David Eagle (2010) compares three surveys on religious attendance in Canada. The 2006 Canadian General Social 
Survey shows weekly attendance at 18.9% (down from 25% in 2000), Statistics Canada‘s 2004 National Survey of 
Giving and Volunteering and Participating reveals a weekly attendance of 17.4% (stable with 2000 figures), while 
Bibby‘s 2005 figures of 25% show a 3% increase since 2000. Eagle hypothesizes that Bibby‘s figures are inflated 
because of the smaller size of his sample relative to the other surveys, and the fact that people who are willing to sit 
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Further, Bibby (2002: 220) shows that only 15% of yearly attenders indicate a definitive desire 
for greater involvement in their religious group. Despite persistent claims over the years that 
people do not belong to religious organizations, but they still believe in God, Bibby (2006: 205) 
shows that since 1975 there are decreasing percentages of Canadians who believe in God or a 
higher power (from 94% down to 90%) or in heaven (from 89% down to 81%). 
Furthermore, in their book The Emerging Millennials (2009), Bibby, Russell and 
Rolheiser comment on recent trends among Canadian teens. Interestingly, while they document 
widespread declines in belief and practice, they also note a polarization between those who are 
actively religious and those who are not religious at all. For instance, between 1984 and 2008 
teens who ―definitely‖ believe in God or a higher power decreased from 54% to 37%, while those 
who ―definitely do not‖ or ―do not‖ believe in God or a higher power increased from 6% to 16% 
and 9% to 17% respectively (Bibby, Russell and Rolheiser 2009: 167-169).14 What is important 
about these findings is that unlike their baby boomer parents whose belief in God or a higher 
power shifted into the middle ground ―yes, I think so‖ category, teens have polarized themselves 
straight to the ―definitely believe‖ and ―definitely don‘t believe‖ groupings. Since the 1980s, 
teens show declining levels in other areas of belief too, including belief in life after death (from 
80% down to 75%), miracles (from 63% down to 56%), and astrology (from 53% down to 47%) 
to name a few areas (2009: 175).  
When it comes to affiliation with a religious organization, 32% of Canadian teens claim 
to have ―no religion,‖ Roman Catholics and Protestants alike have gradually lost teen affiliates 
since 1984, and ―other faith groups‖ such as Muslims and Buddhists show modest signs of 
growth relative to the entire Canadian population since 2000 (Bibby, Russell and Rolheiser 2009: 
176-177). With respect to church attendance, the most remarkable shift is found in the ―never 
                                                 
14 Similar findings are evident in the United States (see Pew Research Center 2010).  
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attend‖ category, where percentages have progressively increased from 24% to 40% to 47% 
between 1992, 2000, and 2008 (Bibby, Russell and Rolheiser 2009: 178).
15
 Fewer teens are 
attending ―hardly ever‖ and less and less of them desire for religious rites of passages in the 
future, which suggests that teens are skipping this middle ―marginal affiliate‖ involvement 
altogether.     
Despite the grim statistics, Reginald Bibby has attempted to put a good face on the 
results, suggesting even though Canadians are not attending religious services as frequently as in 
the past, some still desire more involvement in their religious group. He continues that changes to 
the supply of religion are critical for potentially witnessing a return of less active religious 
affiliates. I do not mean to dismiss the possibility over time. People point to anecdotal evidence, 
of family, friends, and neighbours who have become active affiliates over time. However, I have 
provided clear qualitative evidence that, on the whole, it is presumptuous and misguided to 
assume that marginal affiliates will likely become active affiliates. This way of thinking is 
especially wrongheaded if premised on the idea that changes to the supply of religion will almost 
inevitably bring about the desired ―fit‖ between religious suppliers and religious consumers. 
Beyond these points, my data lends itself to a discussion of religious transmission from 
one generation to the next, a clear problem evidenced in recent Canadian polls and in my own 
sample. Depending on how one looks at it, some will take comfort in the fact that nearly all 
marginal affiliates were raised in a religious home, hopeful that they may eventually return to 
higher levels of church involvement. Others may interpret this to suggest a point of no return for 
marginal affiliates. British scholars David Voas and Alasdair Crockett‘s longitudinal work is 
instrumental for this discussion. In their examination of religion in Britain and Europe, they 
                                                 
15 A 1999 report reveals that 23% of Canadian children under the age of 12 attended religious services weekly, 
followed by 13% on a monthly basis, 22% occasionally, while 42% never attended (Jones 1999).   
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explore whether secularization can be attributed to age, period, or cohort effects. Age effects refer 
to changes to one‘s religious beliefs and practices over the life course, while one‘s society stays 
the same. Period effects imply that significant social events occur that influence all of society to 
change at once (e.g., the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States). Cohort effects means that 
individuals‘ religious beliefs and practices remain constant over the life course, but that societal 
changes influence how and why separate generations believe and practice at different levels.  
They look to data on religious affiliation, church attendance, and the importance of 
religion to a person‘s life to address religious change in Britain and Europe. They draw on data 
over a twenty-year period in the British case (Crockett and Voas 2006; Voas and Crockett 2005) 
and eighty years of data in the European context (Voas 2009). Particularly useful to their 
analysis, and an advantageous feature of longitudinal quantitative research, is that they compare 
different cohorts‘ level of religious belief and practice over the life course. In both circumstances, 
they document widespread secularizing trends in each of the above measurements of religiosity.
16
 
Their task then becomes to explain why this is the case. Is it for age, period, or cohort reasons? 
They eliminate age as a possible explanation because the data reveals that on the whole, 
individuals within each cohort did not become noticeably more or less religious with age.
17
 This 
point is reinforced by Smith and Snell (2009), challenging the widespread myth and hope among 
some that people become more religious with time. Similarly, they set aside period as an 
explanation for secularization because there are no indications of simultaneous increases or 
decreases of religiosity at any point in time, across the different generations. When it comes to 
                                                 
16 Laying out the specific data from their studies goes beyond my purposes here, but it can be found in Crockett and 
Voas (2006), Voas (2009), and Voas and Crockett (2005).  
17 It is important to remember that their data is longitudinal and holistic, unlike the data in my sample. Thus, the fact 
that most marginal affiliates in my sample became significantly less religious than they once were (measured by 
attendance at religious services), or that some active affiliates came from non-religious backgrounds, should not 
concern us here. In reality, most marginal affiliates abandoned regular church attendance before or around the age 
that they would even qualify to fill out the surveys that Voas and Crockett rely on in their analysis.  
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cohort, however, they clearly illustrate that each successive generation is less religious than the 
previous one. Bibby, Russell and Rolheiser (2009: 162-187) also show cohort effect at play in 
Canada, between ―pre-boomers,‖ ―boomers,‖ and ―post-boomers.‖18 The question becomes why 
is there a cohort effect? 
Voas (2010) postulates potential explanations for why each generation is less religious 
than its forerunner: structural, compositional, and value changes among young people or value 
changes among parents. To assess the first possibility, Voas looks to Robert Wuthnow‘s recent 
book After the Baby Boomers (2007), which accounts for the relationship between declining 
religious attendance among young adults and seven key changes to their life worlds: delayed 
marriage, having few children or having them later in life, uncertainties over work and money, 
increased education, changing nature of relationships, globalization, and the information 
explosion. Among other things, Wuthnow cautiously suggests that declining church attendance 
can be attributed to factors from increased university or college education, to the growing 
presence of women in the workforce who subsequently have less time to spare. However, Voas 
counters these explanations by noting that, in general, education is positively correlated with 
church attendance, and church attendance is largely independent of how many hours people 
work.       
Next, Voas considers possible changes in values among parents and/or teens. Here Voas 
argues that cohort effects can best be explained by shifting values among parents, namely in that 
they are less committed to ensuring that their children conform to their values and beliefs. To 
support this assertion, Voas points to changing values among parents that deemphasize strict 
obedience and loyalty to church, in turn emphasizing independence and tolerance. He also shows 
                                                 
18 Once more, this is supported in recent survey findings in the United States (see Pew Research Center 2010).  
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that among parents who attend regularly, there is a sizeable decrease in the percentage of those 
whose children also attend religious services. My interview data clearly supports this assertion.   
With respect to changes among young people, Smith and Denton‘s (2005) discussion of 
―Moralistic Therapeutic Deism‖ is instructive. Teens believe in being good, moral beings, and 
that religion may help toward this end. If they are religious, many teens believe that religion 
serves a therapeutic purpose, to make people feel good, happy, secure, and at peace with life. 
While teens might believe that a God exists and created the world, they believe that God is 
distant from people‘s personal affairs. Accordingly, ―therapeutic individualism defines the 
individual self as the source and standard of authentic moral knowledge and authority, and 
individual self-fulfillment as the preoccupying purpose of life. Subjective, personal experience is 
the touchstone of all that is authentic, right, and true‖ (Smith and Denton 2005: 173). Perhaps this 
approach to religion helps to explain how and why religion operates in the background of teens‘ 
lives (see Bibby, Russell and Rolheiser 2009; Smith and Denton 2005), and why young adults in 
their twenties and thirties view religion in a highly individualistic and experiential way (see e.g., 
Hayes 2007; Wuthnow 2007: 133). 
Voas offers some plausible hypotheses that, with further research, are likely to be proven 
correct. I think the evidence presented in this chapter is suggestive that parents are a source of the 
disconnection between young people and religious belief and practice. For example, in my 
sample, five marginal affiliates were either given the option of whether or not to attend church 
once they reached their teen years, or they gave their own children the option of whether or not to 
attend. That marginal affiliates are willing to do this for their own children (and even to stop 
attending themselves because their children do not wish to attend) further epitomizes value shifts 
among parents. This change in parental values should not be interpreted in isolation however, but 
rather in the broader context of structural shifts toward individualism that I discussed earlier. If 
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we follow the earlier findings among those over the age of fifty-five in my sample who recall 
never being given the option of whether or not to attend religious services when they were 
growing up, giving choice to children about their level of involvement in their parents‘ religion 
reflects a relatively recent (i.e., last fifty years) and large shift in consciousness that favours 
diversity, pluralism, and relativism at the expense of exclusive and absolute values and beliefs. 
As in Britain, these values are particularly acute in Canada, a highly liberalized democratic 
country.   
Individualism is also reflected in the shifting priorities among parents away from church 
attendance, whether it be for work or leisure. When parents say that it is too time consuming to 
commute to church, or that they want weekends to relax or complete chores instead of going to 
church, they are communicating to their children that religion is not a high enough priority to set 
the other desires aside; the rewards for attending are not that great.19 Once more, these realities 
must be framed in the context of broader structural shifts. The demands of contemporary society, 
of two parents working just to pay the bills, of children‘s exposure to even more extracurricular 
activities that fill their time, and of urbanization and the growth of suburbs (hence longer 
commute times to work) leave families in a vulnerable position today, with respect to their time. 
There is no denying that these modern day strains are real for families, and yet we know that 
those who attend religious services regularly are equally, if not more busy. Although I err on the 
side that individuals can choose to invest time in the things that are most important to them, I 
realize that the added strains of modern society make such decisions increasingly difficult and 
perhaps this is something that religious groups ought to consider in trying to more effectively 
minister to their affiliates.                  
                                                 
19 I do not intend to attach any normative evaluation to such a statement. 
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One of the consequences of declining levels of religious belief and practice from 
generation to generation is the rise of the ―no religion‖ category. It is more common in Canada 
today than ever before. Although being raised in a religious home does not guarantee that a child 
will remain religious throughout their life (as clearly demonstrated by my marginal affiliates), we 
know that there is a stronger chance of someone being religious in their adult life if they were 
raised in a religious home (see Dillon and Wink 2007). Further to this, we know (and the data 
from this study verifies this) that social influences play a significant role in whether a person is 
religious at all and, if they are religious, how religious they are. If we consider the current 
religious attendance patterns outlined near the beginning of this section then, with two-thirds of 
the Canadian population attending religious services yearly or less, and a growing percentage of 
people who claim to have ―no religion,‖ it is easy to see how and why one would argue that 
secularization at the individual level is likely to continue in Canada. This is certainly the future 
that I see in store for religion in Canada. Still, even if people do attend religious services, the 
findings that I have presented in this chapter indicate that religious motivations are not always at 
the center of people‘s religious attitudes and behaviours, once more supporting the notion that we 
should not accept the renaissance thesis.
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Chapter 7 
Religion in Canada: Myths, Realities, and Implications 
Introduction 
I draw this dissertation to a close by addressing four matters. First, I return to the 
fundamental question that this dissertation sought to address: what explains higher and lower 
levels of religious involvement? I respond to this question by synthesizing some of the defining 
similarities and differences between the active and marginal religious affiliates that I interviewed, 
exposing several myths and realities about religion in Canada. In doing so, I reference many 
rational choice and secularization ideas, ones that not only aid our understanding of active and 
marginal affiliates, but ones that also further our knowledge of rational choice and secularization 
theory themselves. 
Second, if I am correct to reject the religious renaissance thesis, what are the implications, 
if any, for Canadian society? Should Canadians be concerned about the social and civic fabric of 
our society if individuals are less and less religious? This ―so what‖ or ―who cares‖ question 
ought to be relevant to the broader sociological community, and the Canadian public, as 
sociologists grapple with the relationship between religiosity levels and everyday social and civic 
responsibilities in Canada. Incidentally, more and more scholars who study religion are asking 
this type of question in the context of their research (see e.g., Bibby 2007; Bowen 2004; Dillon 
and Wink 2007; Putnam 2000; Smith and Snell 2009; Stanczak 2006; Zuckerman 2008).   
Third, I offer a series of suggestions for religious leaders on how they might make use of 
the research findings from my interview data. Connecting academic research findings with 
practitioners in the field is a growing interest among social scientists (see e.g., Kirby, Greaves, 
and Reid 2006; Richer 1988). This idea, more generally known as ―use value,‖ is perhaps most 
common among conflict and feminist theorists, who hope that their research findings will lead to 
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social change that benefits those on the margins of society. Some leading scholars of religion (see 
e.g., Smith and Denton 2005; Wuthnow 2005, 2007), including Bibby (e.g., 1987, 1993, 2004), 
have given detailed attention in their writing to helping practitioners in the field, in this case 
religious leaders, to utilize the knowledge that comes from empirical discoveries about people‘s 
religious attitudes and behaviours. I agree with Richer (1988) that research should ideally benefit 
those who are researched rather than for the acquired knowledge to merely get lost in the ivory 
tower. In the case of this project, ―use value‖ entails the idea that active and marginal affiliate 
realities should be communicated to the organizations they are strongly or loosely connected with 
(something I have begun to do—see Thiessen 2010). Hopefully the recommendations that I offer 
in this chapter are useful for religious leaders to better understand the cultural context that they 
are operating in, ultimately for the benefit of their affiliates.   
Fourth and finally, I identify a series of research questions and topics that arise from this 
study that should be addressed in the future.    
What Explains Higher and Lower Levels of Involvement? 
In light of the evidence presented in this dissertation, there are two overarching 
explanations for how and why the active and marginal affiliates that I interviewed are different: 
personal experience and social influence (several other things are also at work, which I note 
below, but most factors can be explained by their relationship with these two variables). In 
making this claim, I am not suggesting that there is a universal causal relationship between these 
factors and an individual‘s propensity to be involved in a religious group. Yet, from the 
interviews that I conducted, there is at least a strong correlation between these things. Indeed, 
future qualitative data collection and analysis with larger sample sizes and multivariate statistical 
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analysis of large survey data sets would be instrumental to directly addressing cause and effect 
patterns. 
I begin by discussing how and why active religious affiliates are as involved as they are. 
As Andrew Donnelly‘s story demonstrates, a fundamental difference between active and 
marginal affiliates is that active affiliates believe their religion should have a ―master status‖ in 
their life. Recalling from chapter two, Andrew declares:  
My Christian faith isn‘t something which is . . . laid on top . . . it‘s not part of my life. My 
religious faith is an expression of what is ultimately true in my life . . . Being a committed 
Christian doesn‘t mean that you say goodbye to all the other parts of life. It is something 
which is part of life...the Christian faith is a way of looking at life as a whole . . . There is 
no conflict between the ordinary and the spiritual. There is no conflict. It is the same thing 
as two things. 
 
In general, the active affiliates that I interviewed think that everything in life should be 
influenced by their religious beliefs and practices and as a result many are diligent in faithfully 
observing religious rituals such as church attendance. While many believe that attending church 
is a requirement of their belief system, it more importantly helps to reinforce their belief that God 
should be at the center of their world. They have acquired this strong religious orientation to life 
in their home, at their church, with their friends, and through using other religious resources such 
as the Bible, religious music or books. This all encompassing religious worldview leads to a host 
of other attitudinal and behavioural realities for active affiliates that are developed below.  
One feature is that most active affiliates believe that they should submit their lives to the 
will of God. They do not view their life as their own, but instead as one that belongs to God, to 
do with what He wants. As highlighted in chapter two and four, over half of the active affiliates 
that I met with shared something along the lines of one individual who says, ―You don‘t get to 
make your own decisions. Your life isn‘t your own anymore. If you‘re serious about it, it‘s not 
your own anymore. So you‘re not . . . you‘re not the boss.‖ Church attendance, among other 
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activities such as reading the Bible or praying, is one of the religious practices that they believe is 
helpful for knowing how and why God is working in their life. The words people hear at church 
help to give them a framework for interpreting their experiences and the social world. Although 
many see submitting one‘s will to God as a significant cost of faith, they strongly value the 
subsequent direction and purpose that God offers them in exchange. 
Part of the reason that most active affiliates in my sample believe they can submit their 
lives to God is because they claim to have personally experienced God‘s active involvement in 
the world. Reflective of many other active affiliates in my sample, Becky Eagleton‘s vignette 
reveals how she depended on God, and when she prayed, she believed that God answered her 
prayers. Personal experience validates this belief that God is dependable. When good things 
happen in life, active affiliates are quick to acknowledge God‘s hand in such events. Further, if or 
when bad things happen, such as when the woman referenced in chapter four lost her job, active 
affiliates in my sample tend to justify such events by pointing to human error or they claim that 
God has a bigger plan in place. Bolstering the social nature to their faith experiences, active 
affiliates‘ personal experiences of a God who is active in the world is reinforced in the words, 
prayers, and songs that are lifted unto God in their religious gatherings each week, which in turn 
reminds individuals to constantly go to God with all of their joys and pains in life.   
Active affiliates like Andrew Donnelly and Becky Eagleton are also more inclined to 
believe in life after death, maintaining that what they believe and how they act on earth is directly 
connected to whether or not they will obtain life after death. Still, contrary to RCT, few identified 
life after death as the main reason for attending church, and it was clear in their responses that 
attending church is not necessarily interpreted as a required activity that leads to life after death. 
As a reminder, and reflective of other active affiliates in my sample, a thirty year-old speaks 
about what is required to obtain life after death, saying, ―It‘s God‘s grace . . . I think if you . . . 
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just the willingness to hand yourself over and to ask for forgiveness. And I really believe that it‘s 
. . . God‘s grace. We don‘t earn our way. It‘s given to us . . . I don‘t think you need to pray fifty 
times a day or that everybody has to go to church. I think that church is . . . a commandment that 
I‘m able to celebrate, but I don‘t know that it would stop anybody . . . from going to heaven.‖ 
Instead, active affiliates (particularly those who were not raised in a religious family, like Cam 
Bender) believe that church attendance is necessary in order to learn, from a trained specialist, 
how God wants followers to live their lives so that they can please Him, towards obtaining life 
after death. 
The social component to active affiliates‘ faith binds all of these things together. Most 
active affiliates are surrounded by individuals, either in their church, another church, or in their 
family, who share similar beliefs and practices. Regularly gathering with others who are like-
minded helps to remind them of what they believe, how they should act, and how they should 
interpret their daily existence. Reflective of the data presented in chapter two and four, one 
gentleman expresses that he regularly attends religious services because he enjoys ―the 
community, the camaraderie . . . the group of people . . . group of like-minded people.‖ Another 
female says that she attends because ―you can meet people who relate with you or who you can 
help grow together in your faith or just have moral support with regarding your faith . . . even just 
to have someone who . . . you know is there for you and will pray for you if you‘re going through 
a tough time.‖ As we saw in chapter four, this sense of community is one of the primary rewards 
that active affiliates attach to regular church attendance. As a result, the social component to their 
faith helps to provide individuals with stability and certainty in a chaotic and fragmented world. 
In contrast to active affiliates, one of the defining features of marginal affiliates is that 
they believe that religion is primarily an individual phenomenon. As Emerson Cairns, Emily 
Foster, and Debbie Fisher‘s vignettes reveal, marginal affiliates largely reject external authorities 
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telling them what to believe or how to behave, and they value their ability to pick and choose 
which religious beliefs and practices they will adopt. As I indicated in chapter six, individualism 
can be attributed to a combination of societal and parental values. In Canada, individualism is a 
consequence of broader societal shifts that include pluralism, diversity, liberalism, and relativism. 
Canadians, especially parents, are shaped by these social realities to the point that many parents 
opt not to force their children to attend religious services or teach them the ―absolutes‖ of their 
religious system. Active affiliates are not exempt from the forces of individualism, as I 
demonstrated in Cam Barker‘s story in chapter two. Indicative of some active affiliates, Cam 
states, ―I have my own beliefs and . . . things that I hold dear and that I sort of know in my heart . 
. . I think that that‘s why . . . I found the church that I did. Because it . . . embraced the things that 
I . . . believed in. And they‘re teaching me more about what I wanted to know.‖ In other words, 
some active affiliates claim authority over their religious beliefs and practices rather than 
deferring authority to their church tradition or religious leader, associating only with 
congregations that conform to the things that the individual already holds as true (things that they 
were socialized to believe at a younger age). However, active and marginal affiliates are 
distinguishable by the social ties that they have. Marginal affiliates are surrounded by others who 
do not attend religious services regularly, which from the literature cited in this dissertation, often 
results in a social setting that values and embraces individualism in the area of faith. The opposite 
is true for active affiliates. From my data, it is difficult to definitively determine whether the 
people‘s social-connectedness causes them to think in individualist directions, or whether their 
presuppositions about religion and the world draw them to others who reinforce those beliefs. I 
suspect that both are probably occurring, and further research with larger sample sizes and even 
quantitative multivariate analysis would be an asset. At the very least it seems clear that there is 
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some type of correlation at play between one‘s social ties and their approach to religious beliefs 
and practices.    
Interpersonal and intra-organizational tension also contributed to marginal affiliates 
adopting an individualist approach to religion. As we saw with Debbie Fisher‘s experience with 
the Roman Catholic Church when she got married, marginal affiliates were more likely to have 
negative experiences with others in the church or to witness either first-hand or at a distance, that 
Christians caused immense destruction in others‘ lives. In chapter four I provided several 
examples of how marginal affiliates were treated poorly by fellow congregants or religious 
leaders. Characteristic of many other marginal affiliates that I interviewed, one woman 
summarizes this point by saying, ―I think there‘s also the scandals in the church—not just the 
Catholic Church, but just the scandals that we see—that really put people off . . . that they can‘t 
really trust the people in charge.‖ These experiences and perceptions played a critical role in 
some marginal affiliates‘ decision to turn their back on regular church involvement, with many 
currently holding a strong negative perception towards Christians. While active affiliates are 
aware that bad things happen at the hands of Christians, their experiences have been much more 
positive than marginal affiliates. Without question, personal experience does cause some people 
to become more involved in a religious organization, while for others it leads to reduced 
involvement. 
 Active and marginal affiliates are also different in the rewards that they attach to their 
church involvement. Active affiliates like Andrew Donnelly, Becky Eagleton, and Cam Bender 
(among many other active affiliates in my sample) attend religious services primarily to be part of 
a like-minded community, to receive meaning, purpose, and direction in life, and to learn from a 
trained specialist. Marginal affiliates like Emerson Cairns, Emily Foster, and Debbie Fisher (and 
others in this study) mainly attend out of respect for tradition or family, or to connect with God in 
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a sacred space. When it comes to these rewards, one of the worthwhile contributions of this 
study, as discussed in chapter six, is that less than half of the marginal affiliates consistently 
associate any religious significance with the religious services that they attend. This finding 
challenges Bibby‘s repeated notion that we should hold out optimism that marginal affiliates are 
connecting with God when they attend religious services or that they supposedly desire to be 
more involved in the future. The fact that marginal affiliates like Emily Foster say that they are 
too busy to attend church is an indicator that the rewards offered at church are not enough to 
convince them to attend more regularly. Mindful that active affiliates are just as busy, one 
explanation for the difference in attendance patterns could be linked to marginal affiliates‘ 
conceptions of life after death, whereby one only needs to be a good and moral person, not 
someone who is caught up with correct doctrine or proper religious practice. Even when 
considering that marginal affiliates attend when they do because of tradition, family, and sacred 
space, clearly even these factors do not warrant a high enough reward to attend more regularly. 
These are some of the reasons for why I reject supply-side explanations of religious behaviour. 
One of the other main reasons why I reject supply-side theory has to do with marginal 
affiliates‘ social ties. We already know that they have fewer social ties with people who attend 
religious services regularly, which is partially a result of their parents‘ decision to give them the 
option to attend during their teen years. Yet an even more critical factor that explains 
involvement at church is that some marginal affiliates like Debbie Fisher are fearful to pursue 
more involvement because they believe that those close to them will ostracize them in return. The 
cost of losing these social ties is simply too great when compared with the perceived rewards of 
religious involvement. In this, along with other areas which were discussed, including that people 
are too busy, individualism, and individuals who question their faith, religious groups have very 
little control over attendance patterns. As a result, I am less optimistic than Bibby that we are 
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about to witness a religious resurgence, and instead, based on the recent empirical findings in 
Canada that were documented in the last chapter, we should expect to see ongoing secularization 
at the individual level in Canada. 
Religion and Civic Engagement in Canada 
Hall, Lasby, Ayer, and Gibbons (2009: 22, 41) demonstrate that if children learn at a 
young age to volunteer and give money to charitable organizations, then they are more likely to 
do so as adults (also see Dillon and Wink 2007; Hodgkinson and Weitzman 1996; Wilson and 
Janoski 1995). Further, children who were active in their religious organization when growing up 
tend to give more often and in greater amounts when they are adults, compared to any other 
social setting where children are taught to volunteer and donate money (Hall, Lasby, Ayer, and 
Gibbons 2009: 22). The same is true in the realm of volunteering (p.41). Considering that fewer 
Canadian teens are raised in religious homes, adopt basic religious beliefs, or are involved in a 
religious organization, should we be concerned about the potential impact this might have on 
Canada‘s civic fabric in the future? If I am correct that we should not expect many marginal 
affiliates to eventually become active affiliates, combined with the reality of a growing ―no 
religion‖ category, how might this influence civic engagement in Canada? Although my data 
does not help us to answer these questions directly, there are several studies that do.  
In his book Christians in a Secular World: The Canadian Experience (2004), Kurt Bowen 
documents that those who attend religious services more regularly are more satisfied with life, 
have more close relationships, place more importance on relationships with family and 
neighbours, and demonstrate higher levels of honesty, ethical behaviour, and general concern for 
the welfare of others. Bibby‘s (2007, 2009) comparison of teens who are theists versus atheists 
reveals that theists score higher in the level of importance that they give to values such as trust, 
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honesty, concern for others, politeness, working hard, and patience. Further, they are less likely 
to have been in trouble with the police and they show more desire to be involved in the 
community in the future. Zuzanek, Mannell, and Hilbrecht‘s (2008) examination of teenagers in 
Canada also shows positive correlations between teens‘ religious involvements and their overall 
well-being, measured, for example, by higher levels of personal happiness, stronger ties with 
family members, greater concern with doing well at school, and lower levels of anxiety or 
feelings of boredom and loneliness. 
Beyond the personal benefits of religious involvement, research in Canada also shows 
that there are social benefits. Kurt Bowen (2004) suggests that religious involvement is directly 
linked to social capital, volunteering and charitable giving, political engagement, and pro-social 
behaviours such as honesty and compassion. Bowen‘s findings are supported in many, and more 
recent, research findings. When it comes to donating money to charitable organizations, Hall, 
Lasby, Ayer, and Gibbons (2009: 20) show that 49% of weekly attenders are in the ―top donor‖ 
category
1
 compared with only 15% of those who do not attend weekly (also see Reed and Selbee 
2001). Ninety-four percent of weekly attenders made donations in 2007, compared to 82% of 
non-weekly attenders, and weekly attenders donated an average of $1,038 annually versus $295 
for those who do not attend weekly (p.23). Among Canadians who volunteer their time, 66% of 
weekly attenders volunteered somewhere in 2007, compared with 43% of non-weekly attenders, 
and weekly attenders volunteered nearly twice as many hours than non-weekly attenders (p.43). 
With 25% of volunteers contributing almost 80% of the total volunteer hours (p.36), 23% of 
weekly attenders are in the ―top volunteer‖ category compared to 9% of non-weekly attenders 
(p.41). These findings are all supported in other studies by Berger (2006), Campbell and Yonish 
                                                 
1 The ―top donor‖ category refers to the 25% of Canadians who account for 82% of all donated dollars.  
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(2003), Nemeth and Luidens (2003), Piché (1999), Putnam (2000: 117), Smidt, Green, Guth, and 
Kellstedt (2003), and Wuthnow (2004, 2007). 
It is true that many regular church attenders give much of their time and money to their 
religious organization (see Campbell and Yonish 2003; Hall, Lasby, and Gibbons 2009: 24; 
Nemeth and Luidens 2003), which begs the question: does their charitable work actually benefit 
the broader society? One response to this question is that regular attenders give more money and 
time to secular initiatives than non-religious individuals (Hall, Lasby, Ayer, and Gibbons 2009: 
24). Bowen‘s (2004: 157) research in Canada shows that 35% of those who attend weekly 
volunteered in a secular agency in 1997 versus 25% of the non-religious. As several scholars 
note, those who regularly attend religious services share a theological conviction (and are 
reminded each week at church) to make a positive impact on society, and they are given 
opportunities through their church to do so (see Berger 2006; Bowen 2004; Cnaan, Boddie, and 
Yancy 2003; Harris 2003; Smidt 2003; Wuthnow 2004).  
Another response is that religious organizations offer services that benefit Canadian 
society, thus giving time and money to one‘s church does help those outside one‘s congregation. 
For example, religious organizations provide social services to fill the gap where state financial 
or human resources do not (Cnaan, Boddie, and Yancey 2003). Bowen (2004) points out that 
despite religious organizations spending large sums of money on buildings and facilities, 
religious properties actually serve outsiders‘ needs (e.g., shelter for the homeless or Boy Scouts 
and Alcoholics Anonymous groups).
2
 Expenditures on clergy also save governments money in 
areas of counselling. At an individual level, religious group members develop practical skills 
                                                 
2 While churches may serve the needs of the community, Omar McRoberts‘ (2003) study of church and community 
in a black urban neighbourhood in the United States offers mixed results. Some churches intentionally seek to 
distance themselves from the community, on theological grounds, while others are more intentional to bridge the 
divide, including offering their space as a service to the community. The perception of those in the immediate 
community of different churches are also mixed, with some seeing the church as an asset to the community while 
others see it as a place that is closed the entire week other than for worship services. 
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such as letter writing, planning and chairing meetings, giving presentations, and teamwork that 
are transferrable into the workplace and overall civic participation (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 
1995; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).3 These skills are especially helpful for the 
disenfranchised that are looking to establish themselves in the economic sector. 
In his comments at the 2009 Society for the Scientific Study of Religion conference in 
Denver, Colorado Robert Putnam summarized one of the major findings from his forthcoming 
book American Grace: How Religion is Reshaping our Civic and Political Lives (2010): 
―religious people are just nicer.‖ Although not arguing that people must be religious in order to 
improve the civic and political landscape, he does interpret religion as a good thing for society.    
Not everyone agrees that religion is necessary for strong civic engagement though. In his 
book Society without God (2008), Phil Zuckerman examines Denmark and Sweden, two of the 
world‘s least religious nations and yet two of the happiest and most content countries in the 
world. Far less than 50% of Swedes or Danes believe in God, believe that religion is important to 
their life, believe in life after death, or attend religious services, among several other indicators of 
religiosity (p.24-25). Yet, when looking at the ―Human Development Index,‖ which is based on 
having a long and healthy life (e.g., life expectancy), high levels of knowledge (e.g., literacy and 
school enrolment rates), and a decent standard of living (e.g., GDP per capita), Sweden and 
Denmark rank in the top twenty in the world, surrounded by several other non-religious nations 
such as Norway, Britain, and the Netherlands (p.26). Other indicators of societal health such as 
the ―Quality of Life Index‖ or low crime rates or suicide also position Sweden and Denmark, 
alongside other irreligious societies, among the world‘s leaders. Zuckerman concludes that ―it is 
not the most religious nations in our world today, but rather the most secular, that have been able 
                                                 
3 Life skills, such as communication skills or organizational skills, are also learned in non-religious volunteer settings 
(Hall, Lasby, Ayer, and Gibbons 2009: 49).   
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to create the most civil, just, safe, equitable, humane, and prosperous societies‖ (2008: 30). He 
also states that he is ―not arguing that the admirably high level of societal health in Scandinavia is 
directly caused by the low levels of religiosity. Although one could certainly make just such a 
case . . . I simply wish to soberly counter the widely touted assertion that without religion, society 
is doomed‖ (Zuckerman 2008: 18). 
In addition to Zuckerman‘s observations, we know that religious individuals and groups 
are also the source of intense conflict and division in the world. At the macro-level, staunch 
atheists like Dawkins (2006), Harris (2006), and Hitchens (2007) draw our attention to the 
Middle Ages which were riddled with religious conflict, the ongoing religious tensions in the 
Middle East, and the current war on terror that is steeped in religious ideologies. In a different 
way, and at the individual level, marginal affiliate experiences of interpersonal or intra-
organizational tension, and Kinnaman and Lyons (2007) account of Christians as hypocritical, 
anti-homosexual, sheltered, overly political, judgmental, and insincere also validate the 
destructive elements of religion for society. Piché (1999) shows that highly religious Canadians, 
particularly conservative Christians, are the least tolerant of homosexuals acquiring equal rights, 
and they are the most likely to challenge the belief that all religions are equally good and true. 
Robert Wuthnow highlights similar things in America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity 
(2005), and, in his presentation at the 2009 Society for the Scientific Study of Religion 
conference, Putnam also commented, based on findings in his book American Grace: How 
Religions Divides and Unites Us (2010), that religious individuals are extremely intolerant of 
people who are different than themselves. 
Returning to the original question of whether we should be concerned about civic 
engagement in Canada if we continue to see secularization at the individual level, there are some 
who suggest that the intersection of church involvement with social capital is paramount for civic 
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engagement. In referencing Wuthnow (1994), Coleman (2003: 37) states that ―even intense, 
purely personal spirituality that is cut off from churches or some ongoing groups has almost no 
predictive value for civic engagement or social activism.‖ Nemeth and Luidens echo this idea and 
claim that ―the social capital produced by the relations found in churches and synagogues is 
evident only among the most frequent attenders. Simply being a member or being an infrequent 
attender, it appears, does little to increase one‘s financial support for nonreligious charities‖ 
(2003: 114-115).  
To the contrary, Siobhan Chandler summarizes the sentiments of many who argue that 
just because individuals practice their religion privately, or are involved in New Age forms of 
spirituality, does not mean that they are, by default, selfish or non-contributing members to 
society: 
Autonomy and self-expression are not synonyms for negative freedom. By the same 
measure, the autonomous and self-expressive nature of contemporary ‗New Age‘ does not 
make it de facto a selfish religion, even if it is a religion of the self. Sweeping 
generalizations condemning a massive cohort of post-materialist seekers as narcissists is 
untenable. That some spiritual but religiously unaffiliated individuals are selfish is 
inevitable, but so are many of the religiously affiliated. Not all individuals are equally 
benevolent and moral, no matter what their religious beliefs (2008: 13). 
 
For instance, in a study of New Age students, a group of people who are typically identified to be 
more individualistic than non-New Age followers, Franz Hollinger (2004) shows that New Agers 
have higher levels of political activism, involvement in political party activities, and charitable 
donations when compared with non-New Agers (also see Dillon and Wink 2007; Heelas and 
Woodhead 2005; Stanczak 2006).  
 I do not deny the points made by proponents of this last position. Indeed, those who do 
not attend religious services regularly can and do contribute in positive ways to society. 
Zuckerman‘s (2008) findings in Scandinavia are a stark reminder of societal health in the absence 
of religious belief and practice. However, I think it is hard to deny the mounting evidence for the 
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societal benefits that come with regular church attendance, especially when measured by 
charitable giving and volunteerism. I agree with researchers like Bowen (2004) and Putnam 
(2000) who maintain that religion is an important variable for civic engagement. By saying this, I 
am not suggesting that if individual secularization continues that Canada is heading for a state of 
moral deprivation or that Canadians will become apathetic to others‘ needs, as we are a world 
leader in volunteerism (Curtis, Grabb, and Baer 1992; Curtis, Baer, and Grabb 2001), despite our 
relatively low levels of religiosity.
4
 Still, if my prognosis of the future of religion in Canada is 
correct, then we may also witness declining levels of civic engagement. In no way am I saying 
that religion is necessary for social and civic engagement, but based on the evidence at hand, it 
helps.      
Implications for Churches 
I am sympathetic to religious groups and their plight. In what follows, I offer six practical 
suggestions for religious leaders, on how they can use the information presented in this 
dissertation. I realize that I have a difficult task to offer reasons for optimism because my main 
conclusion is that there is very little that churches can do to draw in affiliates who are not 
currently involved regularly; demand-side explanations are more appropriate for understanding 
religious behaviour, in my estimation. Still, interpersonal and intra-organizational tension is a 
significant area where religious groups do have control, and I direct my comments in this section 
to this topic, drawing in large part on Kinnaman and Lyons‘ (2007) work. I do not deny the 
challenging road ahead for religious organizations, particularly in Roman Catholic and mainline 
Protestant contexts. I do not think there is a universal or quick-fix solution, as remedies must be 
contextualized and interpreted relative to the local congregational settings across the country. 
                                                 
4 Volunteerism in Canada can, in part, be attributed to an underlying humanitarian concern among Canadians for 
those in need. 
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Yet, if there is a chance for religious organizations to survive and thrive, I think the following 
suggestions give churches the best chance. 
Recently I was asked by some national denominational church leaders in Canada what the 
greatest challenge is for churches in Canada today. I responded by saying that it is the lack of 
demand for the things that religious groups offer. Many Canadians, like Emerson Cairns, are 
content with their fragmented consumption of religion. As Bibby rightly suggested in 1987 
(p.134-135), it is difficult to convince a person to eat five meals a day when they are content with 
three. As I think the evidence in this dissertation suggests, there are many more powerful factors 
outside of the control of religious groups that explain why marginal affiliates are not more 
involved and why they are not likely to become more involved in the future. Therefore, the first 
thing that I would say to religious groups is that it is not necessarily your fault that more people 
are not involved in your congregation; do not beat yourselves up for faulty supply, when really 
demand is the critical problem.  
These things said, I do not dismiss the fact that religious groups need to offer a great 
religious product. I agree with Bibby (2004) that lively music, relevant preaching, strategic 
program offerings, and a spirit of excellence need to pervade religious groups if they are to have 
much hope in Canada. Research by Miller (1997) documents the effectiveness of such initiatives, 
especially in evangelical Protestant settings. However, I am equally quick to say that, for the 
most part, offering religion that is ―done well‖ enables religious groups to keep their own, and 
possibly attract the occasional outsider; it is not likely to many marginal affiliates into active 
affiliates. 
The second noticeable challenge that religious groups face is the negative public 
perception of Christians held by many Canadians. The public is justifiably suspicious of 
Christians, given the past and present sexual and financial scandals, the reactionary influence of 
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the Christian Right in the United States (that some fear characterizes evangelicals in Canada), and 
the general belief, often based on personal experience, that Christians are judgmental and 
hypocritical (recall the findings in chapters two, four, and six). Whether or not Christians and 
individual congregations reflect these qualities (and some do) is irrelevant, so long as the general 
public believes these things to be true. The challenge for religious groups is to change people‘s 
perceptions as well the reality. To their credit, some individuals and their congregations are doing 
everything they can to distance themselves from the negative perceptions about the church (e.g., 
speaking out against religious groups that make a concerted effort to condemn homosexuals, 
challenging groups that limit women‘s involvement in church leadership, or chastising 
televangelists who deceive people in order to make a great profit). I highlight the following 
actively involved Roman Catholic female that I interviewed to illustrate my point: 
The other thing is they‘re really, really strong anti-abortionists . . . but you know why? 
Because it‘s a sin . . . as opposed to, ‗There‘s a woman in trouble. The only reason she‘s 
thinking of abortion is because her life is so miserable or she‘s worried about things that, 
maybe, with some help, she could get past.‘ So . . . I‘m anti-abortion, too, but the thing is 
to first look at the mother. Why is she thinking that, and what can you do to support her. 
So, really, what I always hear from their perspective is, ‗It‘s a sin to kill the unborn child‘ 
. . . that‘s true. But can you please look at the one who‘s doing the killing first? Like, 
that‟s the person they need to help. I get to say that because . . . and I don‘t . . . I don‘t 
know those people‘s lives. I don‘t know if they‘re doing it. I mean it‘s the Catholic 
Church type people. I don‘t know what they‘re doing, but I . . . believe you cannot make a 
statement about anything unless you have acted on it. So I had . . . when I had free space 
at my house, which I did, called Birth Right, and said, ‗I have a room. Do you have a 
mom, or anybody who needs a place to stay?‘ So, encouraging someone who . . . now the 
Birth Right people are . . . like, counselling women out of abortions, but they need to 
support them in some other way. So I thought, ‗Okay, I can do that.‘ So they did all the 
counselling, and I got this girl to stay with me. So I did it . . . I don‘t believe you can go 
along, just feeling and spouting all these things unless you are prepared and have taken 
action.  
 
I would suggest that more responses like this are necessary for changing people‘s perceptions of 
Christianity, but the negative social perception is so deep that they have much work to do. The 
 232 
question becomes, what can religious groups do to change the social perception towards 
Christians?    
One of the criticisms levelled at church members is that they are too inward-looking and 
that they condemn and ostracize outsiders, criticisms supported by several of the marginal 
affiliate quotations in this dissertation. The third statement that I would make to religious leaders 
then, is to look outward in your ministry and to make this a central focus of your church identity. 
Dave Gibbons, in his book The Monkey and the Fish (2009), builds on sociologists‘ work on 
―third culture.‖ This is the culture of an individual who is conversant in two different ways of life 
and understands how to bridge the gap between those worlds, forming a third hybrid culture in 
the process. The challenge for religious groups is to become conversant in their own religious 
culture and the larger Canadian culture, and then develop a bridge between the two. How can 
religious groups direct ministry efforts to outsiders? Perhaps it is by offering each month free oil 
changes to single mothers. Maybe there are practical ways of helping immigrants adjust to life in 
Canada. Maybe religious groups can offer activities for kids and families in the neighbourhoods, 
particularly to help with ―latchkey‖ children who spend hours each day on their own, while both 
of their parents work. Perhaps religious groups can shovel snow and do yard work for seniors. 
Possible ideas are limitless, but if religious groups want to change the negative social perceptions 
of them, there is no denying that they need to invest more of their time engaging outsiders. Their 
assistance to those outside their congregation needs to be real, personal, and repeated, to have any 
significant impact on people‘s lives. Again, Bibby is correct to stress that attention to the supply 
of religion is important to keep insiders around. A group cannot effectively minister to outsiders 
if it does not properly care for insiders. Yet, it appears that churches too often neglect outsiders, 
which poses a problem for religious groups that wish to thrive in the twenty-first century and 
beyond.       
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A related point that Kinnaman and Lyons (2007) make is that Christians are criticized for 
only befriending non-believers with the hope of converting them. If Christians realize that others 
are not interested in being converted, they tend to abandon them in hopes of finding other ―fresh 
blood.‖ When focusing ministry efforts on outsiders, religious groups must pay careful attention 
to loving people without strings attached, for if they do not, they risk providing further (and 
justified) ammunition for those who are critical of Christians. 
A fourth comment to religious groups concerns the centrality of relationships and social 
ties. The fact that breakdowns in interpersonal relationships contributed to many marginal 
affiliates leaving behind involvement in their church suggests that religious groups need to do a 
better job in how they relate to people. This applies to religious leaders and lay people alike. 
Religious leaders need to be conscious of how they interact with lay members, being 
approachable on issues that matter to congregants and mindful of the ways they deal with conflict 
in their church. The way that people approach issues can be as important as the content of the 
conflict itself. Religious leaders also need to try to instil a culture of healthy and caring 
interactions between and among leaders and members. I am sure that many religious leaders 
already seek to pass on these values, but individuals in the congregation still offend others and 
are poor representatives of the Christian message. Religious groups cannot be held responsible 
for such individuals. Yet as we know, it only takes one bad experience with one individual to 
color a person‘s perception of all churches or religious organizations. Therefore, religious leaders 
and lay people must be extra careful to treat people well in all circumstances and to encourage 
those they influence to do the same.  
In addition to interpersonal relationships with insiders, religious groups should encourage 
members to build relationships with outsiders. We know from Stark and Bainbridge‘s (1985) 
work, for example, that religious converts typically arise from social networks that people have 
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with current members of a religious group. Not only could relationships with outsiders help some 
groups possibly grow through converts, as evangelical Protestants and sectarian groups are better 
known for, but individuals will have the opportunity to change others‘ perceptions of 
Christianity, one person at a time. As individuals model love, compassion, grace, and mercy, 
others‘ negative perceptions of Christians as exclusive, judgmental, or hypocritical may gradually 
give way to new perceptions. Walking alongside others, in their high and low moments, 
demonstrates a commitment to long-term relationships, which we know many Canadians desire 
(see Bibby 2002, 2006, 2009). 
Fifth, Gibbons (2009) indicates that a focus on social justice is a logical way to engage 
outsiders, particularly young people who are interested in grassroots movements for social 
change. It is hard to argue against the good things that religious groups can and do for society, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter. The trouble is, religious groups are more often known for the 
bad things they do, making the task of emphasizing social justice initiatives that much more 
important. What are religious groups doing to make a difference in the world and how are these 
things central to their identity and message to the outside world? In my sample, active affiliates 
in the United Church of Canada who had no religious upbringing were drawn to the United 
Church‘s social justice initiatives for the marginalized in society. This fact is a testament to what 
I am getting at. Religious groups, if they want to keep and attract people, need to downplay their 
hostile approach to society, and emphasize the bridges that can be built with other Canadians.5 
                                                 
5 I realize the complexity of this statement, for religious leaders. By its very nature, religion is based on distinctive 
beliefs and practices, believed by many to come from an unchangeable god. I am not suggesting that religious groups 
should change their beliefs per se, since boundaries are essential for group identity and commitment, but maybe 
some distinctive beliefs do not need to be the focal point of the group‘s message. The religious group should ask: 
what is core to our message? Are anti-homosexual beliefs a fundamental belief to the group? What about opposition 
to women in leadership? Must groups build a platform based on distinctions between ―us‖ and ―them‖? True, all 
social groups have boundaries and rules for who belongs and who does not. Yet, I think the evidence is clear that 
emphasizing an exclusive approach is not working well for religious groups in Canada, and thus I think groups need 
to reevaluate what their core message is and how they will communicate that message to Canadians.  
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This can be achieved through religious organizations that, as a group, seek to make a positive 
impact in the world, as well as through individuals in their relationships with outsiders. How are 
religious groups helping the less fortunate in society? What are religious groups doing for the 
oppressed? Are religious groups taking action on the environment? Would people in 
neighbouring communities notice if churches left their vicinity? These are the questions that 
religious groups should ask if they want to be attentive to the social needs of those around, and 
wish to change social perceptions and lessen the gap between ―insiders‖ and ―outsiders.‖ 
Finally, ongoing attention needs to be given to religious socialization. We know that what 
children learn in the home plays a significant role in whether or not the child will adhere to those 
beliefs and practices later in life. Although churches cannot control how or if parents reinforce 
religious teachings in the home or even if parents bring their children to church, groups can and 
should equip parents with the tools to do so. Leaders may wish to remind parents of the religious 
―master status‖ framework, which does not mean pawning their children off to the church to 
socialize their children, but to seek an integrated approach between the church‘s efforts and their 
own initiatives in the home. Perhaps this reinforcement comes through sermons, maybe it is in 
specific courses designed to equip parents to effectively raise their children with religious values 
in contemporary culture, or maybe it is through family events that bring parents and children 
together for fun or specific religious purposes. Regardless, a concerted effort between parents and 
churches is required, particularly since fewer Canadian teens claim to identify with a religion.   
Religious groups should also give ongoing attention to children and teens. One of the 
reasons that evangelical Protestants are more successful in retaining their own is because they 
offer children and youth programs that are relevant, experiential, and meaningful. Providing 
space for children and teens to explore their faith, to ask questions, or to challenge religious 
beliefs in a safe, non-judgmental atmosphere is paramount, otherwise teens will leave and explore 
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their questions in non-religious settings, as an Anglican gentlemen who was quoted in chapter six 
did:  
I think that at that age, when you‘re young like that in the world, you tend to rebel a bit 
against it . . . And you question religious doctrine. You question why this is like that . . . 
and I probably went through a lot of questioning . . . just like normal kids do when they‘re 
that age . . . you scratch your head. If you think a little bit, you think, this doesn't seem 
right . . . this is stupid. And all in the name of bloody religion. You know? So I went 
through a lot of that. Yes, yes. Yeah, there was a lot of questioning . . . I didn‘t find 
myself going to church on a regular habit.  
 
The centrality of relationships to teens‘ lives should also intersect well with church objectives. 
Church leaders should be encouraged to foster a space for teens to establish meaningful 
relationships, with leaders as mentors as well as friends and peers, or to bring friends into 
religious fellowship. Such relationships were essential for Becky Eagleton and Cam Bender, 
allowing them to pursue greater involvement in their congregations. Understandably, religious 
supply is critical when it comes to teens. Lively music, relevant teaching and mentoring, and 
honest and personable exchanges will go a long way to keep or attract teenagers. 
In total, I cannot argue with Bibby and others who suggest that religion needs to be 
supplied well. Beyond the natural and logical suggestions relative to music, preaching, or 
programming however, the above suggestions tap into other elements of religious supply that 
may influence how people perceive the Christian community, in turn impacting their potential 
level of involvement in a church. For the time being, I remain sceptical that mass changes to 
religious supply will yield a religious renaissance in the way that Bibby forecasted, but 
intentional efforts in the areas noted here may contribute to religious groups‘ stability and 









In this project I investigated questions that sorely needed to be asked, especially relative 
to marginal affiliates, that survey data to date have not adequately addressed. Still, as beneficial 
as the findings in this study may be for our sociological understanding of religion (in Canada), 
one of the drawbacks of a study like this is that it is restricted by the limitations of those theories 
and studies that it seeks to test. One of those limitations concerns the ways in which we define 
and measure religion. As Greil and Bromley (2003) note, religion is not universally understood to 
mean the same thing, nor can it necessarily be studied objectively and neutrally from the 
―outside.‖ Instead, ―religion‖ is a socially constructed term that is historically situated and 
defined, often based on the interests of those in power (e.g., law makers). They state that 
―religion is a term that social actors have used in certain societies and at certain times to 
understand and describe an important aspect of their experience‖ (Greil and Bromley 2003: 5). 
Talal Asad, an anthropologist, similarly argues that ―there cannot be a universal definition of 
religion, not only because its constituent elements and relationships are historically specific, but 
because that definition is itself the historical product of discursive processes‖ (1993: 29). 
When dealing with Rational Choice Theory, secularization theory, or Bibby‘s assessment 
of religion in Canada, we cannot forget that ideas of individual actors choosing to be religious or 
measuring religiosity based on church attendance or belief in God are social constructions that 
reflect specific historical realities. In truth, these notions of religion and religiosity are heavily 
influenced by Protestant and European ideas about religion (Asad 1993). For example, the 
Enlightenment pursuit of a less religious society contributed to our modern day distinction 
between religion and society (and politics and education, for example) where individuals 
voluntarily choose to be religious (an idea reinforced with the Protestant Reformation). European 
colonization also influenced more sophisticated conceptualizations of religion as different beliefs 
 238 
were discovered beyond European soil, yielding definitions of religion among academics in 
particular that are grounded in belief, belonging, and practice. The point of this discussion is to 
caution us against taking a narrow and ethnocentric view of religion, both in how we define and 
measure it. Some of the limitations in this regard have been highlighted in the dissertation (e.g., 
are people actually as free to choose their religion as rational choice theorists assume or is church 
attendance in and of itself a good measure of religiosity?), and future research that intersects with 
Rational Choice Theory or secularization theory should pursue these matters further. 
Despite these definitional and measurement shortcomings, there are several areas of 
research that could and should be pursued in light of the findings in this dissertation. A logical 
next step would be to conduct interviews with active and marginal affiliates across Canada, 
asking similar questions to the ones posed in this study. A national initiative would help to 
generate a larger sample size, one that would permit for regional, age, and denominational 
comparisons. This type of study would also test the reliability and validity of the findings 
discovered in this project. Do the conclusions and hypotheses advanced here, based on forty-two 
interviews, hold in a larger sample across Canada? 
In this dissertation I tested several taken for granted propositions of Rational Choice 
Theory, but much more needs to be done. Additional research is needed into how people compare 
religious rewards and costs, whether people believe in life after death (and if they do, the extent 
of their desire for the afterlife and what they think is required to obtain life after death), and the 
relationship between one‘s confidence in religious explanations and the degree to which their 
religious beliefs and practices are informed by their association with others in their religious 
group. Further inquiry with a larger sample size would test the hypotheses that emerged from this 
dissertation, that people do not necessarily make religious decisions based on a comparison of 
rewards and costs (especially costs), that life after death is not the most desirable reward that 
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people seek (and that religious organizations have little control over one‘s pursuit of the afterlife), 
and that one‘s confidence in religious explanations is not necessarily connected to the social ties 
and influences from their religious group. 
Further examination of the role of tradition, family pressure, and sacred space for 
marginal affiliates would also be worthwhile. Theoretical explanations for why these things are 
important for marginal affiliates started this conversation, but now people need to be asked 
directly about these features of their religious life. What are people afraid of if they stop attending 
church for religious holidays and rites of passage? How and why are tradition, family, and sacred 
space so important to them, and what does this tell us about self-identity and self-concept in 
contemporary society? Focused efforts in these directions would, perhaps, provide the most 
illuminating empirical data.  
With the dramatic rise in those who claim to have ―no religion‖ in Canada, an 
investigation into how and why people choose this categorization would be valuable. An obvious 
area of research would look at religious transmission between generations, tracking families over 
a longitudinal period. Are there certain stages of life or other factors that contribute to people‘s 
religious and spiritual development, particularly among those who choose to decrease their level 
of belief in God or level of participation in a religious organization? It is difficult to know for 
sure, but perhaps the marginal affiliate category, of people with a foot in both the religious and 
secular door, will become a thing of the past as people are either ―in‖ or ―out.‖6 The trouble is 
that we know very little about the subject. 
Future research could also look into those who turn their back on religious organizations 
but who claim that their faith has a ―master status‖ in their life. Books such as A Churchless 
                                                 
6 A decrease in the number of marginal affiliates could also take place as more Canadians choose to remain single or 
cohabitate, instead of getting married (implying that fewer will turn to the church for weddings because fewer are 
getting married) (McDaniel and Tepperman 2007).  
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Faith (Jamieson 2002) or Revolution (Barna 2005) highlight those who were once heavily 
involved in church organizations, often in leadership positions, who have left the church, but not 
their faith. They are different from the marginal affiliates in this study because religion remains 
highly important to them, but they are similar to marginal affiliates in their level of church 
involvement.
7
 Some may turn to alternative forms of religious life, such as house churches,
8
 
while others may rely on Christian friends to journey through life with, but without any formal 
commitment to gather on a regular basis. Whether or not these individuals currently claim to 
have, or will claim to have ―no religion‖ is difficult to tell, but it is a growing group that could 
yield valuable information about contemporary religious life. 
In total, pursuing research in any or all of these areas will extend our knowledge of the 
similarities and differences between active and marginal affiliates and our ability to further 
evaluate the renaissance of religion and secularization theses. Combined, such initiatives will 
advance the strong social scientific legacy that Bibby has established in the sociology of religion 
in Canada. Hopefully this dissertation has contributed, in a small way, to that larger conversation 
about religion in Canada.  
  
                                                 
7 George Barna (2005: 13) estimates that there are over 20 million Americans who fit this description. 
8 House churches are another area of inquiry where very little, if any, empirical data is known (see e.g., Zdero 2007). 
Empirical research on church plants is also lacking. Both of these areas are probably understudied because of their 
size and loose affiliation with more formal religious organizations (e.g., denominations), thus they are difficult to 
locate in order to study. Research into these areas, however, might shed light on another pocket of religiosity in 
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Active and Marginal Affiliate Demographics 
 
 Actives Marginals Total 
    
Gender    
Male 10 13 23 
Female 11 8 19 
    
Age    
     18-34 9 5 14 
     35-54 6 9 15 
     55+ 6 7 13 
    
Marital Status    
     Single 5 5 10 
     Engaged 0 1 1 
     1
st
 Marriage 11 8 19 
     2
nd
 Marriage 2 2 4 
     Divorced 2 2 4 
     Widowed 1 3 4 
    
Completed Education
1
    
     Less than high school 1 3 4 
     High School 2 2 4 
     Diploma or Certificate 2 3 5 
     Some college or university 2 6 8 
     BA or B.Ed. 11 7 18 
     MA 2 2 4 
     Ph.D. 2 0 2 
    
Religious Identification    
     Roman Catholic 7 6 13 
     Mainline Protestant 6 5 11 
Evangelical Protestant 6 4 10 
     No Denominational Allegiance 2 6 8 
 
                                                 
1 The total number for completed education is higher than the total sample size of 42 because three individuals took 
some college or university courses despite not graduating from high school.  
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Appendix B 
Rewards and Costs for Active and Marginal Affiliates 
 




Like-minded community and accountability 14 
Meaning, purpose, direction, and morals 13 
Learn from a trained specialist 10 
Rest from the rapid pace and ―noise‖ of life 8 
Honour and worship God with music 7 
Tradition 5 
Obedience to commandment to attend church 2 
Beneficial for children 2 
Restless for God 2 
To know that they are loved by God 2 
Emphasis on social justice 1 
Substitute for daily religious practices 1 
Youth program 1 
Feels like ―home‖ – it is safe 1 
Feel good about one‘s self 1 
To become a better person 1 
Commitment to other church members 1 
To connect with self 1 
 
 




Social isolation from friends and society 8 
Give up control of one‘s life unto God 7 
No time for secular activities 5 
No perceived costs 5 
Tithing – but do not interpret this as a cost 4 
Time – but do not interpret this as a cost 3 
Tithing 2 










Sacred space (quality of experience is greater) 18 
Family pressure or time to spend with family 11 
Tradition 9 
Reinforces religious beliefs 8 
Commanded to attend and observe rituals 8 
Enjoy the rituals (like any social event)  7 
Crutch in a time of need 5 
Community around a common set of beliefs 5 
Fear of going to hell (Pascal‘s Wager) 3 
To avoid the commercialism at Christmas 3 
To feel good about one‘s self 3 
Could be doing worse things 2 
To learn from a trained specialist 2 
To connect with other people 2 
Funeral is a testament to others of a ―good‖ life 1 
To earn a favour from God 1 
To return to childhood innocence 1 
To learn more about the person who died 1 
Reduced funeral or burial costs 1 
Intellectual stimulation 1 
 




No perceived costs 16 
Give up control of one‘s life unto God
1
 3 
Something is missing in life if not involved 1 
Time 1 
Cannot treat people poorly or behave poorly 1 
                                                 
1 Marginal affiliates believe this would be a cost if they took their faith more seriously, but that this is not actually a 
cost for them because they do not take their faith that seriously.  
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Appendix C 
Reginald Bibby‘s Recruitment Letter 
 
April 30, 2008 
 
John Doe 
12345 Calgary Drive SW 
Calgary, AB   C1C 1C1 
 
Dear Mr. Doe: 
 
Hello once again!   
 
I wish to again thank you for your willingness to participate in the Project Canada Research Program by 
participating in one or more of our national surveys that have been carried out every five years from 1975 
through 2005. 
 
I want to assure you once again that your name is known only to me and complete confidentiality is being 
honoured in any reporting of survey results. Complete information on those results can be found by going 
to the website "reginaldbibby.com". 
 
Recently, a University of Waterloo graduate student and friend, Joel Thiessen, who is from Alberta and is 
writing his doctoral dissertation while a member of the faculty at Ambrose University College in Calgary, 
has made contact concerning his doctoral research. He would value being able to speak with any Calgary-
area people who have participated in the Project Canada surveys; I am taking the liberty of attaching an 
information sheet from Joel explaining what he has in mind.  
 
Know that he does not know who you are, nor does he have any information whatsoever about you; as I 
keep emphasizing, I am the only person on the planet who knows that you participated in a previous 
Project Canada survey! But, if you are interested, please respond directly to him by e-mail, phone, or mail 
(he has provided the contact information). If you are not interested, there is nothing that you need to do. I 
myself will not know who participated in his study and who did not. 
 
His research topic is important, and I hope that many of you will consider participating. 
 
Thank you for giving his request some thought. If you have any questions or concerns, don't hesitate to 






Reginald W. Bibby, O.C., Ph.D. 
Board of Governors Research Chair 
Department of Sociology 
University of Lethbridge 
Lethbridge, AB  T1K 3M4 
Ph 403-381-0151  Fx 403-381-0231 




Joel Thiessen‘s Recruitment Letter 
 
May 7, 2008 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I am a doctoral student at the University of Waterloo in the Department of Sociology, from Calgary, and an 
Assistant Professor of Sociology at Ambrose University College here in Calgary. 
I would like to invite you to participate in my research on active and marginal religious affiliates in religious 
organizations in Canada. By ―active religious affiliates‖ I am referring to those who identify with a religious 
group and attend religious services nearly every week; ―marginal religious affiliates‖ are those who identify 
with a religious group and attend religious services primarily at Christmas or Easter, or for events such as 
weddings and funerals. The research is designed to gain a better understanding of the reasons for people‘s 
different levels of involvement.    
If you agree to volunteer, your participation would entail a 1-2 hour interview, and would be conducted at a 
time and location of your convenience, either in person or by telephone. Questions will include: Would you say 
that religion is primarily an individual journey, or one that ought to be shared with others? How is this belief 
reflected in your religious journey? What, if any, beliefs and practices shape your religious life? Are there 
certain beliefs and practices that are more important to you than others? You can decline to answer any of the 
interview questions if you so wish and, for that matter, terminate the interview at any time. Any information 
you provide would be kept completely confidential. In addition, your name would not appear in any written 
report resulting from this study.  
If, after receiving this letter, you have any questions about this study or would like additional information to 
assist you in reaching a decision about participation, please feel free to contact me at 403-295-8384 or by email 
at j2thiess@artsmail.uwaterloo.ca. You can also contact my supervisor, Professor Lorne Dawson at 519-888-
4567 ext. 35340 or email ldawson@uwaterloo.ca. If you are interested, it would be helpful to hear from you by 
May 31 or shortly thereafter by contacting me either by email or telephone; I hope to complete the data 
collection by August 31. Please note that Dr. Bibby will not know who has volunteered and who has not, and 
that your decision to participate or not will not affect your ongoing relationship with Dr. Bibby.   
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office of Research Ethics at the 
University of Waterloo. Any comments or concerns can be directed to Dr. Susan Sykes at 519-888-4567, ext. 
36005 or email ssykes@uwaterloo.ca. 
 
I thank you in advance for considering participating in the project. 
Yours sincerely, 
  





PART 1 – BACKGROUND  
 
(1) Description of Project & Demographic Information 
 
a. How old are you? 
b. What is your highest level of completed education? 
c. What type of occupation are you currently involved in? 
d. Are you married? If so, how long have you been married? 
e. Do you have any children? If so, how many, and how old are they? 
 
(2) Tell me a bit about your upbringing: 
 
a. Where did you grow up? Did you have any siblings? What was your parents‘ 
occupation while you were growing up? 
b. Growing up, was your family affiliated with any religious group? If so, which 
group? If not, skip to question (f)? 
c. How often did your family attend religious services? 
d. Would you describe your family as religious? Explain.  
e. Growing up, would you say that religion was important to your family and was it 
important to you personally? 
f. Thinking back to when you moved out of your family‘s place, what effect, if any, 
did that have on your religious journey? Did your interest in religion increase, 
decrease, or stay the same? Did your level of involvement in religious 
organizations increase, decrease, or remain the same?   
 
PART 2 – CURRENT RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOURS  
 
(2) Current religious affiliation, beliefs, practices, and level of importance attributed to each: 
 
a. At present, are you affiliated with any religious group? 
b. How often do you attend religious services? 
c. Do you participate in any other activities associated with your religious group? If 
so, which activities, and how often are you involved? 
d. How did you decide to affiliate with this group? (If they are having trouble 
thinking of reasons—were there certain beliefs or practices that were appealing? 
Did you know others already involved with this group? Preacher? Music? 
Programs?)  
e. Could you indicate for me how important your religious affiliation is relative to 
other aspects of your life (e.g., family, job, or social activities)? Explain. 
f. Have you ever seriously considered affiliating or getting involved with any other 
congregation, denomination, or religious group? Why or why not?  
g. Overall, what, if any, beliefs and practices shape your religious life? Are there 
certain beliefs and practices that are more important to you than others? 
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h. In general, would you say that religion is important to you? If so, what does this 
statement mean for you and in what ways is religion important for you? If not, 
why not? Explain. 
 
PART 3 – RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY  
 
(4) Religious Costs and Rewards:  
 
a. People attend religious services for different reasons. Why do you think that 
people in general attend religious services?  
b. Why do you attend religious services? 
c. Do you think you gain something specific from attending religious services? 
d. Do you think you gain anything in particular from your religious beliefs and 
practices outside of attendance at religious services? (If nothing, skip to section 4). 
e. Keeping in mind some of these benefits, what are some of the sacrifices that you 
have made along the way? In other words, what are the ―costs‖ associated with 
obtaining these benefits? 
f. Do you believe in the afterlife? If so, do you desire life after death? What do you 
think is required to obtain life after death? 
g. How confident are you in the religious beliefs and practices that you adopt? 
 
(5) Dependable and Responsive 
 
a. Do you have a sense that you can depend on God and/or another spiritual entity? 
If so, how? Can you provide an example? If not, why?  
b. Do you believe that God and/or another spiritual entity is concerned about, and 
acts on behalf of humans? Explain. 
c. To what extent do you feel that you belong to or identify with a particular 
congregation? If they do not feel connected to a congregation, ask: do you 
remember a time when you did feel like you belonged to or identified with a 
particular congregation? If the answer is still ‗no,‘ skip to section 6. 
d. With this congregation in mind, do you have a sense that you can depend on 
others in the group (either among leadership or lay people), that others in the 
group could be relied upon in times of need? If so, how? Can you provide an 
example? If not, why? 
e. Do you believe that your congregation is concerned about, and acts in the interests 
of its members? Explain.  
f. How confident are you in the religious beliefs and practices that you adopt? 
   
(6) Role of others in shaping one‘s religious life: 
 
a. Would you say that religion is primarily an individual journey, or one that ought 
to be shared with others? If shared with others, what sort of activities do you have 
in mind? How are these beliefs reflected in your religious journey?  
b. Of your closest friends, how many of them are from your local congregation? 
How many of them share the same religion as you?  
 266 
c. How influential do you think religious groups should be in shaping people‘s 
religious beliefs and practices? How influential is your religious group in shaping 
your religious beliefs and practices?  
 
PART 4 – SECULARIZATION AND GREATER INVOLVEMENT 
 
(7) Secularization and Greater Involvement: 
 
a. There is some research that suggests that attendance at religious services is on the 
decline. Presuming for a moment that this is true, what do you think explains this?  
 
Marginal Affiliates:  How would you explain your own level of participation? 
   
b. Some Canadians have suggested that they draw selective beliefs and practices 
from their religious tradition, even if they do not attend frequently. They indicate 
that they do not plan on changing religious traditions, but they will turn to 
religious groups for important religious holidays and rites of passages. Why do 
you think that this is the case? How well does this describe yourself or others 
close to you? 
c. It is well known that attendance at religious services is higher on religious 
holidays and for rites of passages. What do you think explains this? 
  
Marginal Affiliates: How well does this explain your attendance patterns? What 
draws you to religious services on such occasions? What meaning and 
significance do you find in these activities?  
 
d. In a related manner, some of those that we have just discussed indicate a desire for 
greater involvement in their religious group. Why do you think that this is the 
case? How, if at all, does this desire for greater involvement apply to you?  
e. If participants are interested in greater involvement, what factors do you think 
would make greater participation more worthwhile? If participants are not 
interested in greater involvement, why not (and then skip to question (g))? 
f. If religious groups received the responses that you have just provided and they 
adjusted their supply of religion to provide some of the things that you mention, 
how likely would you be to increase your level of participation?    
g. There are other theories that suggest that many religious groups already offer such 
things as good preaching, music, and programs, and have relaxed their doctrinal 
positions to accommodate to the wider culture, yet people are still not pursuing 
greater involvement in their religious group. Why do you think that this is the 
case? 
h. For yourself (if they desire greater involvement), are there any efforts that you 
have made to find a suitable congregation to participate in, one that meets some of 






PART 5 – SOCIAL AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT  
 
(8) Religious Involvement in the context of other Social Involvements: 
 
a. Overall, do you think that religion is a positive or a negative social force in 
society? Explain. 
b. Do you believe that people need religion in order to be moral or ethical beings? 
c. Are there other organizations, social activities, or volunteer initiatives that you 
dedicate your time to? If so, what does this commitment entail? If they have 
trouble thinking of any, suggest things like sports activities, book clubs, political 
activities, social protests or movements, and regular meetings with friends and 
family.   
d. How important are these involvements for you? Is there any correlation between 
these involvements and your religious involvements? Put another way, does your 
religious involvement influence the type or amount of time given to other 
activities, or would you be more involved in church activities if you were not 
































Dear (Participant‘s Name): 
This information consent letter, a copy of which has been given to you, outlines the details of this project 
and what your participation entails. This study is part of my doctoral dissertation in the Department of 
Sociology at the University of Waterloo, under the supervision of Professor Lorne Dawson.  
This research centers on active and marginal religious affiliates in religious organizations in Canada. By 
―active religious affiliates‖ I am referring to those who identify with a religious group and attend religious 
services nearly every week; ―marginal religious affiliates‖ are those who identify with a religious group and 
attend religious services primarily at Christmas or Easter, or for events such as weddings and funerals. The 
research is designed to gain a better understanding of the reasons for people‘s different levels of 
involvement.    
Participation in this study is completely voluntary and there are no known or anticipated risks to you as a 
participant in this study. The interview will be approximately 1-2 hours in length. You can decline to 
answer any of the interview questions if you so wish and, for that matter, terminate the interview at any 
time. With your permission, the interview will be audio-recorded to facilitate collection of information, and 
later transcribed for analysis. Any information you provide is kept completely confidential. Your name will 
not appear in any written report from this study and your information will be de-identified prior to storage, 
however, with your permission anonymous quotations may be used. With your permission also, data 
collected during this study will be retained indefinitely in a locked filing cabinet in my locked office in the 
Behavioral Science Department at Ambrose University College, with the possibility that it may be used in a 
future larger follow up study. Only my supervisor at the University of Waterloo and me will have access to 
the data.  
If you have any questions about this study, or would like to discuss the study before reaching a decision to 
participate, please feel free to contact me at 403-410-2000 ext. 2979 or by email at 
jathiessen@ambrose.edu. You can also contact my supervisor, Professor Lorne Dawson at 519-888-4567 
ext. 35340 or email ldawson@uwaterloo.ca.    
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office of Research Ethics at 
the University of Waterloo. Any comments or concerns about your participation in this study can be 
directed to Dr. Susan Sykes at 519-888-4567, ext. 36005 or email ssykes@uwaterloo.ca. 
Please indicate below your willingness to participate in this study. Thank you in advance for your co-
operation in this research. 
Yours sincerely, 
  
Joel Thiessen, Ph.D. (ABD) 
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CONSENT FORM 
I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being conducted by Joel 
Thiessen of the Department of Sociology at the University of Waterloo under the supervision of Dr. Lorne 
Dawson. I have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory 
answers to my questions, and any additional details I wanted. 
I am aware that I have the option of allowing my interview to be tape recorded to ensure an accurate 
recording of my responses.   
I am also aware that excerpts from the interview may be included in the dissertation and/or publications to 
come from this research, with the understanding that the quotations will be anonymous.  
I was informed that I may withdraw my consent at any time without penalty by advising the researcher.   
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office of Research Ethics at 
the University of Waterloo.  I was informed that if I have any comments or concerns resulting from my 
participation in this study, I may contact the Director, Office of Research Ethics at 519-888-4567 ext. 
36005.  
With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this study. 
YES     NO     
I agree to have my interview tape recorded. 
YES    NO     
I agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication that comes of this research. 
YES   NO 
 
Participant Name: ____________________________ (Please print)   
Participant Signature: ____________________________  
Witness Name: ________________________________ (Please print) 















Dear (Participant‘s Name): 
I would like to thank you for your participation in this study. As a reminder, this research centers on active and 
marginal religious affiliates in religious organizations in Canada. By ―active religious affiliates‖ I am referring to 
those who identify with a religious group and attend religious services nearly every week; ―marginal religious 
affiliates‖ are those who identify with a religious group and attend religious services primarily at Christmas or 
Easter, or for events such as weddings and funerals. The research is designed to gain a better understanding of the 
reasons for people‘s different levels of involvement.      
Please remember that any data pertaining to you as an individual participant will be kept confidential. Once all the 
data are collected and analyzed for this project, I plan on sharing this information with the academic and public 
community through seminars, conferences, presentations, and journal articles. If you are interested in receiving more 
information regarding the results of this study, or if you have any questions or concerns, please contact me either by 
telephone (403-410-2000 ext.2979) or email (jathiessen@ambrose.edu). You can also contact my supervisor, 
Professor Lorne Dawson at 519-888-4567 ext. 35340 or email ldawson@uwaterloo.ca. If you would like a summary 
of the results, please let me know whether you wish to receive a copy of the study findings by providing me with 
your email address. When the study is completed, I will send it to you.  
As with all University of Waterloo projects involving human participants, this project was reviewed by, and received 
ethics clearance through, the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo.  Should you have any 
comments or concerns resulting from your participation in this study, please contact Dr. Susan Sykes in the Office of 
Research Ethics at 519-888-4567, ext. 36005 or email ssykes@uwaterloo.ca. 
Yours sincerely, 
  






















Dear (Participant‘s Name): 
Enclosed is a copy of my dissertation ―Active and Marginal Religious Affiliates in Canada: Describing and 
Explaining the Gap.‖   
I hope you enjoy the dissertation, and in particular I hope you will find that I have been faithful to the 
information you gave me. If you feel that I have misrepresented you in any way, or if my presentation of 
events with which you were connected is not as you remember them, I invite you to send me your 
comments and I shall take them into consideration moving forward. And of course, you may, as always, 
contact Dr. Susan Sykes of our Office of Research Ethics, at 519-888-4567 ext. 36005, if my dissertation 
raises any concerns. This project was reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office of 
Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. Some sociological writing, as you know, is an interpretive 
act, but as professionals we endeavour to tie our interpretations rigorously to the factual record. 
I look forward to receiving any desired feedback within the next two weeks. If you do not have time to 
email them to me (jathiessen@ambrose.edu) feel free to give me a call at 403-410-2000 ext.2979. 
Yours sincerely, 
  
Joel Thiessen, Ph.D. (ABD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
